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Preface 
 
This thesis explores the theoretical traditions that have been proposed to give 
structure to and to critically reflect over product design practice. The field of design 
theory has provided a wealth of narratives on this practice, but as this thesis shows, the 
theory herein is eclectic, and the advices for practice are based on premises not always 
obvious. The thesis takes up the models, the common generalisations, and the positions 
that underlie these theories. In short, the thesis examines the many ways of framing 
design practice that can be found within this field. 
If designers are to develop their practices, it requires a conscious use of abstractions 
and theoretical frameworks for inquiring into this practice and to further the knowledge 
in the field. It necessitates questioning how one documents professional experiences, 
and how one questions and critically examines different professional practices. 
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1 - Narratives and knowledge in product design 
 
The investigation reported in this dissertation takes up narratives in design theory 
relevant to product design. Motivating this investigation was the observation that the 
literature in the design field comprises a variety of abstractions and models of design 
practice. Given that the literature holds a central role for inquiring into and reflecting 
over professional design work, the diversity indicated a general uncertainty towards the 
project of generating and documenting professional theories and knowledge for the 
product design profession; a methodical uncertainty which seemed to impact the 
capabilities of the profession itself.  
Following WWII, the development of professional knowledge in the form of 
theories, textbooks and exemplars of best practice, has been regarded as a scientific 
project. The widespread ideal of a research-based practice has among its characteristics 
that theories which documents practices and aid practitioners in their work should be the 
outcome of methodical research efforts carried out in a rigorous, purposive, and 
informed manner.  
For all its merits, this scientific image of professional knowledge often receives 
criticism as a limited perspective on the kind of knowledge practitioners draw from in 
their work. Issues that appear to be omitted are such as situatedness, the contingencies 
of practices, or the value of experience.  In the design domain particularly, the fact that 
designers’ professional jurisdiction spread widely, that the transfer of knowledge in the 
field rests with analogies between projects and products of different nature and 
contingencies, and that its canonical authors have drawn from a range of theoretical 
thinkers, renders the scientific accounts of professional knowledge here open to debate 
and contesting claims. 
Due to such inherent challenges, several narratives have emerged as theoretical 
frameworks for how design practice should be understood, and how theoretical 
development in this field should take place. These narratives abstract design in different 
manners and draw on different theoretical premises.   
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The situation may require some consideration. For purposes of documenting and 
furthering knowledge in the field, i.e. design research, these narratives hold a central, 
yet obscure, role. As these narratives underlie the understanding of practice and aligns it 
with different sets of concepts and worldviews, they lay important frames for the 
understanding of this practice and the development of knowledge in this field. However, 
there seems to be little awareness over how, and to what extent the diversity lays 
trajectories for the development in the field. Commonly, the theoretical framing of 
inquiries in the design field is relegated to off-hand assumptions, and the competing 
schools of thought often resort to polemical writing against antagonist perspectives 
rather than regarding the different narratives as a repertoire of approaches for gaining 
insight on the profession and the challenges of professional work. 
For the function of design research as a common field, the situation is problematic. 
It is obvious that the furthering of this profession’s capabilities in the form of sound 
theories and other items is a necessary project. But it is also a project which requires the 
ability to inform oneself of the field’s history, and to assess the situations, in a wide 
field, where different narratives have their valid and intended uses. The need for 
secondary and introductory literature to the field is therefore pressing; a way to 
understand the characteristics of different narratives, their limits and their potential.  
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1.1 Narratives in the product design literature 
In a practical field as product design, the literature that supports design work holds a 
central, yet usually tacit position. The literature documents and communicates the 
“common professional wisdom” in the field in the form of theories and textbooks that 
guide professional work and document principles for good practice. It thereby serves an 
instrumental role of guiding practical work and providing exemplars and metaphors for 
this practice.  
Throughout existing literature on design, one will find a great degree of diversity 
and eclecticism in the depictions and models of design practice (Buchanan 2004). 
Contributing to this state is both the fact that the product design profession, and design 
in general, reach quite widely in their claims for professional responsibility, subsuming 
a wide range of tasks related to making, and that design theory, due to historical 
reasons, has attracted the attention of scholars from a variety of academic backgrounds. 
The many narratives, as the traditional ways of depicting design practice are here 
termed, assert different generic qualities to the design field. There is for instance a large 
tradition that sees ‘design’ as primarily a cognitive domain and employs cognitive 
science to further our understanding of the field; there is a tradition that sees design as a 
professional practice, drawing from pragmatist thinkers; and a tradition that sees design 
in the vein of artful creativity, drawing on aesthetics and art theory. 
To exemplify this state of diversity, and the consequences for normative and 
practical guidance, one may consider the commonly used models of the design process; 
models that state how idea-generation takes place and develops into a fully fledged 
concept or product. Establishing a typical design process as a theoretical leitmotif has 
been a central issue in design theory. Since design is a varied practice, a common 
abstraction for how work typically is carried out is central for purposes such as 
organisation and general reflection. It requires, however, making a range of 
assumptions: identifying central elements and characteristics to the process, asserting 
how designers understand the problem, steps in the creative process, and typical 
challenges in this process.  
For one, Ulrich & Eppinger’s textbook Product Design and Development (2007), a 
state-of-the-art approach to product design and development, sees design as a 
managerial challenge, needing transparency and structure:  
• The product design process is understood as a generic decision process with 
distinct phases ranging from the planning of the product to detailed design and 
physical embodiment of the solution.  
• A design process is motivated by the perception of a market opportunity or need. 
From this onset, designers should establish target specifications for the product, 
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generate several product concepts in parallel, select concepts by formal ranking 
and scoring of the concepts and successively carry out the detailed design and 
embodiment.  
• Throughout this process, designers must take care to identify and include aspects 
pertaining to success criteria as early as possible in the process, since the cost of 
changes to the product will increase at later stages in the process. 
Together, Ulrich & Eppinger present a structured methodology for design. The 
rationale underlying this model is to make the decision process explicit, and to provide a 
methodology that may serve as a checklist in design processes (Ulrich and Eppinger 
2007, p. 7). This requires that one is structuring the design process according to its 
phases, and that one is fairly meticulous in carrying out these phases. 
 
Figure 1.1 - Ulrich and Eppinger’s generic design and development process. From Ulrich and 
Eppinger (1995) 
 
Contrasting Ulrich and Eppinger’s decision-process with Vincenti’s model of design 
processes (Vincenti 1990), a different set of heuristic principles emerges. Here, the 
design process is understood as primarily social. It is suggested that design processes 
seldom are carried out in the structured way of the decision-making model. Instead, the 
view is that when designers are faced with a design problem, they need to differentiate 
between the problems they know how to handle, and the unknown problems that require 
trial-and-error. For familiar problems, designers will have fundamental design concepts, 
knowledge, theoretical tools, and rules-of-thumbs that can be employed more or less 
automatically. Unfamiliar problems however, require trial-and-error, more demanding 
in terms of resources and time: 
• Vincenti holds that, in practice, design processes are organized based on the 
degree of unfamiliarity that the individual problems pose to the designer. Most 
problems will be trivial; the real challenge is to identify and solve the unknown 
ones.  
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• Decisions are not only rational judgements on how solutions fit with the 
specification. The knowledge that designers draw from is based in their practical 
experience and the professional community they belong to. The knowledge 
types range from rules-of-thumbs to scientific theories. The actual decision is 
therefore secondary to that of having an experienced professional and 
community involved in the design process. 
• Understanding and abstracting typical problems is a crucial factor in 
professional design work, therefore, the way the professional community as a 
field develops solution strategies (professional knowledge) is important. 
Vincenti proposes that professional communities come up with metaphorical 
models that have enough precision to aid judgement, yet are sufficiently open to 
include a wide range of problems.  
In general, the principled view of design processes in Vincenti’s account is that 
these always will be complex and difficult to structure. The focus of the theory is the 
challenge involved in developing precise understandings of the issues they tackle in a 
process and the role of the professional community in this respect. Belonging to a 
community which holds sound and operative theories for the design problems 
encountered is seen as a more central issue than the organisation of the process in 
decision-phases.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 - Vincenti regards design as a two-tier process; differentiating between routine 
professional problems and unknown problems. Interpreted from Vincenti (1990) 
 
Another alternative account is Schön’s theories on reflective practice (1995); a 
pragmatist model of design work focusing on how designers develop their 
understanding of the design problem in the course of work. The understanding is seen to 
develop through interaction with clients and materials such as sketches and models, 
emphasising the didactical elements in professional work, as well as the value of 
practical experience. 
• The design process is challenging first and foremost in that the designer has an 
initial and inadequate understanding of the design problems. The elaboration of 
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product concepts and solutions necessitate that the designer co-develop the 
problem-diagnosis and product solutions simultaneously.  
• Throughout this process, the elaboration requires the use of materials and tools 
which are the natural elements of design practice, and with which the designer is 
acquainted, e.g. sketches and models. The interaction with these provokes new 
insights on the design problems, but in a tacit and automatic way. 
• A design process takes place as a successive series of restructurings of the 
designer’s initial understandings. The design process requires the testing and 
elaboration of designers’ own preconceptions and lead to successively improved 
understandings and specifications of the product concept. 
Under this view, design practice is challenging to explain and assess, as it relies on 
tacit knowledge and experience. Learning design is “learning by doing”, and therefore a 
form of apprenticeship under the guidance of experienced professionals, where 
designers learn the common ways of understanding and thinking about professional 
problems. The model of design as reflective practice therefore emphasise reflection with 
the materials at hand in a process. It also argues that an openness towards different 
perspectives on the design problem, and a will, on the designer’s part, to question own 
preconceptions, are central elements in good design practice. 
 
 
Figure 1.3 - Schön’s didactic theories on professional practice were developed from protocol-
studies where designers discussed their work over physical materials as sketches and models. 
Example of architectural sketch from  Schön (1995) 
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More industrially focused, product design can also be regarded as essentially a 
collaborative process between different professional groups, such as with Integrated 
Product Development (Andreasen and Hein 1987). Here, designers are seen as holding a 
particular professional responsibility within an industrial organisation and a central 
managerial challenge is to facilitate the smooth collaboration with other departments 
within the organisation: 
• An implicit norm for design processes is to aim for the inclusion of 
competencies and perspectives as early as possible in the design project. Since 
any given designer will have only a limited understanding of the many aspects 
relevant to the product, it is therefore important to include the perspectives of 
other professional groups holding an interest in and responsibility for the 
product.  
• A central challenge with design processes is thus that different professionals 
have internalised different perspectives and preferences. The stakeholders in a 
design process will understand the product and its associated professional 
problems differently. Correspondingly, design processes are difficult in that they 
include problems of communication, in that the participants hold different object 
worlds (Bucciarelli 2003).  
 
According to this perspective, design processes should be organised to facilitate 
cooperation between groups of professionals. The process must attend to different 
interests and kinds of seeing professional problems in such a way that cooperative 
design is encouraged. 
 
Figure 1.4 - Integrated product development sees design as a collaborative process. From 
Andreasen & Hein (1987) 
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The examples illustrate the diversity existing in the literature for product design: 
Central concepts and models differ, the diagnoses that underlie these accounts are 
different, the advices and heuristics they give are different; ergo: they will produce 
different results. Ulrich & Eppinger argue for a structured process. Vincenti, however, 
suggests that the design process is messy, and should be organized on basis of the 
knowledge-gaps that designers identify early in the process. The pragmatic model of 
Schön accentuates an issue with designer’s use of models and materials, whereas the 
collaborative view sees design as a process of facilitation, taking place between many 
professional groups. 
The advices that these accounts give for any concrete design process are quite 
different. Following Ulrich and Eppinger, one would hold that the design process 
should be carried out by the development of concepts in parallel and the formal 
evaluation of concepts. If one were to follow Vincenti, however, this would be a too 
bureaucratic approach. One should instead opt to identify and categorize the challenges 
that are familiar from those that are unfamiliar.  The models of Schön, on the other 
hand, advocate experimentation and trial-and-error as the natural first step in any design 
process. And the collaborative models advocate an “open” approach to the design 
process, which seek to include other perspectives in an early stage of the process.  
The diversity of narratives in the design literature point to a potential problem: 
Apparently, for nearly every normative position on how to organise and carry out a 
design process, one may locate an opposite position, basing its claims in a different 
diagnosis of design practice, providing different guidance. The “meta-understanding” of 
the literature’s authors will shape the theories and models to such a degree that 
individual theories may appear contradictory on their advice and insight on design 
practice.  
This suggests a modicum of scepticism when engaging with design theory. If 
different agendas can be grounded with different narratives, then what are the 
consequences for how theory and knowledge in the field develops? To what extent can 
one trust and believe individual accounts if “the common professional wisdom” of the 
profession can be construed to support a large range of theoretical positions and 
practical heuristics?  
The question warrants a closer look at professional knowledge in design - i.e. how 
designers develop their ability for judgement and reflection for solving professional 
tasks, and the role of literature and research in this respect.   
 1 - Narratives and Knowledge 
 
9 
1.2 Design research and professional knowledge 
As stated earlier, the design literature holds a central place in the development of 
professional knowledge for the design profession; it is from here design practitioners 
draw the larger theoretical and intellectual “wisdom” of the field; common principles 
for work and organisation and exemplars of best practice.  
These concepts require some explication. Professional knowledge is here 
understood, quite simply, as the mental structures and entities that designers draw from 
when judging and reflecting in their work. The literature for design thus is seen as the 
systematic efforts at formalising and documenting good practices and principles to 
adhere to in practical design work.   
The conventions and accepted methods for these systematic efforts raise larger 
questions pertaining to philosophy and science. For the purposes here, suffice to say that 
these efforts are commonly regarded as a scientific project. For design however, the 
scientific schema has been argued to raise some problems. Conceptually, the “problem” 
is that knowledge for designers cannot be regarded as a theory-base, in the form that 
cumulative science aims for, but rather as an eclectic field of various local, and situated 
practices; a situation leading to the narrative diversity existing. 
In the following, it is argued that a central aspect of these narratives is that they 
comprise abstractions and models. This is significant because ‘design’ is a wide and 
eclectic field where abstractions can be expected to hold a particularly central role. 
Abstractions are central to make sense of this wide practice as they are pivotal elements 
in knowledge-transfer. This raises a question on the diversity of abstractions of design 
available in existing literature, and the possibility of assessing and successfully 
employing these abstractions to make sense of design practice.   
1.2.1 Professional knowledge 
Post 1950, the main strategy in the professions, has been to liken the theoretical 
domains of professions with the theoretical domains of science. A scientific ideal, 
where the development of professional knowledge has been likened to the development 
of scientific knowledge has been the dominant and influential schema for the 
documentation and formalisation of professional knowledge; effectively pursuing an 
ideal of research-based professionalism (Abbott 1988; MacDonald 1995). One of the 
effects of this ideal is that professional knowledge often is regarded as a form of applied 
science. By carrying out methodical research in an area of interest to the profession, the 
practical work can be carried out in a more certain and efficient manner. For instance, 
the profession of medicine has been regarded as the application of physiological 
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research. Engineering has been seen as an application of mathematics, and management 
has been seen as an application of social science.  
Motivating this association between professions and science is both that professions 
gain access to rigorous methods for the examination and development of their 
intellectual structure, but also that the profession’s intellectual content gains the 
authority and status associated with science, effectively defending the profession from 
interlopers (Abbott 1988). 
The research ideal contains an important template for the development of literature 
for professional practice. To avoid myth and furthering of ill-founded practices, 
theoretical accounts should be purposive, methodical, informed and peer-reviewed. The 
development and dissemination of professional knowledge should take the form of a 
common project, where methodical conventions are adhered to, and scrutiny of others is 
encouraged.   
However, the scientific image of professional knowledge has been generally 
criticised as alien to how professionals themselves understand their profession and its 
valuable knowledge. The scientific image risks missing out that professionals’ 
knowledge is both different - it isn’t necessarily explicit and expressible - and more 
flexible - in that it applies to a range of practical situations, with varying degrees of 
similarity between them.  
Schön, for instance, pointed out at that professional knowledge could arise from 
experience and practice, and not necessarily as the application of scientific and 
laboratory studies (Schön 1995). Polanyi’s theories on tacit knowledge express another 
concern; that humans in practical situations will know much more than they can state or 
verbalise (Polanyi 1964). The prime example is that riding a bike will entail more 
psychomotoric skill than one can possibly express. Similarly, accounts from the 
sociology of professions argue that while the intellectual structure, i.e. theories, models 
and metaphors, associated with professions often may appear scientific, they are 
socially contingent. They are based in a certain worldview and perspective, scientising, 
and objectifying the knowledge that is local to the communities of a profession. Their 
function, it is argued, is often to appear scientific (in the sense of objective and rigorous 
truths), whereas in reality, they promote a worldview inherent with a profession as a 
social group (Abbott 1988; MacDonald 1995). 
In the design field, the relation between the scientific ethos and the realities of a 
highly practical domain are mirrored and possibly accentuated. The project of 
establishing formal and valid theories on design, i.e. design theory, has taken place 
within the frames of academic research, and thereby ascribe to the common research 
conventions for academic research in the same way that other professions have 
formalised their professional knowledge. Exemplified by journals such as Design 
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Studies and Design Issues, the research community seeks to document insights on 
design, exemplify methods and render them amenable to critique and improvement. 
Typically, such research is expected to follow the conventions expressed by Cross, 
which holds that research in this domain should be (Cross 1998): 
• Purposive – based on the identification of an issue or problem worthy and 
capable of investigation 
• Inquisitive – seeking to acquire new knowledge 
• Informed – conducted from an awareness of previously related research 
• Methodical – planned and carried out in a disciplined manner 
• Communicable – generating and reporting results which are testable and 
accessible by others 
 
In other words, design research aims for a cumulative science, where theories and 
insights build upon previous theories and insights. Knowledge in the field grows 
through individual inquiries carried out by researchers, academics and practitioners on 
areas of practice that are thought to be of central importance, or represent a particularly 
pressing challenge. 
Central in this project is the necessary step of idealising and defining ‘design’ as a 
homogenous idealisation. Any scientific endeavour relies on a social agreement on how 
the subject issue is to be idealised and depicted; i.e. a principle of similarity across this 
field. This agreement identifies the characteristics that are general and provide 
coherency across individual instances in a field (Hendricks et al. 2000). 
But looking beneath such surface descriptors of ‘design’ one will see that there is 
eclecticism and variance that extend beyond the idealised depictions one find in theory. 
For one, the ‘design’ field is wide in that it covers many kinds of practices, implying 
that the potential topics that fall under its jurisdiction go beyond singular domains and 
the disciplinary boundaries of science. Secondly, the profession of product design is 
practical, and not theory-based; deducing professional knowledge from first premises or 
a common agreed definition of the profession is unlikely. And thirdly, the design 
literature draws from a variety of practical and academic cultures, rendering the 
theoretical project of developing professional knowledge a cross-disciplinary 
endeavour.  
Against this background, the emergence of theoretical diversity in the form of 
several narratives appears quite natural. The numerous accounts of design work have 
been put forth to answer the needs for knowledge and explanation, but they have been 
based in different historical perspectives and understandings of what design is and the 
ways in which it is challenging. The narratives suggest different conventions for the 
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common project of developing and furthering the professional knowledge in the design 
domain.  
But even though these narratives are natural, the diversity of them presents a 
practical problem. The narratives have a central role in the development of professional 
theories. But as they may be employed to support a variety of stances, the situation 
requires awareness over the premises with them, and the ways in which they impact 
results and advices. They raise the question of how theoretical development in the 
design field takes place. The methodical principles by which professional knowledge 
can be arrived at are important for the development of design theory. Principled 
perspectives of how professional knowledge comes about will differentiate valid claims 
from non-valid ones, and underlie the authority and credibility of design theories.  
The aspect of narratives in focus here is that they comprise abstractions - models and 
metaphors - which ground reflection on design practice. Both in practical situations, and 
in instances of more formal research, the abstractions within different narratives serve 
as ways of generalising and idealising design practice and thereby underlie how one 
understands and learns from concrete projects and instances of design work. In this way, 
the narratives in design theory lay trajectories for how one generally understands this 
profession as well as how design theory develops. 
To further this perspective, the following sections argue that important 
characteristics to the theoretical fields associated with product design are that the 
theoretical structure of the field is not based in a theoretical domain but holds what may 
be termed a project structure; the empirical and historical reference for practitioners are 
the projects that designers accomplish and the products that designers make. These 
serve as exemplars for designers in professional work, and therefore constitute a central 
source for reflection and judgement. Such reflection requires, however, the attentive use 
of said abstractions. The main source for abstractions today is the field of design theory, 
and the question is raised whether the theoretical conventions today pose a problem in 
that abstractions are mostly implicit and tacit.  
1.2.2 The “project-structure” of the product design field 
Central to the intellectual structure of any profession is the jurisdiction of the 
profession; the tasks that normally fall under the purview of a practitioners, implying 
the role and responsibility that profession normally is expected to hold (Abbott 1988). 
The jurisdiction is the tacit background against which theoretical accounts are produced, 
so obvious it seldom requires stating, and providing the purpose and meaning against 
which theoretical accounts are written. The development of theories relies on a common 
understanding of roles and responsibilities, the central challenges, typical professional 
inferences, and typical challenges in this respect.  
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In product design however, the exact jurisdiction is somewhat uneasily located. As a 
profession, product design is concerned with the conceptualisation and making of 
products in an industrial context. Normally, this work takes place through projects 
carried out in cooperation with other professions, such as other kinds of engineers and 
designers, marketers, industrialists, and logisticians. The job requires the ability to solve 
professional problems across several domains; from the functional and aesthetical 
domains of product use to the technological domains of production. 
Valtonen analysed the role of product designers in Finland and Scandinavia post 
WWII (Valtonen 2005). The examination shows that the profession has undergone 
changes both in terms self-perception as well as jurisdiction: In the 50’s, designers were 
perceived as product creators, aesthetically trained innovators working in a workshop 
tradition. In the 60’s the role was seen as a team member, where design was an element 
in the product development process. In the 70’s designers were considered user-
specialists, with a particular emphasis of ergonomics. The 80’s saw an emphasis with 
management and the coordination of design work, whereas the 90’s saw designers as 
creators of brands and experiences. Since 2000, according to the account, design has 
been intertwined with innovation, where the role of designers is seen as contribution on 
a strategic product level (figure 1.5).  
The account provokes a question on what kind of knowledge designers draw from 
when engaging in professional tasks of such different natures. The range of issues in 
Valtonen’s account points towards several larger formalised knowledge domains, each 
with their own scientific culture. Brands, experiences, and innovation draw from the 
marketing domain, cooperation draw from the management domain, ergonomics draw 
from physiology and cognitive science, whereas earlier accounts draw from a crafts-
tradition. Additionally, there are domains not mentioned of obvious interest to the 
profession: ecology and sustainability, semantics; how products communicate, and 
aesthetics in general. The paradox is that if one were to expect that design theory 
developed knowledge in all these areas in the way that the scientific image postulates, 
i.e. as a scientific project that lent itself to subsequent practical application, it would 
appear as if the field of design theory would grow exceedingly large quite quickly. It 
would require years of empirical research, publication, peer-reviewing and similar 
activities over an enormous range of domains. 
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Figure 1.5 - Six decades and six different roles for the designer. From (Valtonen 2005). 
  
A way to make sense of this seeming conundrum is to hold that design theory, and 
the design field implicitly has assigned a central role for physical exemplars, and that 
this is a way in which the design field differs from the classical sciences. Designers 
draw knowledge from existing products and projects, inferring analogies relevant for 
one’s own practice, thereby implicitly establishing structure and coherence across the 
design field.  
Characteristically therefore, an important part of the knowledge by which designers 
ground judgements and decisions, does not reside with mastery of an empirical 
knowledge-base. The design field has what may be termed a project structure - 
concrete, physical instances of products and projects are the source for insights and 
normative guidance. And consequentially; a central element in the learning and 
dissemination of professional insight, is the ability to interpret and examine the projects 
that (loosely) fall in under the design domain. The theoretical reference for design 
practice is thus different from e.g. medicine, which can trace its empirical basis to 
scientific research on the body, or e.g. lawyers, who can trace their empirical basis to 
legal documents and jurisprudence.  
In design theory, one will find indications that a tacit, but de facto function of design 
theory is to provide documentation and understanding of concrete products and projects, 
but this theoretical production is constrained against a social agreement on the kinds of 
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projects and products that fall within the boundaries of the ‘design’ domain. Theories in 
the design domain are normally argued to hold value and relevance across the field, but 
they extensively make reference to existing products and projects in a significant way. 
Thus, the design field is pragmatically constrained and defined as “the projects that 
designers do, and the products that designers make”. Cross for instance, implicitly 
references designer’s projects in a classical taxonomy of design research (Cross 1999): 
• The study of designer behaviour, including theoretical deliberation and 
reflection on the nature of design ability.  
• The study of the processes of design, and the development and application of 
techniques, which aid the designer 
• The Study of the form and configuration of artefacts, which is recently 
complemented with studies on the design of services and systems. 
 
Since the design field holds a project structure, the traditional learning in the field 
deviates from the scientific image. The learning of design practice does not take the 
form of gaining familiarity with a knowledge-base, but rely on “studio teaching”. 
Historically, the model for product design education has taken the form of project 
learning (Findeli 2001): Normal educational practice is to train designers in the 
simulated environment of the studio. Here, designers are trained in structuring and 
carrying out practical professional problems, addressing and resolving issues pertaining 
to both the cultural and technological domain. This suggests that an important element 
in the development of professional knowledge is transfer, i.e. the ability to derive 
insights from one domain and reapply it in another one. 
Design professions in this way precede the current academic focus on project- and 
problem-based learning (PBL). Although the product design profession has a fairly brief 
history, related disciplines such as architecture have traditions for project learning 
dating back to the renaissance. In the architecture education that was established at 
Accademia di San Luca, Rome, 1577, The term project (progetti) was used for 
assignments where the students were to carry out imagined design projects; a kind of 
learning that involved skills, the relevant knowledge, and particularly, the reapplication 
of these skills and insights in concrete design projects (Pettersen 2005).The model of 
project learning extends to engineering as well. The renaissance engineers were 
originally trained as an artist in the same vein as architects, before the eventual 
professionalization in the 1700’s led to the current scientific emphasis (Picon 2004). 
But learning and reflection in a field with project structure is a complex endeavour. 
The risks for misconception and construal of projects are obvious. Real-life projects and 
products will extensively vary. With every design project there will be contingencies; 
different premises and success factors. There are differences in complexity; product 
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designer’s responsibilities vary from the making of simple products to partaking in large 
industrial projects. There are also differences in the contexts with which design takes 
place; contexts which in practice will decide much of the role and responsibility of 
designers in a concrete project. 
1.2.3 Knowledge-transfer in design; the role of abstractions 
Since design teaching cannot be broken down to discursive learning in a theoretical 
domain alone, it suggests a more eclectic or anarchic depiction of the way in which the 
more general professional knowledge in the field develops. Designers draw important 
experiences from a range of products and projects, invariably drawing analogies in new 
and often surprising ways.  
A didactic model for the kind of education and reflection which takes place in the 
design field, where knowledge is acquired in one context for the purpose of 
reapplication in another context, is transfer of learning, which is sometimes also 
referred to as transfer of knowledge. Transfer of learning occurs when “learning in one 
context enhances a related performance in another context”. It implies that one draws 
insight from one domain and reapplies that knowledge in another domain. It relies on 
the student being able to identify some form of similarity between the two contexts, 
implying that knowledge is mapped across contexts that are in some way similar, but 
not identical. 
This general model from pedagogics, states that transfer occurs by means of two 
roads, the low road and the high road (Salomon and Perkins 1989): Low-road transfer 
occurs by the automatic triggering of well-learned behaviour in a new context, whereas 
high-road transfer occurs by intentional mindful abstraction of something from one 
context and the application in a new context.  
For design, transfer by low-road can be likened to the learning of skills, e.g. 
sketching, that can be reused in successively new design projects. Transfer by way of 
the high road however, addresses the meta-cognitive understanding of design work. 
When solving a problem in one domain, the student has abstracted a solution structure 
in another domain that allow for solving the problem in the new domain. Thus: 
…abstraction involves the extraction from or identification in a learned unit of 
material, in a situation or in a behaviour, some generic or basic qualities, 
attributes, or patterns of elements… Abstraction thus involves both 
decontextualisation and rerepresentation of the decontextualised information in 
a new, more general form, subsuming other cases. Abstractions, therefore, have 
the form of a rule, principle, label, schematic pattern, prototype, or category 
(Salomon and Perkins 1989, p. 125).  
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Thus, central elements in the “production” of knowledge in the design field are the 
abstractions which decide general features and characteristics across the variety of 
products and projects in the field. Both for the purposes of understanding the broad field 
of design, and for making sense of learning, there must be abstractions which allow for 
the extraction of general, prototypical features, so that insights can be identified and 
reapplied in new contexts. 
The abstractions comprised in the narratives of design theory may influence our 
understanding in many ways, yet still appear as a tacit, or self-evident, component. 
Their influence upon research and the general understanding in design may arguably 
extend to several areas: 
• Abstractions are common ways of generalising design work. They thereby 
underlie much general discourse and a common understanding of design 
practice. They provide generalisations, basic categories and concepts that are 
taken up and used also in more general design discourse. 
• For research, the concepts that are inherent in different abstractions serve as 
parameters and invariants in research. They provide the elements by which 
design practice is observed and thereby understood 
• For education, the abstractions have a role as mindful abstractions. They are a 
principled constructs that are used by designers in the transfer of knowledge 
across design situations, or design projects. They thereby provide general 
frameworks by which design practice may be understood and reflected upon in 
everyday situations. 
 
The argument emerging from this account is that abstractions have a significant 
impact on how theories and knowledge in the field develops. They are pivotal elements 
for making sense of this practice. But because the field of design is only loosely 
constrained, the development of theories and knowledge requires precise and extensive 
abilities for abstraction and generalisation, to avoid the obvious danger of dilettantism.  
1.2.4 Abstractions in design theory 
The question is thereby which abstractions that are commonly used to make sense of 
design practice, and where to turn to identify common abstractions. The main source for 
abstractions of design work appears to be design theory. One will here find examples of 
abstractions comprised in the many narratives. These are different principled ways of 
regarding designers’ work, and the elements considered important in this respect. For 
example, if design researchers choose, as basis for inquiries, to explain aspects of 
design in terms of Schön’s framework of reflective practice (Schön 1995), the 
principled abstraction of design practice is that this practice is about interpreting, 
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interacting and seeking an understanding of the design problem. Correspondingly, the 
process is explained through concepts such as frames, problem setting, generative 
metaphors and similar. If, on the other hand, one chooses a systematic decision-making 
framework (Simon 1996), design practice is understood in behaviourist terms. It is 
abstracted as a goal-oriented process of decision-making, and the terms and concepts of 
this program are such as the problem-space, heuristics, structure, decomposition, 
evaluation, and goals.  
But the abstractions of design within design theory are, in line with normal research 
practices, mostly tacit. In the history of design theory, various abstractions of design 
practice have been asserted in different ways: The teachings of Bauhaus, from which 
product design draws much of its rationale, saw design responsibility as adherences to a 
particular aesthetic program (Findeli 2001; Heskett 1980); i.e. as form giving, in a way 
informed of modern production processes. Another example is the systematic efforts of 
the design methods movement, drawing on artificial intelligence and formal logic 
(Jones 1970). These efforts led to eventual proposals that an ability for modelling was 
the uniting feature of design work (Archer 1979). The critical theory of the 70’s saw a 
focus on designers as agents for the user (Papanek 1971; Rittel and Webber 1973), 
implying a focus on user participation in design processes. The 80’s saw a focus on 
management principles of collaboration for purposes of organisation (Andreasen and 
Hein 1987). And recent theories now propose that the similarity across the design field 
rest with “design thinking”, arguing that a certain set of attitudes towards the design 
process and the user is the uniting feature of this field (Brown 2008). 
A cross-sectional look at any journal or textbook confirms the large array of 
abstractions in the design field: In addition to the aforementioned examples, there exists 
a range of alternative views, such as design as a hermeneutic process (Coyne and 
Snodgrass 1992), design as hypothesis-testing (Woods 1998), design as participation 
and facilitation (Sanoff 2007), design as a special capacity for visual reasoning (Oxman 
2002), design as a business process (Hölttä and Otto 2005), and several others. 
These abstractions define design practice differently. But they also draw from 
different theoretical works, effectively aligning and positioning design within several 
different theoretical disciplines and boundaries. But as stated, they rest with an analogy, 
and a presumption that design practice should be abstracted in such and such manner. 
They rest with the author making an analogy between their own theoretical models and 
the eclectic practical field of design. Drawing such analogies is conceptually 
demanding. In a subject domain, design, which reaches wide, subsuming aspects that 
historically have been construed to be cognitive, social, pragmatic, aesthetic, technical, 
and several others, require considerable abilities for multi-disciplinary thinking. Authors 
must decide concepts, generalisations, assumptions, principles, common 
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responsibilities, common tasks, common challenges, presume skills, presume the 
industrial structure designers work within to mention a few. Understanding aspects of 
use, understanding aesthetics, establishing sound principles for management and 
organisation, alignment and cooperation with other practitioners, documenting good 
practices in all these areas, and so on, are drivers towards a facetted set of narratives in 
design theory. 
In summary, the observation here is that for historical reasons, design theory 
provides a wealth of theoretical perspectives, i.e. narratives, on design. These are caused 
by fundamental challenges in the endeavour of establishing and furthering theory for the 
design fields. But it is a situation which requires a steady hand and deep theoretical 
knowledge if one is to draw on the history of the field and assess the available repertoire 
for one’s own purposes. The situation can be summed up.  
• The focus of the design professions spread quite widely, in that its jurisdiction 
has changed fleetingly over the years. 
• The theory for the field has a project structure. Theory will rely on an inferred 
analogy between the projects and processes considered relevant to the design 
domain.  
• Many narratives exist. They provide different perspectives and abstractions on 
design practice. Demanding awareness from researchers on theoretical premises 
and traditions if the historic field is drawn from or if one’s methodical repertoire 
is to be assessed.  
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1.3 Problem statement 
The question is what this theoretical diversity practically implies for the 
development of theory and thereby how it relates to knowledge generation in the field of 
product design.  
If one assumes that the growth of knowledge in design field develops by way of 
individual inquiries on issues of relevance to professional work, then a challenge is that 
the researchers (and sometimes practitioners) who carry out this research must navigate 
and make sense of an enormous range of narrative traditions with correspondingly 
different perspectives on design practice. Researchers must navigate these traditions 
either to learn from previous research or assess the theoretical and methodical repertoire 
available to them as researchers.  
Characteristically, design research is different from a classic conception of research, 
in that it usually is problem-based. Whereas classical research can be understood as 
departing from a theoretical field, finding instances of concrete usage, design theory 
often is motivated by a concrete problem associated with the profession (e.g. problems 
of choice, ways of framing professional problems). Since these issues potentially reach 
widely, the implication is that design research requires a form of cross-disciplinary 
orientation which established academic disciplines seldom require. Researchers must 
navigate a wide scope of narrative traditions to seek out explanations and hypotheses to 
their problems. The situation can be illustrated (figure 1.6). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6 - Typical chain of consideration in problem exploration in design research 
 
However, there are indications that the ability for cross-disciplinary reflection of this 
kind is hampered. Commonly, narratives appear simply to be inherited; i.e. furthered as 
a, or the, idealisation underpinning design as a field of inquiry, reducing reflection over 
the framing of practice to an off-hand assumption:  
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• The way design practice and projects are abstracted is usually a position that is 
tacit and implicit with authors. Given that design theory is a practical and 
applied domain, effort is seldom put into critical reflection over the theoretical 
perspectives. It appears to be common practice to align one’s research with a 
greater research program, in the form of a brief mention of e.g. cognitive science 
or management science, before getting down to the “real” research. Simple 
assertions in the openings of textbooks and papers, such as “design is now 
generally accepted to be problem-solving”, or “design is a reflective practice”, 
hide an underbelly of stances, definitions, assumptions, and historical references. 
Many of these are by themselves problematic, and could be taken up for critical 
scrutiny on their own merit. Correspondingly, there is little reflection on the 
limitations that are inherent with these programs.  
• In the cases where design researchers have been engaged in discourse on 
fundamental stances, these discourses seldom focus on the situations for which 
different perspectives are valuable and appropriate or what different perspectives 
really say. Rather, the discourses take place as fundamental disputes between 
rival camps akin to Kuhn’s descriptions of paradigm clashes. Surprisingly often, 
authors purport instead to hold an essential definition of what design is, and how 
it should be understood as an object of study. For example, the pragmatic 
theories of Schön (1995), are often used to argue against classical cognitive 
design theories. But Schön’s theories on reflective practice  are susceptible to 
the criticism, for instance, that it makes use of mentalist, unobservable concepts 
(Stumpf and McDonnell 2002). The social models can be argued to black-box 
decision-situations by introducing relativism, managerial models are argued to 
be too coarse and so on. It seems that counterarguments can be raised against 
nearly all narratives in design theory, depending on one’s perspective. 
 
It is plausible that improved understanding of the narratives in design theory is 
warranted and beneficial; the abstractions within them, characteristics, limitations, as 
well as historical knowledge of how they have contributed to design theory. Improved 
knowledge in this area could have the potential to facilitate improved design research 
and reflection in several ways:  
• For research, knowledge of narrative traditions implies improved ability to look 
beyond one’s received perspective, when formulating hypotheses and theorising 
design practice. The current discourse often seems to favour particular “schools 
of thought” rather than regarding design theory as a broad set of methodological 
perspectives with fair uses given awareness of premises. Thus, one may risk 
carrying out research in parallel, unaware of previous and relevant research  
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• For education, knowledge on the different narrative traditions provide the ability 
to explain a facetted practice from several principled perspectives. A broad, 
general understanding of narratives and abstractions in design theory should be 
both beneficial and necessary when design students attempt to transfer insights 
in a studio learning environment. 
•  For the general discourse, awareness on narrative traditions may serve as 
qualifiers when reading and appropriating research findings and theory. 
Understanding the premises underlying research as well as the traditions 
inherent with them will facilitate the critical appropriation of findings in one’s 
own practice as well as improve the ability to read and interpret this material.  
 
Therefore, the aim that motivates the investigation in this dissertation is to take stock 
of existing narratives, and examine how different abstractions that are common with the 
narratives in design theory may be employed as a repertoire or as a “toolbox” of 
approaches, rather than as dogmatic depictions of what design “is”. The purpose is a 
cross-sectional look at the common ways of framing product design practice and an 
improved understanding of how such narratives lay trajectories for our understanding of 
the practice and its challenges. The general questions that have motivated this inquiry 
are: 
1. How do different narrative traditions abstract design practice? 
2. What trajectories do these abstractions lay for the development of professional 
knowledge in the design field? 
 
The research goal raises some tough questions of methodology: How can one 
compare ontologically different worldviews and research traditions? How can such 
traditions be analysed and presented in a structured and comprehensive way?      
Chapter 2 elaborates and discusses these questions, and presents the more detailed 
research questions that are pursued in the thesis. 
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1.4 Reader’s guide and outline 
The thesis is written for those who have a professional or personal interest in 
product design and its theoretical tradition. It presumes the reader has some prior 
knowledge of design theory and the discourses in this domain. The thesis makes use of 
general concepts and models from the philosophy of science to establish theoretical 
perspective and discuss design theory. These concepts are explained and exemplified in 
some detail.  
For readers, this might be perceived as an uneven read. Some claims appear obvious, 
whereas others would warrant more argument. Such problems of breadth versus depth 
are inevitably general challenges with cross-disciplinary research. Design theory draws 
from several scientific and philosophical disciplines, with the unfortunate consequence 
that many fundamental discourses; for example that between constructivist and 
empiricist perspectives on design, are only superficially treated. 
The text is organized in the following way: 
Chapter 2 contextualises this research. It presents the assumptions and definitions 
underlying the investigation in the thesis, and the background understanding of ‘product 
design’, ‘design’ and ‘design research’ that motivated this research. The theoretical 
perspective, research questions and methodology are subsequently presented.  
Chapter 3 elaborates the context and theoretical background of six models of 
professional reasoning which were identified. Chapter 4 is an exemplary exposition of 
the conceptual structure with three of the models. Chapter 5 takes up the challenges of 
assuming correspondence between models and real-life practice, and exemplifies how 
the discourse in design theory can be used to qualify the use of ideal models in concrete 
instances of research on design. Chapter 6 sums up the findings, derives the transfer-
models implied with the different narrative traditions, and discusses how these can be 
used for theoretical triangulation in design research. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, 
discusses the methods used and suggests further work.  
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2 - Background, perspective and methods 
 
The investigation in this thesis takes up a broad issue pertaining to product design as 
a profession and the intellectual practices common with this profession. With the goal 
of identifying narratives relevant to product design and ways in which these influence 
the development of theory in the field, this chapter presents the theoretical framework 
and understanding which have guided the investigation, before presenting the research 
questions and the methods employed.  
In the following, the section motivation and assumptions presents the personal 
understanding and outlook underlying this thesis. Definitions presents the operative 
understanding of key concepts. The background section presents the initial 
understanding and diagnosis that were the outset for this thesis. As theoretical 
perspective, the semantic view of theories is presented and argued. The research 
question narrows the field to the ideal models underlying the narratives in design 
theory. The methods section presents the detailed account of the methods followed and 
discusses these methods.   
2.1 Motivation and assumptions 
The investigation reported in this dissertation addresses central issues pertaining to 
theoretical description, inquiry and practice in the design field. The initial, professional 
problems that led to an interest in narratives and theoretical tradition are presented, 
displaying the personal motivation and argument for the investigation. The assumptions 
on the relation between these concepts are also stated. 
2.1.1 Practical motivation 
The focus of this thesis may appear unusually theoretical for a practical and applied 
subject as product design. It should therefore be noted that this focus emerged from a 
practical problem in an industrial context. Originally, this work grew out of an applied 
research project (Hovde 2005), where the purpose of the project was to increase the 
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knowledge about, and the ability for, design and development in Norwegian wood and 
timber industries.  
The wood industry was largely unfamiliar with product design. Traditionally, the 
industry is traditionally concerned with bulk production of timber, and few resources 
are allotted to design and development activities. Production methods and business 
models have remained the same, in principle, for a long time. This differentiates the 
Norwegian wood industries from many European counterparts, where both a 
proportionally larger element of hardwood as well as a more developed industrial 
systems have contributed to a larger focus on innovation. 
The design and development initiatives that could be observed in the national 
industry were often ad-hoc and incremental innovations. Few companies kept any 
formal design and development departments or competencies in-house. In those 
companies that did have design and development projects going, these were carried out, 
or led, by senior management. 
In the projects where designers were engaged as consultants or in other capacities, 
cultural problems often arose. For instance, when product concepts were proposed, 
these often led to disputes. Different understandings of design and the boundaries to this 
activity led to disagreements over how the process should be organised and carried out. 
Often, professionals in the wood industry and designers would hold different 
conceptions of e.g. the technology that was feasible to make use of, the room for radical 
innovation, the understanding of markets, and the industrial requirements of mass 
production.  
Attempts to bridge the gap between the cultures of wood-processing and the cultures 
of product design proved difficult. In general, designers complained over a conservative 
and stubborn industry, while the industry complained over lack of competence and 
unrealistic proposals with product designers. The problems were usually “soft” in the 
sense that they concerned trust, credibility, or authority. Typically: How to negotiate 
and implement different ways of understanding business and business practices; how to 
frame and understand the activities and purposes of businesses, and how to implement 
changes to existing practices.  
When engaged in such projects, it was difficult to arrive at a common understanding 
on and framing of design and development processes. While most people would agree 
on the importance of developing one’s product portfolio, it was difficult to agree on the 
framing and organisation of such initiatives. It was difficult to gain acceptance for 
allocating resources to activities that could support design work, such as analysis, 
workshops, production of mock-ups, not to mention more demanding long-term efforts.  
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Judging from the literature on design, such problems are well-known to the product 
design field, and not restricted to the particular industry here. The more general problem 
seemed to be about the description of reality. How was it that professionals saw 
purposes and necessary tasks so differently? This led to an interest in the models that 
were used to describe design; the models that are the basis for the understanding and 
organisation of design as a professional practice.  
This insight eventually led to a shift in focus, from industry practices to product 
design theory itself. There seemed to be a need to examine the models and theories that 
grounded designers’ understanding of their roles and responsibilities in design projects. 
What were the models and theories of business practices that designers “brought to the 
table”? What were the characteristics of these models? How did they influence design 
work, and for which situations were they useful and applicable?  
Such questions are central in many of the cultural problems that crop up when 
designers are engaged in industries unfamiliar with design practices. Models and 
metaphors are central elements in how designers understand their practice and also 
underlie the strategies that designers follow when engaged in projects. Design theory 
therefore emerged as the place to look for models and theories that could describe 
design practice at different levels of detail and precision. Such knowledge could be of 
practical benefit, because it could, potentially, expand the repertoire by which design is 
understood and explained also in practical and applied contexts. 
2.1.2 Assumptions 
The didactical role of design theory 
The interest in narrative traditions here is primarily a didactical one. It is assumed 
that design theory constrains understanding of and reflection over product design 
practice in several ways. Different narrative traditions will underlie reflection and 
inquiry, and in this way shape professional knowledge in ways that differ from each 
other significantly. The main focus is the referential aspects of these narrative traditions; 
i.e. how they depict and model design practice. Aspects such as the affective properties 
or the metaphysical status of these traditions are not considered.  
Design theory as a scientific field 
Design theory is here considered to be a scientific field. Design theory shares many 
characteristics with scientific discourses in that it is governed by the same principles as 
these discourses: It is carried out as a common project for the development of 
knowledge in a domain. Inquiries must be carried out in a methodically sound and 
accepted manner. There exists a community of researchers holding interest and 
responsibility for the literature, and lastly, there are institutions (universities, schools, 
industries) which partake in upholding and maintaining the field. The main consequence 
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of this assumption is that design theory can be read and analysed by the same theoretical 
perspectives that are used to analyse scientific theories, since it is subject to the same 
institutional conventions as scientific theories.  
Constructivist outlook 
To critically analyse and compare the traditions in design theory, the thesis is written 
from a constructivist paradigm. As a general perspective on research and science, 
constructivism emphasizes the historicity, the context-dependence and socio-
linguistically constituted character of these efforts. Constructivists hold that realities are 
apprehendable in the form of multiple mental constructions, socially and experientially 
based, local and specific in nature, although often shared among many individuals 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994, p. 110). In this perspective knowledge, including scientific 
knowledge, is constructed by researchers and not discovered from the world. ‘The 
investigator and the object of investigation are assumed to be interactively linked so that 
the ‘findings’ are literally created as the investigation proceeds’ (p.111).  
It is assumed that the narrative traditions in design theory ascribe to such different 
metaphysical and modal positions when describing and examining the design practice. 
The differences between individual traditions are here understood as primarily a 
difference in perspective, as individual traditions assume different concepts, elements 
and relations when describing design, and that the difference is not a difference in truth 
or correctness.  
This is not the same as assuming that all theoretical explanations of design are 
equally good and valid. It is merely a statement that the “correctness” or the “truth” of 
these models is not a concern in this thesis. The interpretive principle for reading and 
analysing design literature is therefore a sympathetic one. It is not the intention to look 
for “failings” in design theories, but the central stances governing narrative traditions 
and the characteristics to those traditions.  
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2.2 Definitions 
For subsequent reading, this section presents the operative definitions of central 
concepts in the thesis. The first section addresses the ‘design’ related concepts. The 
second part addresses the other concepts as they appear throughout the dissertation. 
2.2.1 ‘Design’ and ‘product design’ as theoretical concepts. 
Product design  
Product design is a professional role holding responsibility for creative making and 
embodiment of products in an industrial context. The work necessitates drawing on 
knowledge that spans technological, societal and aesthetic domains in order to plan and 
foresee the demands posed by the use, production, and distribution of products.  
The professional jurisdiction associated with product design is somewhat fluid, as 
product design is teamwork requiring collaboration with engineers of many kinds, 
marketers, sub-suppliers and other specialists. The exact detail with which this work 
requires knowledge and ability for judgement will be variations along two axes: One 
axis stretches from the domains of technology and production to the domains of use 
(social, functional, and aesthetic). The other axis relates to the conceptual level of detail 
with which products are proposed and solutions are reflected over (Figure 2.1). The 
extent to which any concrete design job can be characterised as one or the other will 
depend on local working culture and traditions.  
 
 Figure 2.1 - The continuum of product designers’ responsibilities and some neighbouring 
professions 
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Design 
‘Design’ denotes a large category of professional roles where the primary 
responsibility is making: Architecture, engineering, graphic design, planning, parts of 
computer science, and others. For historical reasons, product design is normally 
considered a subset to the larger field of ‘design’. In this thesis, the ‘design’ field 
denotes the intellectual tradition concerned with, and relevant to, all the making 
professions, including product design.  
Design theory 
The literature on design is cross-disciplinary in nature. It provides several 
conceptually different takes on the nature of product design. In addition to authors from 
the making professions, authors drawing on elements from philosophy, cognitive 
science, sociology, and other fields have also contributed to design theory.  
The intellectual structure of the field is eclectic; in that the different making 
professions extensively draw on concepts from neighbouring professions. An example 
is the concept of “wicked problems”(Rittel and Webber 1973) which has been used 
extensively to characterise the design task in the literature for all and any design 
profession. The concept was originally coined for planning problems, and its validity 
has never been argued outside this particular field. Yet, it is now a common concept 
also for other making professions. This suggests that authors in design theory invariably 
assume similarities between the design fields, effectively contributing to the furthering 
of a common field of design theory.  
Product design theory 
The sections of design theory with a focus on and relevance for product design.  
Design research: 
Design research denotes theoretical research activities which aim at furthering 
knowledge on design and expanding the field of design theory. There is a leniency 
regarding the research methods that are allowed in this area. Due to the practical and 
non-academic purpose of making professions, as well as the cross-disciplinary heritage 
of the field, a considerable number of methodological and epistemic stances have been 
proposed and argued as beneficial for furthering our knowledge on design. Among the 
perspectives, there is precedence for holding the general position that one can research 
for, into and through design (Frayling 1993); in other words, design research can take 
the form of research aiming for theories and models for improving knowledge and 
abilities of designers, the form of research into the products and outcome of designers 
work, or even through the making of new products themselves. 
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Product design research: 
Design research with a focus on and relevance for product design. 
The design process 
Since a precise definition of what designers do is elusive, and establishing 
theoretical coherence between different design practices is challenging, a common 
leitmotif in design theory is ‘the design process’. This is an ideal entity referencing how 
designers supposedly work. Typically, the process starts with an idea or need, and 
through successive iterative phases ends in the embodiment of a product. (See e.g. 
Gedenryd 1998; Jones 1970; Kroes 2002; Roozenburg and Eekels 1995) 
The design process is ideal in the sense that very few design projects actually follow 
these phases. Often, design work is ad-hoc in its organisation or follows merely parts of 
the process. The pragmatic argument in favour of the design process model, however, is 
that it serves as a common reference in an otherwise eclectic field. 
2.2.2 Other Central Concepts 
Narratives 
Narratives are here used in the sense of a shared conception of what design, or a sub-
field to design, is. A narrative is metaphysical, in that it defines how design should be 
understood, and normative, in that it defines how design should be pursued 
theoretically.  
Examples of narratives are when a group of researchers agrees, and shares as a 
convention a particular view on design. Such conventions can be traced in literature 
through aligning and definitional propositions such as “design is problem-solving”, 
“design is professional practice”, or design is “hypothesis-testing”, to mention a few. 
‘Narratives’ are probably best considered as “sensitising concept” in the tradition of 
Herbert Blumer (1969), in that the concept raises awareness on traditional differences in 
design theory, as well as in limitations to these traditions that would otherwise remain 
tacit.  
Ideal models  
In this thesis, ideal models are the object of analysis. These denote the shared and 
conventional understanding of a research issue in abstracted manner. The design process 
is a prime example of an ideal model, as it abstracts the eclectic field of design work 
into a singular abstract entity upon which researchers can compare and reference their 
findings. 
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Abstractions  
Abstractions are ideal reproductions of real-life objects or events. It is a 
simplification of the object or event in question. Ideal models are examples of 
abstractions.  
Ontology 
The term ontology is here used in the same sense as in the information sciences, 
denoting a set of concepts within a domain, and the relationships between those 
concepts. As an example, a reflective account of design practice conceptualises the 
practice through the use of concepts as problem setting, frame experiments, problem 
resetting and others. These concepts are here seen as forming the ontology of this 
theory. This differentiates the term from its philosophical uses, where it is associated 
also with metaphysical reflection on being. 
Knowledge-transfer 
Throughout this thesis, both transfer of learning and knowledge-transfer are used to 
denote learning and drawing insights from one context which enhances a related 
performance in another context”. It implies that one draws insight from one domain and 
reapplies that knowledge in another domain. It relies on one being able to identify some 
form of similarity between the two contexts, implying that knowledge is mapped across 
contexts that are in some way similar, but not identical (Perkins and Salomon 1992).  
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2.3 Background 
Taking the role that design theory has for the product design profession, and the 
social conventions which guide production of such theory, opens questions pertaining 
both to epistemology and the professional role and responsibility of design professions.  
Here the personal perspective and initial assessment of this relationship is presented. 
Firstly, the characteristics of the product design profession are taken up, and the 
question of how existing narratives for this profession have emerged is discussed. 
Particularly, the scientific conventions in the development of narratives for design 
professions are emphasised. It is argued that the disputes surrounding positivism is a 
central and relevant for the design professions and the consequences of this general 
tendency are probed.   
2.3.1 The product design profession 
As profession, product design is creative, collaborative and cross-disciplinary. It is 
creative because it implies the elaboration of novel concepts and solutions, collaborative 
because today’s industrial context requires the inclusion of many different professionals 
and stakeholders, and cross-disciplinary because the design of products requires 
judgements and rulings in several domains of knowledge. 
Positioning the profession in the context of neighbouring professions will be 
contested. In the Norwegian context, it is fair to say, however, that product design is 
similar to industrial design in its shared focus on making, but that industrial design is 
more firmly rooted in a humanist tradition. Product design on the other hand, draws 
more of its heritage from the technical traditions of engineering and management. In 
real-life practice, one can expect boundaries between product design and industrial 
design to be blurred, and in the international literature, the terms are used 
interchangeably.  
Historically, product design is a professional role that has emerged with the growth 
of industrialised society. Product designers can trace their profession’s history both to a 
modernist and aesthetic heritage; the Arts and Crafts movement, the Bauhaus, and the 
Ulm School of Gestaltung are canons in this respect, and reason and rationale for design 
practice is often evoked from these institutions (See e.g.Heskett 1980) . Additionally, 
there is a technological heritage from mechanical engineering which has influenced the 
modern understanding of design as a professional role in an industrial context (See e.g. 
Hein and Andreasen 1986). There exists a tension between these two traditions, as the 
professional identity of engineers and industrial designers is conflicting, even bordering 
antagonism (Archer 1990)  
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Since the time of the historical design canons, one should note that the 
characteristics of product design have been changing. The responsibilities and skills that 
product designers are expected to master have expanded. Valtonen’s examination of 
role understanding (figure 1.5), mirrors the larger societal changes that have taken place 
as the industrial economy has changed from national systems of workshop production to 
a globalised industrial system.  
Following such changes, the intellectual component of design work has also 
changed. The traditional role of product design presumes competence in areas such as 
materials and technology, form giving, aesthetics, ergonomics, and production 
processes. But from the workshop tradition, with its focus on form giving and 
production techniques, designers have been craving responsibility in new areas such as 
ecology, human factors, interaction, management, marketing, and emerging 
technologies. New professional realms include information technology, medical 
systems, and even the design of services to mention a few. Since the time of the classic 
design canons, there has been an influx of new managerial and organisational principles, 
and a rapid development of new tools and techniques that designers use in their work, 
such as: 
• New tools and methods – Traditional methods such as sketching and modelling 
have been expanded and complemented by techniques such as rapid prototyping 
and developments in CAD and modelling technology. Product designers are now 
expected to master and incorporate such tools in their work. 
• Globalization – New modes of business organization have also affected product 
design work. Outsourcing and a global supply and production network implies 
that designers must master a production context of geographically and culturally 
diversity. Related, designers also increasingly find themselves catering to an 
international market. This requires that designers must make use of formal tools 
and abstractions on the broader context of use in their work. 
• New domains of responsibility – The product design profession has witnessed an 
expansion in the domains that designers are expected to master. For instance, the 
critical theory of the 70’s opened up for participatory design methods, the 
quality focus of the 80’s led to inclusion of quality techniques in design 
education, and  the 90’s saw the introduction of an environmental and 
sustainable focus in design schools. 
 
Differences over definitions and over basic models of product design are therefore 
common in the product design discourse; various perspectives on the design role, and 
the characteristics to this role, have been proposed. Krippendorff (2006) has argued that 
design has shifted from being product- or production-centered to being “human-
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centered”. The argument is mirrored in writings on “design thinking”, which currently 
is much favoured in design and management circles. IDEO executive Tim Brown 
likewise argues that we are now experiencing an expansion of designers’ roles and 
responsibilities from a “technology-centered” practice, to the “human-centered” 
discipline of “design thinking” (Brown 2008).  
Such claims and assertions are not, however, new. In 1981, Cross called for a “wider 
development of a post-industrial basis for design, technology and society” (Cross 1981), 
whereas Papanek published a call for “design for the real world” in 1971, holding that 
designers should take into account real problems and wider societal concerns in their 
design work (Papanek 1971). A call presumably provoked by the lofty promises of a 
“scientific” and “transparent” design process promised by the early design methods 
movement (Archer 1969) 
In general, attempts at exacting the professional responsibility of product design will 
open a soft underbelly of what these tasks actually consists in; a situation which has 
lead to a certain unease about the theoretical framing of this practice. Roth can be taken 
to express these trends, as the design role will mirror the changes in the larger industrial 
system:  
The traditional view of the designer as creative genius, or (worse) stylist is 
evolving to a perception of the designer as team member, interpreter of complex 
systems, communicator, and problem solver (Roth 1999, p. 20). 
 
2.3.2 Design theory and design narratives 
The fleeting characteristics of the profession raise a question on the theories and 
models that are used to explain product design work. Like for any other profession, 
product design needs an intellectual structure; literature which imposes meaning and 
coherence for the field and contains best practices and sound principles for work. 
Among the many potential roles such literature fills are: 
• Didactical: Providing models and means for reflecting over practical work, and 
as such provides the framework for understanding and inquiring into the 
profession’s work (Schön 1995).  
• Jurisdictional: By presenting the intellectual structure of the profession in a 
rigorous and near-scientific manner, the profession seizes jurisdiction over 
professional tasks, and defends the field from interlopers (Abbott 1988). The 
literature thereby serves a role in the professional project of promoting the 
profession. 
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• Practical: The literature provides guidebooks and aids for concrete professional 
problems; providing best practices and sound principles for the execution of 
professional work.  
 
Normally, design theory is pursued through design research as a scientific, or quasi-
scientific, project. This implies that it is pursued as a common project, that theorising is 
based on methodically rigorous inquiries, and that findings are made subject to peer-
review and publication. Cross’ account (in chapter 1.2.1) expresses the general 
sentiment; Design research should be purposeful, inquisitive, informed, methodical, and 
communicable. 
But the attempts at pursuing design as a formal research project, points to an 
underbelly of associated complexities. Fundamentally, a scientific project requires a 
social agreement on conventional perspectives and methods. The traditional view on 
how conventions for a research field are established, is that other members of the 
institutional system determine the criteria and expectations that research is expected to 
fulfil, by institutions such as for instance peer-reviewed publications and conferences 
(Gibbons et al. 1994; Merton 1973).  
Merton subsumes these practices under the term certification of knowledge; the 
perspective that research is a communal effort, where findings and procedures are 
accepted or rejected by the larger research community. The conventions for research are 
thereby the standards, methods, and overarching principles, i.e. research practices, that 
are common and accepted in the institutional system. 
Inquiry and theoretical production is thereby constrained in important ways by the 
social agreement on how this project should be carried out. Foucault coined the term 
episteme to denote the set of expectations and beliefs that structure communal inquiry. 
Any systematic growth of knowledge is shaped by the world-views and beliefs of those 
that are engaged in research and inquiries, and these stances will underlie what is 
possible to think and write:  
I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which 
permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible 
those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a scientific theory, but a field of 
scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the 
‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, 
but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific. (Foucault and 
Gordon 1980, p.197) 
A depiction analogous to Foucault’s episteme is Kuhn’s historical-sociologist 
theories on normal science (1977). Kuhn depicts research as evolving in revolutionary 
steps; periods of ‘normal science’, where researchers work with a common 
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understanding of central problems and methodological principles are supplanted by new 
modes of thinking of and experimenting with the object, commonly known as paradigm 
shifts. During these periods of normal science, the potential modes of thinking and 
acting for researchers are constrained by the disciplinary matrix; the entire cluster of 
problems, methods, theoretical principles, metaphysical assumptions, concepts, and 
evaluative standards that are present to some degree or other in exemplary research. 
Such accounts illustrate that preceding any empirical inquiry and theorizing, is a set 
of governing structures; tacit expectations of the role that research should fulfil, and the 
social conventions for the kind of problems that researchers are expected to address. 
The issue of social conventions in research that Foucault and Kuhn here illustrate can be 
explained from many perspectives; but as this thesis is written from what is often 
considered an applied research tradition, these conventions are here referred to by the 
common-sense terms of conventions, or narrative traditions. 
Turning to design theory, one will observe that there exist several different 
conventions for how design research should be carried out. As design theory has 
emerged, several perspectives have been put forth. These differences are sketched out in 
the following: 
Varying definitions of design:  
Underlying the many theoretical accounts of design, one will find that several basic 
definitions of the subject matter – design – have been proposed, and underlie the 
individual theories and inquiries in the field. 
An historically central definition, which defined design in the form of a science, is 
found with the cognitive research tradition associated with Herbert Simon (1969). 
Simon saw design as a science of the artificial and defined design as a topic within the 
boundaries of a scientific discourse, as a particular kind of problem-solving: Everyone 
designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into 
preferred ones (p. 111). This wide understanding of design is developed in many design 
texts, both of practical and scientific orientation. Goel and Pirolli for instance, elaborate 
Simon’s definition by incorporating later findings in the cognitive sciences, and argued 
that design must be understood as a prototypical category, displaying at least twelve 
common features. (Goel and Pirolli 1992, p. 401). Design is here understood as a 
cognitive research object that is best pursued through cognitive methods, e.g. 
laboratory- and protocol-studies (Dorst et al. 1996). 
In parallel with the scientific understanding of design, several more practice oriented 
definitions of design have been employed in design research. In 1971, Archer defined 
design as to conceive the idea for some artifact or system and/or to express the idea in 
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an embodiable form1. Rittel and Webber, similarly, famously argued that if design were 
to be regarded as problem-solving, it should be regarded as wicked problem-solving. 
The gist of their argument is that design problems always are contingent and unique, 
and therefore required another approach than the technical formal approaches that 
emerged from a formal scientific or systems methodology (Buchanan 1992; Rittel and 
Webber 1973). 
Semiotic and semantic theories on design have also held a prominent role in design 
theory. In a tradition familiar with Jencks and Bairds’s architectural theories, 
Krippendorff defines product semantics as a central area for product design in 
particular, and design in general, defined as both:  
A systematic inquiry into how people attribute meanings to artifacts and interact 
with them accordingly 
and 
A vocabulary and methodology for designing artifacts in view of the meanings 
they could acquire for their users and the communities of their stakeholders 
(Krippendorff 2006, p. 2)  
The semantic, or semiotic, tradition has given rise to a sub-field within design theory 
concerned with products as conveyors of meaning, implicitly arguing that designers are 
in need of knowledge and capacity for judgement on how products communicate and 
convey meaning. (e.g. Vihma 1990).It is also a perspective attracting attention from 
scholars working on the interface between design and management traditions (Verganti 
2009). 
More recently, there have been attempts to define design as a sociological object. 
Ilhan and Wang (2009) argue that design professions can be distinguished from non-
design professions through the disciplinary matrix, implying that the design field can be 
distinguished by its symbolic generalizations, shared commitments, values, and 
exemplars. Central in their account is the view that design should not be defined in 
terms of its knowledge-content, but in terms of the creative act:  
…so central is the creative act to the design professions that we suggest it is it, 
rather than the distinct body of knowledge, that resides at the cores of these 
professions (pp 6-7).  
A parallel sociological account of design is also proposed by Carvalho, Dong, and 
Maton (2009). Their view on the centrality of knowledge is, however, exactly the 
opposite of Ilhan’s and Wang’s:  
                                                 
1 Quoted in Norbert F. M.  Roozenburg and J Eekels, Product Design: Fundamentals and Methods 
(Wiley Series in Product Development: Planning, Designing, Engineering; Chichester: John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd., 1995) 397., p.53. 
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the debate is not about the surface-level descriptors of what designers do, such 
as the diversity of the knowledge needed to design in architecture and 
engineering, but what is the form taken by the knowledge that is valued, 
cultivated, and more generally emphasized within a discipline (p. 486). 
 
Multi-disciplinary influence  
The difference with which design is regarded may stem from the fact that there are 
many stakeholders with an interest in the field. Over the history of the design theory, 
authors have written from within a variety of perspectives. Drawing the history of this 
entire field will be outside the scope here. Suffice to say: The many traditions existing 
have brought different conceptions of the designer and different perspectives towards 
literature and research for the profession as a common and systematic project. An off-
hand account includes: 
• A multi-disciplinary tradition: A central tradition regards design as a multi-
disciplinary field, comprising sub-sets of individual design domains. The Design 
Research Society2, and its associated design conferences exemplify this 
tradition. Characteristically, for this tradition is the allowing of a broad 
theoretical and methodological basis (Buchanan 2004). 
• The engineering design tradition: The Design Society3 is central in organizing 
conferences such at ICED, and EPDE. The engineering design tradition sees 
product design as a natural subset to the wider field of engineering design. This 
discipline has retained and developed many of the theories developed within the 
Design Methods Movement, i.e. systematic and methodical models of design 
(Cross 1993).  
• The industrial design and product design tradition is often defined in opposition 
to engineering design; the aesthetic and functional qualities of products are 
habitually regarded as more central than their technological qualities at focus in 
the engineering tradition. Bodies such as ICSID and the Design for Emotion4 
Society with its conferences exemplify this tradition.  
• Architecture has provided historical contributions to product design by 
introducing basic models and a body of discourse that have had an impact in 
design disciplines beyond architecture (e.g. Alexander 1964; Lawson 1997). 
• Design history is traditionally concerned with historical inquiries, but the field 
has contributed to design research by providing historical accounts of the field, 
and canonization of design works, and as such has impacted the perception of 
design in a normative manner, by defining scope and focus in the design field.  
                                                 
2 http://www.designresearchsociety.org 
3 http://www.designsociety.org 
4 http://www.designandemotion.org 
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• Design management is mostly concerned with management and organisation of 
design, through bodies such as the Design Management Institute5 for instance. 
The field has brought forth models of management of design and proposed 
theories on the integration of product design with other business functions, and 
as such been an interface between management disciplines and design 
disciplines.   
• Information Science and HCI are interrelated with product design on aspects 
such as interaction, use, and the modelling of products. There are several 
instances of theoretical lumping between these disciplines. The works of the 
cognitive scientist Donald Norman (Norman 2002) is an example of theoretical 
works intended for information science that later trickled into and impacted the 
product design domain. 
• Lastly, a crafts-based tradition for design is also influential in the field of 
product design. The history of the product design profession, with a canonical 
focus on Bauhaus, and the Ulm School for Gestaltung, can be seen as the 
development of a craft-tradition to a modern, industrial context (Findeli 1990), 
exemplified in bodies such as the Cumulus conferences6 
 
Antagonism towards science  
While design theory commonly is pursued as a topic for research; i.e. that arguments 
are based on systematic and methodical inquiries, and that there exists institutions for 
publication and review, one will find in the theory many expressions of unease and 
antagonism towards the scientific project.  
One central theme in the many attempts to ring in and define design theory as a 
theoretical field or discipline is the need to define design as “something else”. Very 
often, the authors who define design for purposes of research and study often make use 
of negative definitions, and describe design research in terms of what it isn’t. Design 
research is generally argued to possess an important quality of “otherness” that it seems 
important for authors to render explicitly. 
For instance, in the first edition of Design Studies, considerable effort was put into 
to the definition of design research as something different from both scientific research 
and research in the humanities. Archer regarded modelling as the backbone of a theory 
of design, and argued that modelling had characteristics that made it stand out as a 
distinct area of inquiry; a designerly way of knowing (Archer 1979).  
                                                 
5 http://www.dmi.org 
6 http://www.cumulusassociation.org 
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Another perspective on design that has resounded with the design community is 
Rittel and Webber’s formulation that design is wicked, implying that since design is a 
social activity affecting different social groups and stakeholders, it should not be 
understood as a process leading to solutions in the sense of definitive and objective 
answers (Rittel and Webber 1973). 
Frayling gained attention by proposing that research in the field of design could be 
carried out for design, through design, and into design. The central part of this 
proposition was that not only scholarly research led to new knowledge, but that 
products and artefacts by themselves should be considered a form of knowledge 
(Frayling 1993). 
Owen has proposed that design research may extend understanding beyond 
definitions of classic research used by the sciences and scholarly disciplines. Owen 
advocates stepping away from the term research in its entirety, and rather ask how 
knowledge is built, and he attempts to incorporate design practice in the research 
schema through a knowledge-using/knowledge-building model (Owen 1998).  
The attempts to define the characteristics of the design field still continue; the 
currently most downloaded article from the journal Design Issues is (Fallmann 2008): 
an explorative definition of the relation between research, theoretical traditions, and 
interaction design practice. Implicitly arguing that design theory still is in the process of 
defining itself as a theoretical domain 
In general, the account here necessarily is superficial. The specific circumstances 
that have given rise to these various traditions and positions cannot be treated with the 
thoroughness they deserve within the scope of this chapter. The point to be argued (and 
illustrated) is merely that within design theory there is an abundance of narrative 
traditions. The challenge of defining a “fleeting” profession as theoretical object is 
obviously difficult to resolve. The research community, owing to different academic 
traditions, different principles for the scientific project, and different interests, has 
proposed a variety of ways in which this practice should be understood.  
It is possible to regard the current situation of multiple narratives as beneficial, in 
that it opens for richness in perspectives, or alternatively that the situation is 
troublesome as it leads to vague and confused theory. Either way, the plurality of 
narratives should be regarded as a characteristic to design theory.  
2.3.3 Practical or academic theory? 
Given the many cultural heritages and theoretical traditions design theory can be 
founded with, there exists unease regarding the function and purpose of this theory. 
Most obviously, there is a split between researchers regarding this theory as an 
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instrumental project, whose main purpose is to equip designers with methods and 
theoretical tools aiding designers in their daily work, and those who regard design 
theory as of more foundational nature. The latter project involves stricter conventions 
for epistemic argument, and communal publications; i.e. the perspective that design 
research is an academic, or scientific, project. 
The practical challenge 
Regarding the first perspective, a tacit expectation throughout much of design 
research is that this theory should hold value and credibility for design practice. For 
example, Vincenti argues that the rationale for the accumulation of knowledge in design 
is that designers must guarantee some level of performance and this requirement will 
put a premium on certainty of knowledge. I.e. it is the contractual obligations and the 
demands of the industrial context that designers face in their practice that are the drivers 
behind the growth of “designerly” knowledge (Vincenti 1990). A similar concern for 
the “practical application” of theory and literature motivated Roth (1999), whose 
preceding citation (chapter 2.3.1) was based in a concern that design research simply is 
too boring or “academic”, and that a more creative approach therefore is desirable.  
The criterion of practical relevance is a basis for much of the criticism raised against 
design research. For instance to diagnose the “failings” of the Design Methods 
Movement: Many of the central figures of this group were so unhappy both with the 
design research and its lack of practical application that they dissociated themselves 
from the entire field.7 They did so by pointing out its failings to provide a normative and 
predictive understanding of the design process, and the failings in its practical 
application.  It was the form and language with which these methods were presented 
that were perceived as alien and detrimental by many practicing designers, as it did not 
mirror how designers perceived and thought about their own practice (Archer 1990).  
The view that design research should contribute to the general knowledge of and 
quality of practice may seem common-sense, but it is a utilitarian view of research that 
lay some bearings for how design research should be carried out. If design research is 
considered an applied subject of design practice, then the relation between design 
research (theory production) and design practice appears to be problematic, and most 
authors diagnose the relation as such. In the field of design methodology, for instance, 
Cross concludes a review of science and design methodology with the words that: 
Design methodology has become a much more mature academic field, but 
still suffers from a lack of confidence in it by design practitioners, and it has had 
little (acknowledged) practical application (Cross 1993, p.67).  
                                                 
7 See e.g. Henrik Gedenryd, How Designers Work (Lund University Cognitive Studies ; 75; Lund: Lund 
University, 1998) 227 s., chapter 2, for an introduction and discussion of this episode. 
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The most positive view regarding the practical application of design research seems 
to be a cautious optimism. Sheldon for instance, argues:  
…a lot of ‘blue sky’ intellectual design research continues to be prevalent 
across academia. However, while I have been highly critical in the past, there 
are now immensely encouraging signs that academic design research in specific 
areas and specific university design departments are producing intellectually 
challenging outputs that are being adopted by industry with considerable delight 
and satisfaction (Sheldon 2004, p. 549). 
The exact way in which a theoretical field “contributes” to a practice such as design 
is, however, difficult to assess. Russo and Stoltermann argue that the perspective that 
design research should directly contribute to practice in itself is problematic (Russo and 
Stolterman 2000). They argue that underlying this view are several assumptions, many 
of which are questionable, or at least open for debate. One central assumption is the 
belief that it is possible to change the rationality of design practitioners (by introducing 
them to research results). But Russo and Stoltermann argue that such an assumption 
seems incredulous. Changing people’s rationality and practical behaviour will rely on 
also other issues such as their self-understanding, their values, responsibilities, 
resources and many others.  
The unease concerning “application” of design research is on the one hand the 
position that research in this field should contribute to the knowledge and quality with 
which professional design work is carried out. On the other hand, the counter-argument 
is that expecting design research to directly contribute to design practice is an undue 
demand, based on an inadequate understanding of the complexities of the scientific 
project.  
Academic drift 
The alternate expectation for research in the design field is to hold that it contributes 
to an academic field; that knowledge on design is a project worth pursuing for 
knowledge in its own sake, but simultaneously, that it should ascribe to the conventions 
we normally hold for research in the academic sense. While this is an ethos that 
assumedly should lead to more certain and valid knowledge, it is an expectation that 
also may cause conceptual challenges, particularly the challenge of academic drift. 
In the larger society, drivers and incentives for institutions and schools to carry out 
research for its own sake exist. The danger is that such research may become self-
sufficient, in that producing publications for their own (academic meriting) sake 
becomes the primary goal; i.e. academic drift. 
If one looks outside the design domain, to sociological studies of science, 
professions and education, one finds arguments for the claim that the tension between 
research and practice can be explained as academic drift. The tensions between practice 
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and research are not something particular to design research. Rather, these problems are 
based in societal trends end developments in the education system, particularly the 
institutions concerned with educating practitioners.  
In observing the institutions with an educational and didactical role for the 
professions; typically lower education and professional organizations, Slagstad has 
argued that since the end of the 19th century, existing professions have experienced 
academic drift. The professions have sought higher status by attempting to define 
themselves as scientific, and associate their profession with universities and science 
(Slagstad 2007). Slagstad argues that the scientific research that has taken place in 
conjunction with the institutions of the professions has been modelled on a positivist 
conception of natural science. The result is, however, a quasi-scientific treatment of 
theory, with detrimental effects to the identity of the individual professions. 
The social forces that encourage research for professions are worth some attention. 
Studying drivers for research, Skoie (2000) observes that in the OECD area, there has 
been an enormous growth in mass higher education since 1980. Traditional short-cycle 
courses and special and professionally oriented educations have been taken up and 
included in the university system, where teachers are increasingly expected to serve as 
researchers. The growth in mass higher education has been accompanied by a trend 
where increasingly, teaching is likened with research. One of Skoie’s concerns is that 
this development will be at the cost of professionally oriented skills, and that the 
research itself may be low in quality, but will be an important part of the universities’ 
reward systems: 
Influential faculty groups often seek to improve their working conditions – 
facilities, teaching loads, prestige/salary level and so on. A career structure 
which gives particular credit to traditional academic merits with an emphasis on 
research, quite obviously has great shaping influence in large parts of higher 
education, probably more so than the authorities are often aware of. By the 
same token, teaching becomes less rewarding (p. 415). 
As a diagnosis, these general observations seem to bear relevance to the design field. 
First of all, there has been a marked growth in the number of papers and books on all 
kinds of design since the 1970’s. The first international peer-reviewed journal in the 
field, Design Studies, was established in 1979. From these beginnings, design research 
now can count at least 7 international peer-reviewed journals and a large number of 
conferences and bodies focusing on design (Cross 2007). Secondly, such publications 
are for the most part authored by the staff of mass higher education; teachers and 
academics; and only partially by practitioners. Thirdly, there has been an obvious 
academic drift in the education system for design. Considering the product design 
educations that have been established at engineering schools for instance, one will see 
that this is a relatively recent phenomenon, where product design has been associated 
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with engineering colleges in the same time-frame that these technical colleges have 
sought the status of university, and the association of its professions with scientific 
methods. For instance, the Industrial Design Engineering (IDE) education at TU Delft 
was established in 1969 and the British Innovation Design Engineering program, a joint 
initiative between the RCA and the Imperial College, was established in 1980. In 
Scandinavia, the Industrial Design Engineering program at NTNU was established in 
1993, the IDE program at Chalmers was established in 1999, and the DTU’s Design and 
Innovation program was established in 2002. 
Without making any claims towards the nature of design research in general, it is 
likely that one should take into account that design research is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, often driven by the incorporation of a practical subject into scientific and 
academic institutions. Potential dangers of these developments are the points that have 
been made by social theory on professions and education: A weak research culture, 
where a superficial understanding of research and science is used to ground theories and 
inquiries, little reflection on the characteristics of professional knowledge and how these 
differ from scientific knowledge, and lastly, academic drift; that design theory is 
pursued from academic motivation, rather than its professional and practical uses. 
2.3.4 Positivism 
If it so, that design theory is experiencing academic drift, then a central question is 
whether this has any practical consequences for the embodiment of design theories and 
their accompanying narratives. One of the main caveats emerging from the claims that 
professions are experiencing academic drift is that research on professions is associated 
with a program of positivism. What does this entail, ultimately? 
The general challenges in the common project of design research that have been 
taken up so far, indicate a common theme that runs through the history of this field. The 
scientific conventions of positivism, i.e. using a set of positivist criteria for design 
research, have been pivotal element in the debates and discourses on how design 
research should be framed, and what one can expect, in terms of outcome, from this 
research field. 
On one side, in the internal discourses on conventions for design research, the 
attempts to define design research’s “otherness” can be read as criticism of and attempts 
to avoid the most dogmatic positions of positivism, and restrain its influence on design 
research. Many authors have implicitly argued against a positivist conception of science 
and research, by arguing for a different kind of research that emphasise the particular 
characteristics of design practice. 
On the other hand, the relationship between research and practice also implicitly 
references the historical disputes on positivism. One can see this in the expectations that 
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design research is expected to meet, in terms of “application”, and one can see it in the 
sociologists’ claims that research at professional schools displays a tendency to frame 
their research in a superficial understanding of research, and thereby inadvertently 
frame this research in positivist conventions. 
With a generalization, positivism can be identified as the view that research should 
be carried out according to the scientific method of a positivist epistemology. It holds 
all or most of the following positions (Hacking 1981, pp. 1-2): 
• Realism. Science is an attempt to find out about one real world. Truths about the 
world are true regardless of what people think, and there is a unique best 
description of any chosen aspect of the world. 
• Demarcation. There is a pretty sharp distinction between scientific theories and 
other kinds of beliefs. 
• Science is cumulative. Although false starts are common enough, science by and 
large builds on what is already known. Even Einstein is a generalization of 
Newton. 
• Observation-theory distinction. There is a fairly sharp contrast between reports 
of observation and statements of theory.  
• Foundations. Observation and experiment provide the foundations for and 
justification of hypotheses and theories.  
• Theories have a deductive structure and tests of theories proceed by deducing 
observation-reports from theoretical postulates. 
• Scientific concepts are rather precise, and the terms used in science have fixed 
meanings. 
• There is a context of justification and a context of discovery. We should 
distinguish (a) the psychological or social circumstances in which a discovery is 
made from (b) the logical basis for justifying belief in the facts that have been 
discovered. 
• The unity of science. There should be just one science about the one real world. 
 
A discussion of positivism should be approached with caution, as there is a risk of 
arguing with a straw man. Hacking writes: No single philosopher has ever maintained 
exactly these nine points, but they form a useful collage not only of technical 
philosophical discussion, but also of a widespread popular conception of science (p. 2). 
This conception has been common to design theory also, and a closer examination of its 
theoretical consequences can cast some light on the many disputes underlying design 
research. 
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For design research, the concrete and practical problem that a positivist conception 
of research can lead to is that one obscures important assumptions that research and 
inquiries are based on. I.e. that ‘design’ is idealised and abstracted into an entity where 
underlying assumptions and premises are seldom questioned or reflected over.  
This raises some problems. Since ‘design’ as a domain is constituted by the 
individual practitioners who practice design, design can be seen as a collection of 
projects, a collection of tasks, and of practitioners working in different cultures and 
social realities. ‘Design’ is primarily a social role where responsibilities are defined by 
the designer’s relation to the wider societal or business context, and not a naturally 
existing object per se. If one idealizes design practice into a literary, technical concept 
of ‘design’, one may obscure important assumptions on the nature, role, and context of 
design practice. If one ignores such assumptions, one risks relegating important 
premises for theories to the “background” of these theories, for instance: 
Values in research: Historically, inquiries in design research have usually been 
carried out by examining instances of design practice and evaluating this practice 
against criteria such as the transparency of processes, the resource-usage or the quality 
of product concepts that are generated. Design research relies on such value-laden 
assumptions on what constitutes good design work because it will provide the 
background against which empirical findings are evaluated. These criteria are, however, 
seldom objective or self-evident, and there is a great deal of controversy concerning 
such criteria (Rittel and Webber 1973). 
Generalization of insights: Empirical data in design research inquiries are usually 
restricted to individual design projects and cases. I.e. it is held that by examining 
concrete design projects one can improve one’s knowledge on the wider topic of 
‘design’ in general. It is not clear by which theoretical principles that such insights can 
be construed to the wider profession. Among the characteristics of design projects are 
contingency and novelty, which means that any validity claims for the wider domain of 
design will rely with researchers’ assumptions about the similarities of this practice 
across geographical and social divides. 
Competence: Although design research often is carried out under the idea that one 
can derive rules and procedures for this practice by scientific examinations of it, such 
rule-based accounts of competence are problematic. It is widely acknowledged that 
experience and competence consists in more than knowledge of rules. One argument is 
that human knowledge includes not only statements and argumentation, but that design 
work relies on e.g. tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1964). A pragmatic argument is that 
experience provides more and other insights than the mere accumulation of rules 
(Dreyfus 1996). And a social argument is that knowledge somehow resides in the social 
community of practitioners (Bucciarelli 2003). 
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Concepts and Constructs: If design is understood as an objectively existing entity, it 
obscures the question of which concepts and categories that are best suited to describe 
and analyse this practice. I.e. a reflective attitude to the technical terminology of design 
theory is troubled. Design theory has relied on general abstractions and models such as 
‘the design process’, ‘the design problem’, ‘stakeholders’ and others. But there is 
generally little reflection on whether and to what extent such concepts are the most 
appropriate or beneficial ones (Coyne 2005). 
The accumulation of theory: If design theory is believed to grow through the 
accumulation of mutually compatible theories that are accumulated into a knowledge-
base, then some potentially important differences within these theories may be 
suppressed. Common sense will support the understanding that there are cultural 
differences in designer’s work across geographical and social divides. It may also seem 
obvious that the design profession have changed, over the last fifty years. Yet, such 
differences are not always mirrored in design theory, where the concepts and constructs 
that Simon used to depict design in the first edition of The Sciences of the Artificial 
(Simon 1969), are still basis for much research, e.g. the design problem, the solution 
space and others.  
In general, the problem with the positivist schema in design research is that such 
assumptions are obscured. They are subsumed in a technical concept of design, with the 
potential consequence that theory is ill-fitted to the realities and experiences of design 
practice as a real-world phenomenon.  
The problem that the positivist schema leads to is first and foremost that important 
assumptions are simply ignored: On which values are claims based? By what criteria is 
design practice judged? How are insights and findings construed to be valid across the 
wider profession? Which concepts and categories are used to depict design practice? 
Under what set of criteria is theory produced? Under what circumstances can theories 
be considered disproven? Such questions are important for the general value and 
credibility of design research. But under a positivist schema, these are implicitly defined 
out, because the dominating perspective on science and research is one that does not 
question the idealisation and description that is inherent in theory and language.  
The experiences from the attempts to scientise design through The Design Methods 
Movement (See e.g. Bayazit 2004) provide an important historical experience and in 
this respect. On the surface, this was an attempt to establish an axiomatic and scientific 
design theory, with strong affinities to a positivist program. These theories were based 
on a set of assumptions on design practice. These included the view that design can be 
considered as a series of decisions, that the challenges of this process were largely 
cognitive, and that one could establish a rigorous method for the practice of design 
(Gedenryd 1998).  
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These attempts were eventually rebuked primarily because of the assumptions they 
made on design practice. They were rebuked because they did not mirror the way in 
which professionals worked (Gedenryd 1998), neither did they mirror how professionals 
thought and spoke about their own practice (Archer 1990).  
The analogy between positivist conceptions of science and design research is thus 
the instances where researchers leave little or no room to reflect over concepts used or 
language on design, simply because one of the underlying convictions is that the 
relation between theoretical statements and the real world is largely unproblematic (cf. 
Hacking’s table).  
The general claim that is being argued here is that the split between practitioners and 
design researchers, and the antagonism between design researchers themselves can be 
explained as a deep-running dispute over what kind of conventions that design research 
should abide by, and thereby the wider role and function design research should hold. 
Central to these disputes have been the criticism of and the search for alternatives to the 
positivist schema.  
In these disputes, practitioners often call for a more relevant kind of research. But 
for design researchers, such calls are not easily answered, as the design research 
community is in disagreement about the methods and principles that such research 
should undertake. This problem is not particular to design research, but it is a central 
problem, and it is one which the research community has not yet “resolved.  
Rather than argue the value of any particular approach, the view here is that when 
approaching design theory, one should accept more lenient criteria for knowledge-
production than traditional positivist criteria such as e.g. “falsificationism of theories”. 
One should acknowledge that there are significant challenges with identifying the social 
reality of design work, and even that a large range of conditional views of design may 
be a benefit.  
2.3.5 Initial diagnosis 
The preceding sections have contextualized and elaborated the initial understanding 
which has motivated this thesis. This understanding can be summarized: 
1. Product design is a profession with fleeting characteristics. The profession can be 
seen as the making of products, but concrete tasks and the development of 
professional knowledge and focus will range from the conceptual to the detailed 
embodiment, and from the production-oriented to the market-oriented.  
2. The theory supporting this profession is wide in scope and multi-disciplinary in 
nature. There is no authoritative tradition for how theories and models should be 
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certified for making valid claims for the profession, but a range of different schools 
of thought.  
3. There are expectations and incentives in the larger society for professional theories 
to be developed in accordance with a scientific framework. Since science and 
research requires a culture and collective historical memory, the danger of these 
incentives is that they may promote quasi-scientific, potentially superficial, research 
practices. 
4. To improve research practices, theoretical and methodical reflection will be 
beneficial. Design researchers and design practitioners are presented a wide array of 
potential narratives and methods. Navigating and understanding these are 
challenging. 
In line with the general research problem, the requirement is therefore a proper 
theoretical perspective and methodical framework by which one may assess and analyse 
the theoretical diversity of design theory, and display important characteristics. The 
selected framework is presented in the following. 
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2.4 Theoretical perspective 
By now, the issue is how one can analyse and compare the many theoretical 
strategies and conventions which have been employed in design research. Having 
sketched out the many conventions and expectations that underlie the field, the 
challenge is to find a suitable framework for comparing the many narrative traditions 
existing.  
Using a common unit of measure, for their comparison, risks deflating differences 
and subsuming narratives under rival narratives. For instance, the reflective perspective 
on design attempts to explain this practice with a wide focus on understanding. This 
implies emphasis on learning and the didactical use of materials, using a mentalist 
concept as ‘frames’. If one uses these paradigmatic stances to analyse e.g. how the 
cognitive program of Herbert Simon fared, one would miss out the way in which this 
narrative builds on entirely different premises. From the cognitive program’s 
perspective, the reflective account will be seen as flawed, as it is based on unscientific 
concepts.  
The situation in design research, with many traditional ways of idealising and 
modelling design, is in many respects similar to classical disputes in the sciences; in 
periods between normal science, the research community experiences disputes between 
rival paradigms (Kuhn 1970): Scholars and authors disagree about fundamental 
paradigmatic positions, and the discourse is somewhat politicized. Such discourses on 
the proper understanding and perspective of a target phenomenon often lead to disputes 
about the “true” or correct theoretical understanding of a given phenomenon.  
So, the view here is that the variety of stances exemplifies a classical kind of 
discourse; when design researchers propose different perspectives on design and design 
research, they propose different strategies for understanding the subject matter, design, 
itself. The situation necessitates an interpretative perspective on design theory, how it 
relates to practice, and the elements that are important to consider in this respect; i.e. a 
larger perspective on the relation between research, design theory, and design practice.  
Among the potential frameworks, one will find in design theory several examples of 
reflective perspectives on design existing. These based in different paradigmatic 
positions on language and science. One plausible approach is to hold that design theory 
is governed by different “meta-narratives”, and methodically address these meta-
narratives through discourse-analysis. One could then examine the discursive 
formations in the design discourse to identify the governing epistemes of these different 
discourses; a project that has been referred to as archaeology of knowledge. Such an 
approach in design theory has been explored by Ask, who has analyzed the constitution 
of industrial design as a profession in Norway (Ask 2004). 
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A similar approach, but one that to a lesser degree confronts the classical premises 
of the scientific project, is “paradigm analysis”. Attempts to identify the exemplars in 
design theory and the disciplinary matrices that design texts relate to, may potentially 
identify the limits and common problems that design theory addresses. An example of 
paradigmatic analysis in design research is the work of Dorst, who  compared the 
“rational problem-solving paradigm” with the “reflective practice paradigm” in design 
(Dorst 1997). 
Another approach with some precedence in design theory is metaphor analysis. 
With basis in Lakoff and Johnson (1980), design researchers have analyzed the 
metaphors that underlie design texts, under the assumption that these metaphors are the 
basis for thinking and that they influence and constrain how we think about the world in 
general and design in particular. An example is Hey et al (2007). 
What these approaches have in common, is an interpretative perspective; they hold 
that the terms, concepts and categories that are used to explain the social world in 
general, and design practice in particular, cannot be taken for granted, but should 
themselves be made the object of analysis.  
The perspective in this thesis is similar. The semantic view of theories is a 
perspective drawn from the philosophy of science, which holds that scientific theories 
refer to concrete and abstract models of their subject; theories do not reference real-life 
concepts and events directly, but idealized models of these. The corresponding view of 
the design discourse is thus that it relies upon a set of models of practice, whose primary 
function is to render design practice as homogenous and real-life practice amenable to 
introspection and analysis.  
The significance of ideal models is that in general discourse, theories and 
hypotheses are deemed true with reference to the model, and not to the real-life events 
themselves. This implies that theories will be constrained by the assumptions that are 
laid down in the model, and in this way trajectories for the development of the 
theoretical field are laid.  
Secondly, the ideal models will indicate agreement among researchers; a common 
and shared way of depicting design practice. Central idealized models are therefore 
believed to be indicative of narrative traditions. In the following, the perspective is 
presented and the value of a semantic perspective on design theory is argued. 
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2.4.1 The semantic view of theories. 
The perspective which establishes the vocabulary for differences in the conception 
of design practice, and in a systematic way approaches the difference between 
theoretical positions and stances here is the semantic view of theories. This is a 
perspective from the philosophy of science which holds that scientific theories in a 
significant way rely on and reference concrete and abstract models of their target 
phenomenon (Giere 2004; Suppe 1977).  
 The semantic view of theories (Giere 2004; Suppe 1977) emerged as a perspective 
that seeks to explain issues over scientific representation. It holds that the difference 
between competing theories on the same phenomenon normally cannot be explained 
with reference to one theory being truer than the other, but with a difference in 
underlying models of the phenomenon. According to the semantic view, scientific 
theories do not reference the target object directly, but reference ideal models of the 
target object. These models are simplifications of the target phenomenon, and an 
important difference between competing views in scientific discourse hence is the 
difference in underlying models.  
The historical context that motivated a semantic view of scientific discourse 
followed from Kuhn’s critique of the then received philosophy of science (Giere 1996, 
p. 270). Kuhn voiced a discontent with positivist and logical empiricist accounts of 
science, and central in this critique was the theory-observation distinction which held a 
prominent role in these accounts of science. The then received view of theories claimed 
that a theory of a phenomenon consisted in two parts: Its theoretical terms and its 
observational terms. The theoretical terms were the elements of the theory that 
explained causal relations, assumed elements and so on, whereas observational terms 
were the elements that could be observed empirically. However, the received view leads 
to several paradoxes. Among the more serious ones is that one can usually specify more 
than one procedure for attributing meaning to a term, and that the meanings of terms 
could not be fully captured by correspondence rules (Morgan and Morrison 1999a, p. 
2).  
A solution to these problems was to propose that scientific theories refer to a model 
of the target object and not the target object itself. The semantics, i.e. the meaning, of a 
theory can be found if one defines a model for which the theory is true. Scientific 
theories thus explain phenomena in the world by referencing ideal models that are more 
or less similar to the phenomena themselves. This can be explained as the view that 
scientific theories reference ideal systems of phenomena in the world, not the 
phenomena per se. Quoting Suppe (1977):  
Scientific theories have as their subject matter a class of phenomena known as 
the intended scope of the theory. The task of a theory is to present a generalized 
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description of the phenomena within that intended scope which will enable us to 
answer a variety of questions about the phenomena and their underlying 
mechanisms; these questions typically include requests for predictions, 
explanations, and descriptions of the phenomena. The theory does not attempt to 
describe all aspects of the phenomena in its intended scope; rather it abstracts 
certain parameters from the phenomena and attempts to describe the 
phenomena in terms of just these abstracted parameters. In effect, the theory 
assumes that only the selected parameters exert an influence on the phenomena 
and thus that these parameters are uninfluenced by any other parameters in the 
phenomena. As such, the theory assumes that the phenomena are isolated 
systems under the influence of just the selected parameters (p. 223). 
 
The perspective here, that how one idealises the phenomenon is a central 
characteristic to scientific theories, has motivated several analyses of scientific 
disciplines. Among the examples are an examination of optimality models in 
evolutionary biology (Beatty 1980), analysis of visual models in 20th century geology 
(Giere 1996), and how learning in economics make use of models (Morgan 1999).  
Central in such examinations, is the view that how the research community agrees to 
understand and idealise the target phenomenon is a key determinant for how theories 
will be embodied and the insights that can be drawn from these theories. The scientific 
theorising will depend on and be shaped by many exterior factors, like the purpose of 
the research or the conventions in the research community, and is not simply an 
unproblematic matter of description. Giere writes on an example from physics:  
If one is investigating diffusion or Brownian motion, one models water as a 
collection of molecules. However, if one’s concern is the behaviour of water 
flowing through pipes, the best-fitting models are those that treat water as a 
continuous fluid. Thus, the type of model one uses to represent water depends on 
the kind of problem one faces (Giere 2004, pp. 749-750). 
  
The consequence for the understanding of theoretical truth is important. In a 
scientific discourse, the formulation of theories and hypotheses and the subsequent 
testing or judging of their veracity or falsity are activities that are carried out with 
reference to the ideal model and its stated entities. If one were to hold, for instance that 
a phenomenon is best explained with reference to a given model, the observation and 
eventual confirmation of this model will be carried out under the assumption that the 
target phenomenon is adequately explained by the model.  
Thus, the general scientific perspective here is that scientific theories are not merely 
linguistic statements in the form of theories, but include elements of abstraction and 
modelling of the target phenomena. Teller argues: 
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We should take science to be in the business of providing not just descriptive 
sentences, statements, or propositions, but a much wider range of abstracta 
which represent agreement in form. Second, that such representation, whether 
by description or by form, is rarely, if ever, exact. (Teller 2001, p. 398): 
 
Figure2.2 - An illustration of how scientific theories presume an idealised model: Theories and 
hypotheses (T) reference a ‘model’ (M), which is the intended scope of the theory. The model is an 
abstracted and idealised replica of the target phenomenon. 
But if it is so that scientific theories in a crucial way depend upon idealised models 
of the target phenomenon it opens up a new question: How are we to understand and 
define ‘a model’? On this point, there is a lacuna in our understanding of what models 
are and how they work. Definitional proposals include fictional objects, set-theoretical 
structures, descriptions and equations (Frigg and Hartmann 2009).   
A general and plausible perspective is that models must be understood in light of the 
discourse they are elements in. Since the discourse of any field and how its participants 
understand this field will decide the form of the models, one must be careful making a 
broad category of ‘model’. Teller (2001) argues that ‘models’ must be understood quite 
broadly. What distinguishes them as models is simply that they are used as a common, 
conventional way of understanding and seeing the research object:  
What makes a thing a model is the fact that it is regarded or used as a 
representation of something by the model users (p. 395). And furthermore: 
Science produces models, which are sometimes concrete physical objects, but 
which in most cases of interest are abstract objects. Models are connected to the 
world by theoretical hypotheses, sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly 
stated ]...[ Science uses many things as models, such as ordinary functions, 
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phase spaces, vector spaces, fibre bundles, groups, structures (in the sense of 
formal logic) and much other abstracta, as well as physical models (p. 398). 
In summary, the semantic view of theories conceives science and scientific theory-
production as a social project which depends upon the agreement and sharing of a set of 
underlying models. Scientific insight will be shaped and constrained by these models, as 
theories will be formulated with reference to the models of the target phenomenon that 
the research community shares. The insights that can be derived from a scientific theory 
are thereby constrained by the assumptions that are laid down in the underlying model 
(figure 2.2).  
2.4.2 A semantic perspective on design theory 
For analysing design theory, the semantic perspective on scientific discourse implies 
that theories are formulated with respect to one or several idealised models, and that 
these ideal models are conventions which are shared by groups of researchers. The 
semantic view is a conceptual framework which explains the variety and the many 
different research strategies one can observe in design theory. Under this persepctive, 
these are seen as different ways of understanding design practice; different idealised 
systems that emphasise some aspects and elements at the cost of others.  
Under this view, much of the difference between narrative traditions can be 
observed in their different conventions for idealising and modelling design practice 
(figure 2.3). Using the semantic perspective to analyse and assess models allows 
questioning how different theoretical traditions in design theory describe and 
understand design practice.  
 
Figure 2.3 - An illustration of the semantic perspective on scientific discourse. Different theories 
and narrative tradition are not merely differences in perspective or meaning, but rely on different 
ways of idealising and defining the target object.  
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It appears obvious, once pointed out, that design theory relies on such idealised 
models, and that these models have an impact on the understanding of design.  Design 
researchers frequently make use of both explicit and implicit models to represent design 
practice (figure 2.4). If researchers choose to base their inquiries on common and much-
used conceptions of design such as phased process, design as form-generation, or 
design as collaborative inquiry, these models will shape hypotheses and theory-
generation. The models will decide how observations are to be understood and made 
sense of, and the central and important elements to consider in design practice. Such 
models decide primacy of elements, focus, and the general framing that design inquiries 
receive. 
 
Figure 2.4 - Examples of models in design theory. Clockwise from top left: The basic design 
cycle (Roozenburg and Eekels 1995), a framework for how customer response influence form 
(Crilly et al. 2009), a mind-map of functions and components (Kokotovich 2008), and a subdivision 
of the many design problems in a process (Lawson 1997) 
 
If these models are put to use as assumptions underlying inquiries, they will provide 
much of the rationale for theory-production. The scientific view for instance, espouses a 
program where design theory should aim for empirically grounded “rules” for 
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designers, the social view will opt for understanding the design process as a dialogue, 
whereas the conversation-model may indicate a hermeneutic research program. A more 
detailed understanding of these models may therefore display some of the 
characteristics of the theoretical traditions in design theory, and thereby aid readers in 
navigating the many traditions existing. 
Thus, the general view of design theory argued here is that it contains several 
traditions that rely on different idealised models of ‘design’. Idealised models reference 
design practice, establish common understandings of the how’s and what’s of design, 
and serve as idealised depictions of the design activity. The promise of the semantic 
view of theories is that it provides an analytic framework and some operative constructs 
for understanding the role that such models have for the development of theories, and 
thereby an important element in the larger project of development of design 
competence.  
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2.5 Research question 
Among the many models that can be argued to underlie the narratives in design 
theory, the focus here is how these traditions have abstracted and idealised the 
professional inference of design work: Implicit with existing theories are different 
conceptions of how designers reason and reflect while designing; an assumption that 
will impact how one understands design by idealising this practice in a specific manner, 
and ultimately lay trajectories for how design theory develops.  
These models are, however, different in nature. Some of them are explicit models of 
designers, whereas others are more implicit or hidden reflections. The examples 
displayed in the first chapter illustrates that the presumption on professional reasoning 
hold great influence over how theories in the design domain will be embodied.  
The precedence for decision-making inquiries in design theory, in the vein 
exemplified by Ulrich & Eppinger (2007), associates design practice with a rational-
choice paradigm, influenced by cognitive theories (Simon 1996). Under this view, 
design processes are designated in terms of problem structuring, problem spaces, 
decisions, and others. This terminology is derived from an assumption that professional 
reasoning in design can be seen as a problem of optimal choice and associated with the 
research practices of this tradition. The implicit rationale for theoretical inquiries in the 
design field will be to provide aid and support to the designer in making optimal choices 
by providing heuristics and methods. 
With Schön’s reflective account (Schön 1995) the reasoning process in design is 
seen as a problem of understanding. Under such a program, researchers make use of 
alternate concepts such as frames, reflection-in-action, and restructuring to describe 
design projects. The ontology is based on a constructivist premise; by including how 
designers use experiments to test and restructure their understanding, the account 
implicitly endorses research efforts that challenge frames-of-understanding, common 
professional practices, and aims to disclose designer’s habits and understandings rather 
than how they decide in typical situations. 
The social model sees design as primarily a social process. Reasoning in design is 
something that involves negotiating and bridging the different object worlds of the 
participants (Bucciarelli 2003). The underlying assumption is that in an industrial 
context, no single person will have a complete oversight and understanding of the 
design problem and that several competencies (and stakeholders) will have to be 
involved in the design process. Design work will demand facilitation and cooperative 
innovation, and research theories should thereby aim to support these social challenges 
to design work.  
 Framing Product Design 
 
60 
The hypothesis here is that if one could identify central models of professional 
reasoning existing in design theory, it should be possible to point out the central stances 
and assumptions inherent with individual narratives. If so, one may potentially both 
show some of the practical and theoretical benefits of certain models, as well as some 
implicit limitations with individual models.  
Furthermore, it is assumed that the models of professional reasoning hold such a 
central role within narratives that their identification could be used to demarcate 
between different narrative traditions. Such a study would be cross-sectional in its 
approach; it would show different models across the spectrum of design theory, 
rendering available the narrative traditions which these idealized conceptions have 
emerged from. 
 
This leads to the research questions: 
  
1. Which are the central idealised models of professional reasoning in the parts of 
design theory relevant to product design? 
2. How, characteristically, will the ontology of these models constrain and influence 
theory production in product design?  
 
Addressing the first question, a method for reviewing, and sampling models from 
design theory is presented in the next chapter. The second question on the “influence” 
these models exert on theoretical production is more complex and elusive. It will here 
be approached both through the analytic studies - how the conceptual structure of these 
models will highlight and emphasise some aspects of designing while black-boxing 
others, but also by taking up the discourse that has taken place between rival camps; i.e. 
the politicized discussion that has accompanied the use of these models in design 
theory. These investigations lead to a comparative section, where the transfer-models 
implicit with these traditions are deduced, and the trajectories these perspectives lay for 
design research are sketched out.  
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2.6 Methods 
In general, the models of professional reasoning will be approached from several 
angles, aiming for an interpretative examination of design theory. The research is 
inspired by Lakatos’ perspective that research should be merited by the insights it 
provides on a topic, and by the potential questions it opens for (Lakatos 1977). The 
research design is intended to extract idealised models from the existing discourse in 
design theory and subject these to analysis with a focus on their ontology and premises. 
The ensuing chapters present the methods followed.  
A substantial portion of the challenge with this thesis was finding a method which 
could be used to sample and document the models existing in design theory. Therefore, 
chapters 2.6.1 to 2.6.3 present the methods underlying the review presented in chapter 
3, whereas the subsequent chapters present the methods for analysis.  
In chapter 2.6.1 the perceived methodical challenges with this type of review work 
are presented. The main challenge was seen as uneven dispersion of ideal models 
throughout the literature, leading to the practical problem of having to go through a very 
large data-set with roughly the same content, to cover the relevant models in design 
theory.  
In 2.6.2 the operative understanding of idealised models is presented and, after 
having identified these positions, how the documentation and analysis the models of 
professional reasoning were carried out. In order to identify the models, a broad data-set 
was extracted, mapping the main positions and assumptions of different authors. This 
approach recorded the larger framework by which ‘design’ was understood and 
depicted.  
In 2.6.3 the procedural review approach, designed to overcome the problems 
presented in (2.6.1), is presented. The main idea is to sample idealised models from 
design theory by using well-known conflicts in this discourse. From these one can map 
different central positions in design theory, effectively indicating different narrative 
traditions in the material.  
In 2.6.4, it is explicated how a terminological approach has been used to compare 
the conceptual structures of three of the models. The argument underlying this 
examination is that for research inquiries, the conceptual structure of different idealised 
models will highlight some aspects of design practice at the cost of others. The text 
shows and exemplifies such effects through comparative analysis.   
In 2.6.5 the more political question of correspondence is addressed. Any research 
community has implicit drivers for conservatism in how problems are depicted and 
pursued as objects of study. The conflicts that arise between researchers regarding the 
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appropriate modelling of design practice are political in nature and cannot be “solved” 
analytically. But the proposal here is that disputes stemming from these conflicts may 
be a source for reflection and insights. By structuring the critiques surrounding the 
problem-solving model, the goal is to render, firstly, areas that have been problematic in 
the common project of design theory, and secondly, that the criticism introduces other 
ways of approaching and regarding these “problem areas”. 
The last section, 2.6.6, discusses the methodological approach, taking up the 
problems of representativity, and the robustness of the research design.  
2.6.1 Reviewing design theory.  
To identify and assess different models of professional reasoning in design theory, it 
was necessary to review and analyse large sections of design theory. Defining and 
delimiting relevant literature proved to be a surprisingly large obstacle, due to the 
varieties and idiosyncrasies of design theory. The main conceptual challenges perceived 
are therefore listed as they motivated the form that the sampling and reviewing would 
eventually receive. 
Delimiting the relevant theory 
Historically, there exists precedence for defining a common field of design, from 
which most design professions can be regarded as sub-sets (Chapter 2.3). Since there 
are few formal demarcations in design theory, the scope of theories forming the bulk of 
a literary review or analysis may potentially grow very large. The problem is illustrated 
by a review of design research published by the Rhode Island School of Design 
(Poggenpohl 2002). The publications that this review deemed important and relevant to 
design research belonged to a large array of theoretical traditions, including 
management literature, canonical philosophers, cognitive science, rhetoric, network 
theory, consumer research, sociology, systems theory and others. Since the reading of 
any text will require some background knowledge of the context for the text, one may 
question the realism of presuming that it is possible to cognitively cope with such a vast 
and diverse set of theories, with few disciplinary borders. The insight this challenge led 
to, was that while this text was originally written from the perspective of product 
design, it seemed necessary to retain an openness regarding relevant literature, as design 
theorists have argued by drawing on a large number of theoretical thinkers and 
traditions. 
Self-referential clusters 
This review approaches a subject that is unevenly dispersed throughout the design 
literature. Since texts that answer to specific institutions (e.g. a journal or a conference) 
usually share the same basic assumptions, there is a risk that a large number of texts 
could contain the same models on professional reasoning, and that such “schools” 
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would form self-referential clusters with respect to the ideal models contained. The 
methodological challenge with this was that if the review were limited to certain 
institutions, one would have to go through a potentially large body of texts with 
essentially the same relevant content. 
Lack of review tradition in design theory 
The format and standard of a review is usually given implicitly by the tacit traditions 
in a research community. For design research, however, review articles are quite rare. 
There exists no dedicated review journal, as one can find in other disciplines, and there 
are few reviews in existing journals. For instance, Design Studies, one of the few 
international science citation indexed design journals, contained 14 dedicated theoretical 
reviews from its first publication in 1979. Due to this lack of conventions, the reviewing 
phase was somewhat tentative and exploratory in form. 
2.6.2 Identifying and sampling models 
As the main characteristic of ideal models is their social usage and the agreement as 
a conventional reference on a topic (Teller 2001, quoted in chapter 2.4), the question is 
how such an understanding can be translated into an operative definition. The examples 
we have on use of the semantic perspective on theories are taken from research 
traditions such as geology, economics, and physics, and translating their operative 
approach to the design field requires some consideration.  
The identification of “models of professional reasoning” is circumstantial. The 
model is understood here as roughly akin to the various conceptions of ‘the designer’ 
that can be found in the literature; i.e. the idealised and general depiction of ‘the 
designer’ which underlies theories. Since this model seldom is stated explicitly in texts, 
it appeared necessary to collect the stances and definitions which indicated ‘the 
designerly inference’.  
A review was carried out to find the stances and definitions which indicated the 
models. The review recorded the key concepts which referenced authors’ implicit model 
of professional reasoning. For general understanding, points that indicated the larger 
structure of authors’ theories on design were also included. These points were recorded 
in a concept-matrix (Webster and Watson 2002) and the entities that were mapped at the 
time were:  
• Research paradigm 
• Definition of design  
• Prototypical problems 
• Ontology of design theory  
• Key audience (if stated)  
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• Model of structuring  
• Key terms 
• Types of evidence 
• Main criticisms (if available) 
 
The method follows Hart (2005) in its approach and mapping of key concepts, with 
the general perspective that one needs to elicit from the literature the ways in which 
core ideas, concepts and methodologies have been employed in argument and how they 
have been operationalized for empirical work (p. 142). For analysis, the literature was 
therefore structured according to a set of mapping techniques discussed by Hart8. Some 
risks are associated with this approach as one makes use of extracts of a larger material, 
particularly there is a risk that one construe authors’ positions. Hart, for instance, warns 
against attributing motives and methodological assumptions without clear evidence. 
Another common bias, that Webster and Watson (2002) warn against, is that reviews 
are structured around persons, rather than concepts.  
From this mapping process, six models of professional reasoning were identified. 
These models were categorized on basis of their ontology; i.e. the elements that authors’ 
held important and central when considering design reasoning. The models contain 
different perspectives on design, and on the challenges that designers face in work. 
Table 2.1 shows the models that were identified and their key concepts, and these are 
discussed and elaborated in chapter 3. 
In terms of contribution to the wider research community, one should note that this 
is an original methodical approach to theoretical assessment of design theory. Hart 
observes that quality criteria for reviews will rely on subjective judgments such as 
‘appropriate’ breadth and depth, ‘rigour’ and ‘consistency’, ‘clarity’, ‘brevity’, and 
‘effective’ analysis and synthesis. But there are few other reviews to compare and judge 
this review against. It is therefore uncertain to what extent the models here presented are 
new to the research community, or whether they can be expected to be common 
knowledge in this field. A claim is, however, that the review presents a way of 
understanding design theory that provides the a broad view of the idealized models of 
professional reasoning that have been employed in design theory, and therefore also 
new, coherent, insights on the issue. 
 
                                                 
8 Chris Hart, Doing a Literature Review: Releasing the Social Science Research Imagination (London: 
SAGE Publications, 2005). Chapter 6 
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Table 2.1 - An overview of different perspectives on design collected in the review.  
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2.6.3 Review; using discourse to demarcate theoretical traditions 
In the process of identifying literature, different conceptions of designing were 
actively sought out, while their quantitative influence (i.e. number of citations) were 
regarded as secondary. For this purpose, the review takes as its departure point a series 
of central theoretical disputes existing in design theory. 
It could have been feasible to restrict the review to particular journals, e.g. the peer-
reviewed Design Studies, or it could have been restricted geographically, e.g. 
Scandinavian textbooks on product design. But the assumption at the time was that 
restricting the review to a particular journal would have led to an unwarranted bias. The 
journal Design Studies was, for instance, perceived to favour a systematic and cognitive 
orientation, whereas the scope of Scandinavian textbooks was perceived to be quite 
small. 
Instead, the review seeks to broaden the scope by focusing on canonical disputes in 
the domain of design theory. Over the history of design research, different authors have 
proposed and argued for different conceptual perspectives on design. The review makes 
use of these disputes to extract conceptually different conceptions of design. The 
procedure for this was, firstly, to start with conflicts that were deemed central, and 
record the idealised model or perspective on design that authors argued for.  
After this, citation-mapping was used to identify the origins of those theoretical 
positions. ‘Origins’ were at this point understood rather loosely, as either adherence to 
the same concepts - case in point being the proposal that design is “wicked” problem-
solving - or adherence to the same diagnosis of design - e.g. design is a social process. 
The citation-mapping was carried out in an explorative manner to identify and elaborate 
the models, or conceptions, of professional reasoning that underlie the positions of the 
various authors, and the procedure follows Small in what is termed “a snowball 
approach” to mapping science (Small 2003). 
The process lead to the identification of some works that were perceived as 
canonical, in that they have provided central models and perspectives for how ‘design’ 
can (and allegedly should) be understood as a field of study. I.e. they are “schools” for 
design theory in that they have provided central models, concepts, and premises. 
Conflicts in the design discourse 
The disputes that were the outset for this review can be seen as different variants of 
the positivism-dispute. In different guises, they concern how theory for design credibly 
can and should be produced. Three variants of this dispute were identified. Either, these 
are theoretical disputes over how a theoretical field should be embodied; should it aim 
for design research being a cumulative science, or in another form? There are also 
conflicts over the process-model much used in design theory; i.e. should design be 
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described in the context of discovery and justification, or in another form? And finally, 
there are the disputes whether a design theory should be assumed to hold a deductive 
structure. (Cf. points 3, 8, and 6 respectively, Hacking’s table, section 2.3.4.)  
The first perceived conflict was the one that concerned the extent to which systems 
theory could serve as meta-theory for design theory. The debate, at heart, concerns how 
and whether ‘design’ can be formalised as a cumulative science (through logical or 
numerical means), and thereby has obvious percussions for how a design theory should 
be embodied. Central positions in this debate were perceived to be Simon (1969, 1st 
edition), who asserted that design problems have a formal structure, whereas Rittel and 
Webber (1973), argued that real-life problem-solving could not possibly follow such a 
technical pattern, as it would affect the lives and habits of real people with inherently 
conflicting interests. They termed design problems are “wicked”, a notion that has 
raised considerable interest throughout the design community.   
Although the theoretical dispute concerning the role of systems theory in a theory of 
design is an old one, it resurfaces in discourse at intermittent intervals, although under 
different guises.  Among the protagonists for a systems view of design one find Jones 
(1970), who wrote one of the earliest textbooks on design methods, leaning heavily on 
Simon’s ideas of structured problem-solving. Friedman (2003) uses Simon’s ideas of “a 
process of goal-directed problem-solving” as departure point for an entire classification 
of design theory. And from interaction design, Carroll (2006) sees Simon’s model as a 
beneficial framework for the inclusion of users in design processes (sic). In the 
opposing stance, one find Liddament (1999), who argues that the assumptions 
underlying the “computationalist” paradigm are outdated and flawed. Goel (1995), 
argue from a position inside cognitive science, Simon’s original domain, that the 
Simon’s theory is ineffective. And from interaction design, Kyng (1995) takes the 
opposite position of Carroll, arguing that the problem with system theories is that they 
exclude perspectives and interests of users.   
Similarly, there have been disputes concerning the process-models of design; the 
variations over seeing design as a process of analysis-synthesis-evaluation. Kroes 
(2002), for instance, argues against “the process perspective” he sees as dominant in 
design theory. Earlier, Darke (1979), drawing on Hillier et al (1972), had argued for an 
alternative process understanding of design. This view is summarized by Bamford  
(2002) comparing what he terms “the two principal modes of design”, analysis-
synthesis and conjecture – analysis. The latter model has as its central feature that 
designers bring conjectures to the design task that shape the form in which solutions are 
produced. From the perspective of cognitive science, Gedenryd (1998), has also raised 
criticism of this model, arguing that it relies on a flawed cognitive metaphor. 
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Figure 2.5 - A systematic perspective of conflicts in design theory 
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The last dispute which served as starting point concerns the relationship between 
design practice and design research. The argument is often raised that theorisers are out 
of step with the realities of design practice. This implies a dispute whether design 
theorists should frame this practice from the (assumedly deductive) design theoretical 
field, or whether they should frame it in the language and concepts of practitioners 
themselves. Schön (1983, 1st edition) proposed reflective practice as an alternative to 
“technical rationality”, and  Coyne (2005), sees a conflict between the theoretical 
“systemizers” and alternative conceptions of professionalism. 
The review-material was generated by firstly, documenting various positions that 
had been central in these disputes and then trace the sources and references that authors 
in these disputes based their arguments on. By this approach, authors’ conceptual 
positions on design reasoning could be visualized in a map. 
Figure 2.5 displays these conflicts as a tool to arrange and visualize the reviewed 
material. The figure includes the timeline at which works were published, the theoretical 
domain that authors can be associated with, and the arrows indicate protagonist or 
antagonist stances. 
 
2.6.4 Conceptual structure and black-boxing in design models. 
After having identified these ideal models, the fourth chapter presents an 
examination of conceptual structures, i.e. the ontology, with three of the models. For 
exemplary purposes, the text compares the conceptual structures with three of the 
models and suggests how these influence the formation and development of theory. 
The argument underlying the analysis is that the different models of design have as a 
fundamental trait conceptual structures which emphasise and highlight certain aspects of 
real-life design practice, while black-boxing others. The ontology of the model contains 
a terminology that provides parameters and invariants for inquiries, suggesting that 
observations and hypotheses will be coloured by the worldview inherent. The practical 
importance translate to situations such as when researchers choose to designate aspects 
of design work as e.g. either “structuring”, or the establishment of “generative 
metaphors”. The use of any given conceptual structure will skew inquiries, a fact of 
which awareness is needed in situations of inquiry and research.  
For this research, a terminological procedure was followed (Cabré 1999). It 
consisted in extracting and documenting the significant terms with the models and 
identifying what kind of concepts and conceptual structures that were postulated for 
design. The terms used by authors in different traditions were registered and grouped 
according to the concepts they designated. 
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In this work, the prior identification of models is important, because terminological 
methodology requires that one identifies the ‘conceptual structure’ of a written corpus 
before one can extract terms or concepts from it. This is because the conceptual 
structure serves as a principle for interpretation; it is the conceptual structure that 
enables differentiation between terms that belong to a particular conceptual structure, 
and terms that are just elements in the larger language (Cabré 1999, pp. 132-136). The 
assumption was that these models of professional reasoning corresponded to what is 
terminologically understood as a conceptual structure.  
This approach may be understood also as a general hermeneutic principle: When one 
extract terms from a large written corpus, the derivation of a structure will allow one to 
consider terms in relation to the overall intention of the corpus: One interprets the 
central concepts and elements in the theories by first assuming that the models in 
question are similar to the conceptual structure. 
2.6.5 ‘Correspondence’ - Discourse and criticism of the problem-
solving model 
The text in chapter five takes up under what premises idealised models will have its 
fair and proper application in research inquiries, i.e. the assumed correspondence 
between models and concrete design practice.  
Given the nature of this practice, one could ideally expect design researchers to hold 
a repertoire of methods and approaches to design, and be familiar with advantages and 
limitations to different approaches, and the situations for which they applied. This 
implies ability to recognise concrete problems with a suitable framework, e.g. 
associating problems of cooperation with social models, associating problems of 
organisation with e.g. cognitive models and so on.  
While working with this thesis, a striking feature was that real-life research rarely 
exhibits these rational characteristics. On the contrary, disputes in design theory often 
turn into as-is discussions on the nature of design; fierce discussions on the one correct 
way to depict and designate design practice.  
As an afterthought, this is hardly surprising. The way researchers choose to idealise 
design is closely intertwined with their general perspective on the world, and their 
research orientation. One can assume that researchers have vested interests with 
promoting certain ways of idealising design because it is related to their self-identity as 
researchers, and the commitment that follows from gaining merit within certain research 
traditions. The obvious danger with this practice is that models are propagated 
throughout the research community on basis of habit and convention, rather than 
consideration of the problem at hand. 
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The general problem is that any research community has implicit drivers for 
conservatism in how problems are approached. The conflicts that arise from different 
worldviews and ideal models being argued are political in nature and cannot be 
“solved” analytically.  
But these disputes in design theory over how practice should be understood and 
modelled provide access to many of the practical concerns that has arisen historically 
when researchers attempt to model design practice. The discourses can thereby present 
arguments and caveats that have been raised in the history of design theory, and be a 
source for more pragmatic reflections on the topic. 
One such historical dispute concerns the proper role for and understanding of 
problem-solving models of design. This model of design has exerted much influence on 
design theory, possibly bordering dominance. The model in question can be traced to 
the cognitive information-processing programme of Newell and Simon (1972), and 
essentially regards design as a type of cognitive process.  
In order to provide reflection over issues of modelling of practice, or choice between 
existing models, the aim here is to draw on the historical wisdom of the research 
community. The means is to display and structure the disagreements that have been 
prominent, and thereby provide insight on the practical problematic areas with 
idealising design. The problem of model choice is here approached in an exemplary 
manner. It is structured around the criticisms of one of the models, the problem-solving 
model, in a way that is intended to open reflection over how models can be judged and 
assessed also in general.  
A problem in this regard is that the stances from which researchers have argued are 
uneven in their focus and understanding of design; the individual disputes don’t address 
the same aspects with the problem-solving model. Rittel and Webber (1973) for 
instance, hold that the attempt to “scientise” design in itself is flawed and elaborate their 
criticism to a series of points with a technical conception of design that the authors find 
problematic. For Schön (1995), the criticism is indirect: it is the inherent positivism of 
the model that is problematic, but Schön’s alternative is another scientific paradigm: 
pragmatism. Coyne (2005) on the other hand criticizes what he sees as a flawed 
conception of professionalism with systematic design methods in general. Since these 
discourses hold different foci, it has been necessary to equalise the arguments of these 
authors.  
The approach has been to extract central stances, i.e. premises, from the problem-
solving model and subject these to the historical criticisms of the design community. 
The critiques of these tenets were then structured as a series of arguments pro et contra 
this model to render this discourse transparent.  
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2.6.6 Discussion of the method 
The research questions aim for the identification of “central models” in design 
theory. An important question is therefore whether the method undertaken here is likely 
to yield an overview of the most central models of professional reasoning; i.e. can the 
method yield an overview which is representative for design theory?  
The answer relies very much with the conflict approach, and the postulate that the 
referenced works points to the central conception in design theory. Undoubtedly, this 
diagnosis relies with the author, and is shaped by this writer’s horizon and 
understanding of the field.  
Throughout the work, as one’s understanding evolves, and knowledge grows, one 
discovers that there are more and even more models that could have deserved scrutiny, 
and which substantial groups of design researchers hold as idealisations for inquiries.  
A case in point is the semantic tradition in design theory, exemplified with 
Krippendorff’s “the semantic turn” (2006). The view with this tradition is largely that 
one should differentiate between “technology-centred” and “human-centred” design, 
and that design work implies the ability to negotiate products’ meaning; meaning in use, 
meaning in language, and meaning in an “ecology of artefacts”.  
The reader will see that I in the succeeding text have treated this tradition as one of 
several “doctrinaire” positions. The tradition implicitly presents a normative framework 
for the issues and responsibilities that designers should undertake in the course of 
professional work, a perspective on design knowledge that can be traced to ancient texts 
as (Vitruvius 1914). But this is my interpretation and categorisation. Other readers may 
categorise the field differently, and read the semantic model as a holistic view of design 
activities. 
Thus, the problem with choosing an adequate perspective and a system of 
classification for the models encountered is one that will impact the degree to which this 
text can be trusted and received by readers. The methodical challenge with any text of 
this kind is that examining a large and diverse theoretical tradition to a question of 
models is a project that requires making concessions. 
The knowledge claim associated with the research questions should therefore be 
qualified: This thesis attempts to identify and examine idealised models of reasoning 
that are much used and referenced in design theory, but it is only one of several (and 
equally valid) perspectives on this body of theories.  
A second potential problem with this method is the assumption of a static view of 
theory and theoretical meaning. The perspective underlying e.g. discourse analysis in 
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social theory is that meanings change over time as a discourse unfolds. Meanings and 
intentions in statements evolve as participants reframe and elaborate their argument.  
An example is the cognitive model of design, derived from Newell and Simon’s 
theory of information-processing which by this point has been argued to be a much used 
reference in parts of design theory. Goldschmidt, one of the central figures in cognitive 
design research, speculates that many of these references are not based on a deep 
examination of Simon's theories, but that they are rather referenced because such 
references provide access to the academic discourse (Goldschmidt 2008). 
The implicit argument is that the way in which such theoretical frameworks are 
appropriated in design theory is not only a matter of ‘design theory’ appropriating 
models from ‘science’, but that several parallel discourses exist; Both the way in which 
cognitive scientists understand the problem-solving model, and the way in which design 
researchers understand the problem-solving model. A question that could have been 
raised is therefore how the theoretical models taken up here are used on a daily basis, 
and how they have their implicit meaning has changed over the history of design 
research. 
Thus, the static understanding of ‘theory’ and ‘model’ assumed with this thesis risk 
petrifying stances which are somewhat different from everyday usage in parts of the 
design discourse.  
While this point probably is important to keep in mind for the reader, the scope of 
such an examination would have been too large to pursue within this thesis. The view 
here is simply that overview of these models is beneficial, but notably, it is the 
historical and original meaning that is the focus of attention  
A procedural risk with the method also needs mentioning; the operative definition of 
‘ideal models’ is vague, opening for subjective interpretation of authors’ standpoints. 
The interpretation of theoretical perspectives and positions will give simplified 
depictions of the assumptions that authors have employed in inquiries on of concrete 
design issues. It can therefore be argued that the positions presented in this thesis are 
stereotypes; positions that few writers in reality ascribe to, and which are qualified by 
the concrete problems and concerns of individual writers. It has been necessary to do so, 
however, to render the points in this thesis explicit.  
Lastly, the reader should be aware that employing the semantic view of theories in 
the manner here might leave the impression that this perspective is philosophically 
uncontroversial. The reality is far from it. In the current discourse there is much debate 
over the correct understanding and depiction of models, and associated issues such as 
whether the relation between models and the target phenomenon can be characterized as 
isomorph or similar (Teller 2001), whether the model view leads to relativist accounts 
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of science (Giere 2004), the unclear role that language have in models (Frigg 2006) and 
even over the most fitting or correct depiction of semantic models themselves (Suppe 
1977). What remains uncontroversial, however, is the general claim that scientific 
inquiry relies on idealised models of its target subject. 
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3 - Models of  design as professional reasoning 
 
The review in this chapter identifies six models of professional reasoning. It takes up 
the background and context for these models, the characteristics to the models, and 
discusses how these conceptions will influence theory-production in the design domain.  
Motivating the inquiry is a central problem in the endeavour of documenting 
insights and producing theories in the design domain. How does one “observe” and 
generally theorise ‘design’? It is not self-evident how insights from one particular 
design project can prove anything for another design project. Premises of any project 
will vary and the contingencies of individual design projects are significant, so a 
common-sense argument is that one must be cautious about inferring across such a large 
and eclectic body of practices. 
A key element in the domain is therefore the assumptions laid down on the nature of 
this practice: Which tasks it typically consists in, the context in which this practice takes 
place, and the elements and behaviour postulated for this practice. Assuming theoretical 
coherence for the domain is a necessary step in rendering it homogeneous and 
comprehensible, so that insights can be transferred from individual projects to the 
knowledge of the larger domain (See e.g. Hendricks et al. 2000). 
One way to understand such pre-theoretical assumptions is to hold with the semantic 
view of theories the view that any theorising significantly relies on models. I.e. by 
postulating an abstract and ideal entity of the real-world phenomenon, theories can be 
judged as true or false with reference to this ideal model.  
Here, model-theory is used to explain a group of such models; the models of 
professional reasoning that underlie design theory. ‘Professional reasoning’ is here 
understood as the implicit depiction of the reasoning process typical to design practice. 
In existing design theory, many such depictions exist. Some authors have assumed 
that the design process is a hypothetic-deductive process akin to scientific reasoning. 
Others have held that the reasoning that characterise design is a social process, where 
several stakeholders or groups interact, whereas others have seen reasoning as a 
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reflective conversation with materials. If these models are used as assumptions 
underlying inquiries, they will provide much of the rationale for theory-production. A 
more detailed understanding of these models may therefore display important 
characteristics of the theoretical traditions in design theory, and thereby aid readers in 
navigating the many traditions existing. 
This chapter presents and elaborates these models. The focus for this presentation is 
how these models depict professional reasoning, the central stances with these models. 
The cultural context; tradition or research program, from which these models have 
emerged are presented, and the ways in which they constrain design theory are sketched 
out.  
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3.1 The problem solving model 
Large parts of what is often termed systematic design theory, for instance the Design 
Methods Movement, are based on the problem solving model of design. The model has 
its background in the information-processing theories of cognitive science associated 
with Newell and Simon (1972). Particularly Simon’s contributions to design theory 
(Simon 1973, 1996) can be considered seminal, as they have an explicit design focus 
and are much referenced (Gedenryd 1998). 
The historical background for the problem solving model is complex and its 
emergence appears to have been part of a historical trend: Many practically motivated 
works on design from the same time also describes design by the same depiction as 
Newell and Simon: as a goal-oriented, tractable process, moulded in the tradition of 
decision-theory and systems theory (e.g. Asimow 1962). 
Understanding the problem solving model may require a recapitulation of the 
scientific discourse at the time of its conception. In the 1950’s, behaviourism was a 
leading psychological paradigm (Rowe 1987, p. 44). Behaviourism had emerged as a 
reaction to mentalism, i.e. it rejected all attempts to study inner mental processes on the 
account that these were unobservable, and therefore unreliable as a subject of any 
scientific study. For studies of problem-solving and creativity, the stance caused 
obvious problems, as behaviour in these areas to an undefined extent will rely on the 
thought processes of the problem solver.   
From the perspective of cognitive science, Newell, Shaw and Simon proposed a 
solution to this gordic knot in the paper “Elements of a Theory of Human Problem 
Solving” (Newell et al. 1958).  They proposed to understand problem-solving behaviour 
by way of basic information processes, holding that explanations of human behaviour in 
this respect can be given by the “program” that underlies this behaviour. They thereby 
reasserted the primacy of cognitive processes, although in a cautious manner as they 
maintained an analogy between thought and the physical processes of a computer; the 
computer’s processes having the clear benefit, in this regard, of being observable9. 
As a framework for design, the problem-solving model was introduced to design 
theory through several routes. On one hand, Simon argued vocally that design was a 
natural sub-field in a theory of problem solving (Simon 1996). Simon argued for a 
science of design; a science of the contingent, which could embrace the professions of 
engineering, medicine, business, architecture, and painting.  
                                                 
9 See e.g. Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial (3rd edn.; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996) 
XIV, 231 s., p. 21 
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Many practically focused design theorists have picked up the perspective of problem 
solving, presumably because it provides scientific authority and credence to their 
theories (e.g. Jones 1970; Pahl et al. 1996). The problem-solving program has also been 
furthered as a particular branch of study in design theory (e.g. Akin 1986).  
Recapitulating the stances of this program is rather extensive, as the positions have 
been the backbone of fields such as cognitive science and artificial intelligence. But the 
central positions are: Design is a kind of problem-solving. It can be understood as a 
problem space (P), which is a set of elements or potential choices. Within (P), there is a 
sub-set of solutions (S) that the problem solver seeks to find, i.e. the solutions that 
provide a satisfactory outcome. An illustration that the authors use is to think of the 
problem-space as a crossword. P is then all the possible words in the English alphabet, 
whereas the subset S is those combinations in which all consecutive linear horizontal 
and vertical sequences are words that satisfy specified conditions (Newell et al. 1959, p. 
11). 
Central in Simon’s view of design is that it is a process that seeks to attain goals by 
adapting the inner environments (of products) with its outer environment; mapping the 
structure of the product with its function. The mental process for finding solutions 
consist in two types of processes: One is the solution-generating processes, e.g. trial-
and-error searches. Another is the verifying processes which evaluate the merit of a 
tested solution, through means-end analysis (Simon 1996, pp. 128-129). 
A central stance is that a product, understood widely, has a structure; it represents a 
hierarchy which allows the designer to decompose the design problem into smaller sub-
problems which can be solved individually. Using architecture as example, Simon 
argued in The structure of ill-structured problems (Simon 1973):  
The problem space is not defined in any meaningful way, for a definition 
would have to encompass all kinds of structures the architect might at some 
point consider, all considerable materials, all design processes, and 
organizations of design processes (pp. 187-188).  
Instead, the designer decomposes the design problem into smaller sub-problems. By 
moving down in the hierarchy of functions, the architect will discover sub-sets of 
problems that are amenable to structured problem solving:  
Applying the same linguistic metaphor to house design, “house” might 
transform to “general floor plan plus structure”, “structure” to “support plus 
roofing plus sheathing plus utilities”, “utilities” to “plumbing plus heating 
system plus electrical system”, and so on (p. 190).  
The reason that a design problem presents a challenge has to do with the limits to 
human reasoning, the bounded rationality of humans. Simon does not regard design 
problems as problems of understanding or interpretation, but as problems of processing, 
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i.e. the cognitive capacities for information-processing. Humans are seen as quite simple 
behaving systems:  
The most striking limits of subjects’ capacities to employ efficient strategies 
arise from the very small capacity of the short-term memory structure (seven 
chunks) and from the relatively long time (eight seconds) required to transfer a 
chunk of information from the short term to long-term memory” (Simon 1996, p. 
81). 
 
As a model of the professional inference of design practice, the problem-solving 
model suggests three points: One is that ‘design’ is a matter of matching solution 
structures to the requirements of the situation. It is a process where solutions are evoked 
or generated from memory, and tested, to see whether their application is conforming to 
requirements. Secondly, the judging of appropriateness takes the form of a means-end 
analysis, which Simon termed satisficing: The designer seeks solutions that are “good 
enough”, not optimum ones, as it is practically unfeasible to believe that one can find 
such an optimum solution. Thirdly, due to the complexities of real-life, design problems 
need to be structured: Design problems are decomposed into smaller problems that can 
be solved in a nearly individual manner before being put together to an overall solution. 
What consequences does this model hold for the production of theories and 
hypotheses in the design domain? First of all, Simon promotes a Science of design; a 
cumulative and falsifiable theoretical field of designing. The aim was to elevate the 
status of designers by producing an empirically testable theory of the issues relevant to 
the design professions (Simon 1996, p. 114). 
The main challenge in design practices, as Simon saw it, was the limited cognitive 
capabilities of humans. Correspondingly, he argued for theories that could aid the 
problem-solving involved in design: General strategies that can be employed across a 
large range of projects and which includes evaluation, formal logic, heuristics for 
search, a theory of structure, and a theory for representation. (Simon 1996, p. 134). 
One thing that should be particularly noted with this model is that it excludes what 
we normally think of as knowledge. Simon emphasised that his theory of design was 
complementary to basic knowledge of solutions (Simon 1996, p. 135). So the repertoire 
that the designer draws from when generating solutions is simply assumed to “be there”. 
Designers must turn to other sources if they are to acquire solutions and techniques that 
are to be reapplied in new projects. 
The impact this model has had on design theory is huge. Many writers ascribe a 
central historical role for the problem-solving model in design theory, arguing that it 
was one of the first that abstracted the design process from the product, and dared to do 
so in a systematic way. It has even been argued that it serves as a “default model” of 
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design in design theory (Coyne 2005; Dorst 2006). It has thereby provided stances and 
ways of thinking about design that has moved into the general discourse; problem-
solving, structuring, decomposition, are examples of concepts that can be traced to this 
model.  
The problem-solving model’s influence on design theory can be witnessed in e.g. 
how the topic of representation is a dedicated topic of study in design theory (Porter 
and Goldschmidt 2004; Visser 2006).It can be found with developments of formal 
models of design, e.g. the F-B-S model (Gero 1990). It can be found with research that 
develops Simon’s model and tests the boundaries of it (Goel 1995). Applications 
developed for the purpose of easing or aiding the cognitive problems with designing 
(Restrepo 2004). And it can be found with the tradition for relying design research with 
laboratory, or protocol-studies of design (Dorst et al. 1996). Furthermore, the 
conception of design as a goal-oriented decision process, is a often used as a basic 
model in textbooks on design, e.g. (Jones 1992; Roozenburg and Eekels 1995). 
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3.2 Reflective practice 
The model of design as reflective practice is characterised by a constructivist 
understanding of knowledge and therefore posits a central role for tools, media, and the 
social contexts in which design takes place. The underlying perspective is that if there is 
such a thing as “designerly reasoning”, then the sketches and models that designers 
normally use must be considered elements in this process. This perspective on design is 
commonly associated with Donald Schön, who relied on Dewey’s theory of inquiry 
when the theories on design were formulated (Schön 1992, 1995). 
Schön’s theories on reflective practice extend to all of professional practice. But a 
substantial part of these theories concern design practice specifically, typically 
architects, industrial designers and engineers. Central for these theories is a diagnosis 
and warning that far too often, professional practice is conceived as a form of applied 
science; i.e. that professional work is the mere “execution” of a master science. Typical 
instances of this are when engineering is understood as merely a subset of mathematical 
and physical science, or medicine a subset of biology (Schön 1992, p. 119).  
Rather, Schön argues, knowledge emerges from the context of practice. By 
interaction with the tools and materials that are common to the practitioner, and by 
dialogue with clients, practitioners establish knowledge that is particular to the practice 
they carry out. In the view of Schön, practitioners have their own esoteric knowledge 
codes woven into practice, and he is concerned with how these ontological differences 
in our ways of seeing the world will shape and influence our professional work, hence 
the constructivist underpinnings of this theory. 
In Schön’s view, design is an instance of Dewey’s transactional inquiry (Schön 
1992, p. 127); a kind of inquiry shaping and then shaped by a problematic situation. 
Thus, design is not seen primarily as solving a problem, but about making sense of the 
design task: In order to convert a problematic situation to a problem, a practitioner 
must do a certain kind of work. He must make sense of an uncertain situation that 
makes no sense (Schön 1995, p. 40). The inquiry of the designer depend in a significant 
way on the context of practice, its tools media and clients: The inquirer does not stand 
outside the problematic situation like a spectator; he is in it and in transaction with it 
(Schön 1992, p. 122).  
Concerning the professional reasoning in design, Schön depicts this as a double 
design process. On the one hand, designers construct, from a given technical universe, a 
(wholly mental) design world and within this world, the particular structure, or product, 
is built (Schön 1992, p. 129). On the other hand, this object world is put to the test by 
the moves and experiments that designers carry out in the real-world, particularly with 
the materials of the situation.  
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To begin with, the designer establishes a design world10- or frame – on basis of the 
prestructures and appreciations that the designer holds. Establishing the design world is 
“problem setting”, i.e. the designer decides the meaningful framework for 
understanding the design problem. This framework includes such items as: names of 
elements, features, relations, actions, and of norms used to evaluate problems. A design 
world is not necessarily an objectively true description of the design problem, in the 
way a problem-space is taken to be in cognitive theories, but is a subjective perception 
of the design problem. It relies also on the preferences and appreciative judgments of 
the designer.  
The design world serves for the designer as a frame-of-reference for thinking about 
the design problem. But the elaboration of new solutions is not solely a cognitive effort. 
The designer elaborates the understanding of the design problem through a 
conversation-like transaction with the materials at hand (Schön 1992, p. 125). By 
various forms of interaction, the designer manipulates the design worlds and the 
designed object, testing own understanding of the design problem as much as testing the 
particular structure. By this interaction the designer arrives at new and more certain 
insights. This in turn could lead to either the elaboration of certain proposals or it could 
lead to the designer realising he is holding a limited or flawed understanding of the 
design problem. In such instances, the designer must reconsider his initial 
understandings and reset the design problem. The situation “backtalks” to the designer 
and the backtalking is a central element in professional reflection.  
The fluency and ease with which designers alternate between design worlds thus is a 
central parameter in good design practice. Schön uses an anecdotal example from 
product development to explain this argument:  
Some years ago, a group of product-development researchers was 
considering how to improve the performance of a new paintbrush made with 
synthetic bristles. Compared to the old natural-bristle brush, the new one 
delivered paint to a surface in a discontinuous, “gloppy” way. The researchers 
had tried a number of different improvements. They had noticed, for example, 
that natural bristles had split ends, whereas the synthetic bristles did not, and 
they tried (without significant improvement resulting) to split the ends of the 
synthetic bristles. They experimented with bristles of different diameters. 
Nothing seemed to help. Then someone observed, “You know, a paintbrush is a 
kind of pump!” He pointed out that when a paintbrush is pressed against a 
surface, paint is forced through the spaces between bristles onto the surface 
(Schön 1995, p. 184).  
The argument being, that the appropriate reframing of the design problem leads to 
the elaboration of new and better solutions. 
                                                 
10 Throughout the writings, Schön uses several terms for mentalist concepts, many of which appear 
interchangeable. A synonymous term for ‘design world’ is ‘frame’. 
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The view of knowledge and learning that Schön establishes with this model breaks 
with the positivist conception of applied science that underlies e.g. Simon’s theories on 
design. Instead, they see design practice as a context for generating knowledge, and not 
for applying knowledge:  
In this sense, designing serves as preparation for further designing – both 
within and across the boundaries of a local design episode. We speculate that 
designers are able to store the discoveries that result from past projects, 
carrying them over to new design situations that trigger them, on the basis of 
features perceived as similar. So designers may acquire the ability to operate 
simultaneously in multiple domains, spin out complex design scenarios, and 
think about larger and more complex move experiments (Schön and Wiggins 
1992, p. 155).  
 
Therefore, Schön argues that important theories, concepts and categories are formed 
by designers in their work, and that this knowledge is possible to generalise also for 
other design projects. But Schön also holds that while design is learnable, it is not 
didactively or discursively teachable: design relies upon the ability to recognise 
desirable and undesirable qualities of the discovered world. But novice students do not 
possess this ability, and it cannot be conveyed to them by verbal descriptions. Hence, it 
must be learned through apprenticeship in a novice-expert relation. Schön does concede 
also a role also for more traditional forms of research, suggesting that these may be of 
four types (Schön 1995, pp. 307-325):  
• Frame analysis – the study of the ways in which practitioners frame problems 
and roles. 
• Repertoire-building research – accumulating and describing exemplars. 
• Research on fundamental methods of inquiry and overarching theories. 
• Research on the process of reflection-in-action. 
 
In the same way that the problem-solving model excludes basic knowledge, the 
reflective model is also somewhat silent on these matters. Waks (2001) raises a question 
on where the appreciations and “prestructures” that designers use can possibly originate. 
And he continues to ask where designers can learn acquaintance with the many tools 
and materials that they are presumed to master under Schön’s model. The apparent 
answer is that such general knowledge, as well as skills with tools, is learnt through 
general education, which is the very kind of education that Schön can be read as 
defining out of a design curriculum. 
Schön’s theories for understanding design have influenced and shaped design 
research in many ways. The model of reflective practice thus provides rationale and 
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focus for subjects that have resonated with many design researchers. The view that 
designers have their own distinct culture, shaped by the profession is also something 
that has gained resonance in the discourse. Cross argues that Schön is fundamental in 
understanding the underlying forms of knowledge particular to the designer – the 
designerly ways of knowing:  
Following Schön and others, many researchers in the design world have 
realized that design practice does indeed have its own strong and appropriate 
intellectual culture, and that we must avoid swamping our design research with 
different cultures imported either from the sciences or the arts (Cross 2001, p. 
55) 
Schön’s model for example allows for a focus on how materials “talk back” to the 
designer during the design process, where an applied example is (Dearden 2006), and it 
allows for inquiries into how designer set problems and impose meaningful frameworks 
to design, an applied example being (Adams et al. 2003). 
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3.3 Doctrinaire models 
In design literature one will often find explicitly normative perspectives providing 
doctrines and categorical systems for how design work should be organised and carried 
out. These works present statements of values and thus of priorities to be aspired toward 
in design practice. This is a traditional way of formulating theories in the design 
domain, with e.g. Vitruvius’ Ten Books on Architecture, as the classical example 
(Vitruvius 1914). The example categorically states that architecture must aspire towards 
the qualities of firmitas (strength), utilitas (utility), and venustas (beauty), as these are 
seen as the ethos and responsibility of the architect, which illustrates the general 
characteristic to the doctrinaire model: That a particular set of knowledge, or doctrines, 
are prescribed as the framework by which designers should approach and treat a design 
problem. 
The doctrinaire perspectives can be witnessed in the many Design for X 
publications, both of instrumental and more affective nature: Design for a better world, 
(Papanek 1984), Design for production (Boothroyd et al. 2002), or Design for product 
understanding (Monö 1997), to mention a few. 
The doctrinaire model covers a wide and varied practice, and contains the largest 
sub-set of publications of the models presented here. When categorised in this manner, 
the doctrinaire model includes, for instance, publications on ecology (holding that 
designers should take responsibility for sustainable aspects of products), semantics 
(holding that how products communicate is a responsibility of designers), or 
ergonomics (holding that physiology and cognition are central elements in design work) 
To understand the underlying perspective on design in such works, this text relies on 
an account given by Rowe (1987). In a discussion of architectural theories, he holds that 
doctrinaire theories are characteristic to the field. These formulate the ways in which a 
design task should be approached, and the normative stances the designer should uphold 
when undertaking such tasks. They provide organising principles for design work, and 
thus are a central element in the intellectual structure of the profession:  
To achieve an adjudication of merit that transcends personal likes and 
dislikes would also seem to require inspection, discussion, and debate about the 
perspectives through which organizing principles and constraints are supplied. 
Otherwise, important issues of applicability, appropriateness, opportunity and 
real enhancement of a problem cannot very well be broached. Therefore, it is to 
the normative perspectives that supply and shape organising principles that we 
should turn in order to develop a more thoroughgoing account of inquiry in 
architecture and urban design. (Rowe 1987, p. 113). 
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These “normative perspectives” come in many forms in design theory. They range 
from doctrinaire positions, which are guiding principles for design work, via 
prescriptions of those elements that should be given primacy in a design process, to 
categorical systems, which are frameworks that elaborates, connects, and sustain norms 
and categories for separating the important from the unimportant. 
As a general characteristic, Rowe suggests that the basis for doctrinaire theories is 
the assessment of an unfavourable practice within the profession:   
These normative perspectives can generally be found to include the following 
elements: 1) The location and identification of a problem or pertinent issues 
under contention, 2) an unfavourable assessment of prevailing practice and an 
enumeration of untapped opportunities, and 3) a counterproposal with its 
rationale (Rowe 1987, p. 113).  
 
Doctrinaire theories thus provide designers with a theoretical basis for structuring 
and organising the design task, based on a preceding diagnosis of the design 
profession’s role and poor or unwarranted practice. They conceive design as a form of 
professional expertise, which implies a specific professional responsibility and a social 
role. The implicit normative stances thus aim to influence this practice by steering clear 
of unfavourable practices, and encouraging beneficial ones conveying for instance, 
historical traditions, professional conventions or more technical standards.  
Among the examples of normative perspectives, most designers will be familiar with 
the presence of doctrines for design work such as “form follows function” from their 
studies and the general discourse. They will also be acquainted with more elaborate 
categorical systems such as the mentioned Design for X approaches. These are 
important elements for the development of design competence and ability, as they 
provide metaphorical understanding of design work and its challenges, canons in the 
profession’s history, central exemplars and common professional principles.  
The implicit model of professional reasoning with this tradition is that a design task 
involves reflection against several kinds of standards and conventions, beyond the 
particular constraints given in a design project. It is not only the requirements of the 
task that, in a “technical” manner will provide the normative grounding for design 
decisions, but a large range of standards and conventions that follow the responsibility 
of the design profession. In order to organise and structure the many potential decisions 
the design process presents to the designer, he/she will negotiate a number of normative 
frameworks, ranging from simple doctrines to more elaborate and substantial 
categorical systems. So, reasoning in design can be considered as navigating between 
rival frames of reference that impose different standards for the project to be designed.  
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However, the many normative perspectives present the designer with a new problem 
of choice. He/she must decide which of the many known normative perspectives that are 
fitting for the concrete design task and he must make priorities between the perspectives 
that are relevant. One of the pressing problems, once categories have been defined, is 
the assignment of priorities among the aspects that are to be considered good and 
proper (Rowe 1987, p. 145).  
In practical terms, this implies that the designer may at some point in the design 
process find himself in a trade-off situation, where the requirements of the many 
standards and conventions will need reconciliation. With a caricature, such a trade-off 
situation will occur when the technical requirements of production are found to conflict 
with more functional criteria, or conception of “desirability”. How should one go about 
to assign priorities in such a situation? There are no clear stances on how such priorities 
should be made, but Rowe suggests tentatively that designers may structure such 
choices by drawing on moral philosophy.  
The general view on theoretical production in the design domain is one that 
markedly differs from a scientific conception of cumulative growth in knowledge. The 
normative perspectives emerge from a diagnosis of some unfavourable practice in 
design. This means that they are founded in an understanding of design’s role and 
potential in the society or in practices in the community of designers. For instance, 
Design for X, follows this depiction, where, with the mentioned examples, Papanek 
grounds his views with a diagnosis that designers contribute to the unfavourable effects 
of the consumer society. Monö, on the other hand, diagnosed that designers needed 
better knowledge on communication theory, whereas Boothroyd et al sensed the need 
for better knowledge on production practices. Even though the knowledge in these 
individual domains may develop according to strict epistemic standards, the underlying 
diagnoses are political and ideological, rather than scientific ones. They cannot be 
logically argued as their credibility resides with the authors’ ability to sense real and 
pressing problems that are current to groups of, or all, designers.  
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3.4 The hermeneutic model 
A hermeneutic model of design has been proposed on several occasions in design 
theory (Bamford 2002; Coyne and Snodgrass 1992; Darke 1979; Hillier et al. 1972). A 
unifying characteristic of these proposed models is a concern for how design practice is 
experienced by design professionals, and a focus on the processes of understanding 
during design work. Coyne and Snodgrass argue that the aim of design models should 
be to understand and describe how the designer works:  
This involves a close examination of: the part interpretation plays in the 
design process; how preconceptions function in the process of selection and 
evaluation; how preconceptions lead to prefigurations of the design product; 
and how tacit experience and skills enter the situation (Coyne and Snodgrass 
1992, p. 74). 
 
From a hermeneutic perspective, the central challenge of design work is to gain an 
understanding of the designed product; its contexts, its values, and its functions. At the 
outset of a design process the potential solutions and the choices that designers face are 
practically infinite. The designer must reduce this variety by establishing a directed 
understanding that reduce the variety and provide some guidance. The process of 
gaining such understanding is gradual. The designer will move from an initial vague, or 
fuzzy, understanding of the design problem to some core ideas about the design which 
then are gradually tested and developed. Throughout this process, the preconceptions 
and the strategies of interpretation that the designer employs will be determinants that 
shape the course of the design process. 
The hermeneutic perspective was proposed out of discontent with the much used 
analysis-synthesis-evaluation model of design work, i.e. a traditional process model, 
and the model has a partial precursor in Popper’s model of scientific discovery 
(Bamford 2002) (Hillier et al. 1972). 
If one follows Darke’s conception of the hermeneutic model (Darke 1979), the 
reasoning of the designer does not begin with a list of requirements or a brief. The 
designer begins the reflection in the design process with a prestructure; an idea or a 
group of related concepts that Darke terms primary generators. These prestructures are, 
as Darke holds a designer-imposed constraint that functions as: A way in to the problem 
(p. 38). They are needed to reduce the large number of potential solutions that designer 
would otherwise need to consider: Only by prestructuring any problem, either explicitly 
or implicitly, can we make it tractable, to rational analysis or empirical investigation 
(p. 38).  
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The primary generators, together with the broad requirements of the task are used in 
arriving at an initial conjecture or concept. Once the initial concept has been generated, 
it is tested against the requirements and modified if necessary. This process is spiral or 
iterative in character. Hence, the design process is seen as a process of generator – 
conjecture – test, and not the traditional model analysis – synthesis – evaluation. 
The underlying perspective on design is that designers use considerable resources on 
establishing simple prestructures that guide subsequent designing. These prestructures 
are the designer’s way of understanding the design problem itself and will significantly 
shape the design process. This view contrasts with e.g. problem-solving, which does not 
differentiate between ways of seeing the design problem, and regards understanding 
processes as secondary to a design theory. 
As a general model of design processes, the hermeneutic model will influence 
inquiries and theories, by a more articulate concern for the processes of understanding 
and interpretation. This influence may be somewhat paradoxical however. Darke used 
the hermeneutic model to call for the revaluation of subjectivity (Darke 1979, p. 336) in 
design theory. The hermeneutic model implicitly posits the designer’s personal 
experience of the design process as a central element. But this raises a methodical 
problem: How can a general program of subjectivity be pursued? If the design process 
relies significantly on the personal and the intuitive, it may seem to render the design 
process as entirely personal; one can say little more about design practice than noting 
that some people are more creative than others.  
An answer to such a methodical challenge may be given by Lawson. Design in Mind 
(Lawson 1994) presents a series of interviews with designers. Lawson used the theories 
on the primary generator as underlying model for interviewing these designers on how 
they understood and approached the design process. As such, the research was in the 
form of qualitative interviews, but Darke’s model was the underlying explanatory 
framework of the process. This could suggest that as a research program, the 
hermeneutic model implicitly calls for interpretative research on designer’s ways of 
establishing structures and understandings for the design process. 
As a general perspective for design, the hermeneutic model provides a focus on how 
designers think about their projects. The hermeneutic model has therefore a natural 
affinity with vision-models from the management literature, and there are many hybrid-
models from this literature that resemble the hermeneutic model (e.g. Lerdahl 2001). 
The hermeneutic model is also akin in principle to the Vision in Product Design model 
(Snoek and Hekkert 1999), by focusing on the way designers establish goals and 
contexts in their design projects, and the impact that these have for the design process.  
The impact of the hermeneutic model in design theory appears paradoxical. For a 
long time, Darke’s paper was the most quoted one in the journal Design Studies. But 
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Darke’s model positions itself in a humanist tradition in design research by its concern 
for understanding and its use of mentalist concepts. But at the same time, the model is 
based in the scientific and systematic tradition of design theory, through its inclusion of 
basic process-models, its conception by means of falsifiable scientific methods, and its 
use of the concepts in this tradition. Few would deny the general soundness of the 
hermeneutic model, but it may be suggested that the hermeneutic model has served 
mostly as a corrective to the scientific models of design by pointing out the inherent 
limitations and qualifications in these approaches, rather than as a full-fledged tradition 
for research. 
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3.5 The social model 
A social model of design is proposed by authors who in different ways argue that the 
community of design practitioners can be considered as a social field that holds their 
own norms and kinds of knowledge. Designers belong to a social group which has its 
own stances, knowledge and models which allows for efficient and proper solving of 
design problems. The membership in a professional group thus is a strong influence on 
how individual designers perceive and deal with professional problems.  
This perspective on design is rooted in social theory, and has been argued in design 
theory by, among others, Vincenti, who argues that technology must be considered an 
autonomous form of knowledge (Vincenti 1990), and Bucciarelli, who introduced the 
term object worlds to denote how different designers “see” their object differently, 
depending on the communities they belong to (Bucciarelli 2003). The account here 
relies on these authors, in addition to the tradition in social theory called Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) (Bijker et al. 1987). 
With the view of the social model designers will, as a group, institutionalise certain 
ways of understanding and solving problems that are typical to the professions dealings. 
The knowledge that goes into solving typical problems can be termed a technological 
frame (Bijker 1995). A technological frame is not knowledge in the sense of an 
objective, scientific theory, but is more like the disciplinary matrix of Kuhn; knowledge 
of product conventions, catalogues of examples of similar artefacts, typical problems 
that are faced in design work and strategies for solving them, as well as tacit knowledge. 
It includes abstractions, heuristics, generic conceptual tools and other “tools for 
thinking” on the design problem. As Bijker states:  
Technological frames provide the goals, the ideas, and the tools needed for 
action. They guide thinking and interaction. A technological frame offers both 
the central problems and the related strategies for solving them (Bijker 1995, p. 
192). 
The repertoire of a technological frame consists in knowledge in several forms: 
abstractions, metaphors, common problems, exemplars, product conventions and others. 
Bijker proposes that the elements in a technological frame can only be tentatively listed, 
because the important elements will change from group to group. The tentative proposal 
is that a frame may consist in: Goals, Key problems, Problem-solving strategies, 
Requirements to be met by problem solutions, Current theories, Tacit knowledge, 
Testing procedures, Design methods and criteria, User’s practice, Perceived 
substitution function, and Exemplary artefacts (Bijker 1995, p. 123). 
Central to the evolution of a technological frame for a professional group are the 
typical problems that said group encounters in their work. The frame is institutionalised 
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in the community of practitioners as beneficial ways of thinking and reflecting on 
common design problems. The concrete and practical problems that designers encounter 
in their work are taken to hold reoccurring and general characteristics. Such reoccurring 
characteristics can be, for instance, the deep and detailed knowledge that designers 
develop when they work on the same product group or product type, another is when 
designers work for the same company or particular business, a third is when designers 
gain experience over time with particular technologies, materials or functions.  
The community of practitioners is therefore central with this model. For one, the 
professional community is a beholder of professional knowledge; the relevant 
professional knowledge covers a wide range of knowledge-items, from rules-of-thumbs 
to formalised knowledge. Secondly, it is in the community, on the job, that relevant 
knowledge is established and propagated, and thirdly, the community id the main source 
from which such knowledge can be learnt. 
According to this account, the process of reasoning that a designer undergoes when 
solving professional problems will be twofold. It firstly involves the identification and 
categorisation from a professional task the sub-problems that can be considered typical 
from those problems that are new and require trial-and-error. Typical problems can be 
solved nearly automatic drawing on existing knowledge, whereas trial and error 
approaches will require a more cumbersome working process. (Vincenti 1990, p. 45). 
Since professional problems in the design profession will hold some similar 
characteristics, there will be an impetus to develop professional knowledge that may 
ease judgement and reflection on the particular kind of problem. Central for effective 
professional practice is therefore the membership in a profession, where designers can 
learn “the tricks of the trade”, i.e. the technological frame.  
What this model implicitly says about knowledge and learning in design is that for 
design practice, the social communities, and the ways knowledge is established and 
codified in these communities is important.  
For one, it holds a very open understanding of what “knowledge” is. It gives 
attention to varied forms of knowledge, that often fall out from more formal scientific 
models of design practice: It includes tools to think with, product conventions, 
fundamental exemplars, and the many simplified models and theories that designers 
make use of. This also implies that the documentation of such elements may be valid 
and useful outcomes of design research itself.  
Secondly, the social model assigns a central role to the social field that a community 
of design practitioners is and the institutions of these fields such as schools, chartered 
societies, and government organisations because they have a central role in codifying 
and formalising this professional knowledge. Vincenti for instance, studied the 
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evolution of engineering knowledge across the aviation industry in the 20th century, and 
showed an array of interactions between schools, practitioners, and government bodies, 
which led to the codification of what one today considers formal knowledge in this area 
(Vincenti 1990). 
A general heuristic that emerges from this model of design work is a memento to 
look beyond internal accounts, and consider the competence and strategies of the design 
group or community; the “groupthink” that a set of designers employ on a set of tasks. It 
also encourages comparing strategies between groups of designers or between other 
professionals and to base such comparison on a wider understanding of knowledge than 
a positivist account of scientific knowledge. 
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3.6 The participatory model 
The participatory model of design implicitly sees the designer as a facilitator; 
understanding users and their interactions with a product as a complex task that requires 
from the designer both an empathic perspective as well as a set of tools and knowledge 
for understanding users. The background of the participatory model can be traced to the 
critical theory that emerged in the 60’s and 70’s. In conjunction with the general 
perspectives at the time, design theory saw the emergence of conferences that explicitly 
focused on participation (Cross 1972), contributions that questioned the theoretical 
foundations of means-end reasoning that systematic design methods were based on 
(Rittel and Webber 1973), as well as an increased sense of social responsibility and 
community consciousness (Sanoff 2007).  
Participatory design has had a marked influence in computer science (e.g. Kyng 
1995), and environmental design, (e.g. Sanoff 1999). Participatory approaches in other 
disciplines, such as product design, extensively rely on and reference these traditions. 
Some examples with a focus on product design are scenario building (Fulton and Marsh 
2000) and context mapping (Stappers and Sleeswijk Visser 2007). 
Attempting to ring in participatory design illustrates the fuzzy disciplinary edges in 
design theory. To some people, participatory design is a movement that is well-
developed with its own conferences, journals, and textbooks. To others, participatory 
design is a sub-discipline in a broad design theory, which merely signals the design 
professions’ traditional concern with and focus on user-centred design. 
An underlying diagnosis of design practice that is shared by participatory 
approaches however, is the perception of a gap between the designer and the user of the 
designed product. The designer’s conception of the design problem will be coloured by 
own preferences and values, and throughout the design process it is therefore necessary 
to correct this conception with improved understanding of the real needs and goals of 
the users. Bridging this gap between the designers’ conception of the design problem 
and the user’s problems and real needs is therefore one, if not the, central challenge in a 
design process. 
Minding, or mending, this gap can follow several strategies. One traditional 
approach to participatory design is where designers have involved users as a source of 
information and in post-hoc evaluations of product concepts, e.g. user testing of early 
product concepts. Later approaches, often in conjunction with marketing techniques, 
include ways of eliciting a need, or a social diagnosis, that can be used to develop new 
products. Etnomethodological approaches and e.g. probes exemplify such approaches. 
A third approach advocates the partnering with users in the creation of product 
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concepts. This can be done for instance through workshops or games, exemplified by 
Sanders and Stappers (2007).  
Professional reasoning in design can under this model generally be regarded as the 
attempt to bridge the gap between designers and users. The main “problem” in this 
regard, is that designers will have an incomplete preconception of the product’s 
functions and uses. Designers can not possibly foresee all the potential consequences 
that may arise from use, neither can they foresee all the aspirations and desires that 
users lay on a product. Correspondingly, a pronounced risk is that designers project 
their own preferences and fallible understanding when designing the product.  
Because of this, organising a design process requires that one challenges the 
designer’s preconceptions, and ensure that aspirations and wishes of the user are 
included in the design and development of the product. This is, however, a complex 
epistemic project, and one therefore need strategies and knowledge in order to bridge 
the gap. This takes place as a form of dialogue that will prevent designers from 
inadvertently promoting their own views and preferences during a design process.  
There is no single way in which design processes should be structured to facilitate 
the inclusion of users. The issues that the designer needs to understand will depend on 
the characteristics of the concrete design problem. It may imply attaining an 
understanding of the user’s preferences and personality, it may imply gaining an 
understanding of the product’s technical characteristics and the user’s physical 
characteristics; e.g. in questions of ergonomics, or it may require identifying the user’s 
cognitive frame of understanding for the interaction with the product. 
Concerning learning and knowledge, a participatory view of design will influence 
theory-construction primarily by including the users in the general theories on design. 
As the general challenge of designing is seen as the designers “incomplete” 
preconceptions, the design process will require the externalisation and testing of the 
designers’ beliefs, preferences, and models of the product.  
Thus, within the participatory tradition there has been an influx of particular 
techniques for involving users; interviews, workshops, games, user-testing a.o. But he 
tradition has also seen the introduction of formal research methods to the design field. 
This is because such methods provide valid and credible ways of testing hypotheses.  
Sanders and Stappers suggest that this implies a more research-intensive role for 
designers, because the design process will become more knowledge-intensive: The 
landscapes of design and design research will continue to change as design and 
research blur together. (Sanders and Stappers 2007, p. 15).  They also suggest that 
means for cross-cultural communication should gain a more central importance in 
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design theory, because of the gap that exists between the different frames of 
understanding that the participants in a design process holds:  
For example, one of the major challenges in the planning and architectural 
practices today is the communication gap between the design team, the various 
levels of ‘user groups’ and the wide array of specialised consultants to the 
process. In the future, the new co-design languages that support and facilitate 
the many varieties of cross-cultural communication will become highly valued 
(p. 16). 
 
As general advice, the participatory model function as a memento that requirements 
and briefs are only tentative in their definition of the designed product, and this 
participatory approach suggests a wealth of strategies to mend the gap that exists 
between designers and users.   
Assessing the impact that the participatory approach has had on design theory, it is 
obvious that the participatory perspective always has been an explicit part of design 
theory, and many would probably argue that an implicit concern for user-orientation has 
always been a strong undercurrent in design theory. But to many authors, the future 
promise of the participatory perspective goes beyond that of being a sub-set in a design 
discipline; it indicates the future of designers’ professional roles: We find it promising 
that whatever the future role of a designer will be, it seems that it will be a role of 
participation rather than one of command and control. (Binder et al. 2008, p. 3) 
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3.7 Concluding remarks 
The examination shows that, historically, design practice has been defined by a large 
range of variant conceptions in theory: Design as a goal-oriented process of 
information-processing and problem solving is perhaps the classical, scientific view of 
design practice. Design as reflective practice emphasises the constructionism in 
designers’ reasoning and reflection as well as the iterative nature of interpretation in 
design processes. Doctrinaire models of design provide categorical systems that 
designers use to claim jurisdiction and responsibility for tasks in design processes. The 
hermeneutic model emphasises the important role of preconceptions, or prestructures, in 
design work. The social model points out that much of the knowledge that designers 
rely on in their work reside with the social communities of practice, and particularly the 
typical problems of this practice. Lastly, the many participatory approaches to design 
diagnose the challenge of design practice as the gap in understanding and imagination 
that exist between designers and the users of their products. 
The differences that can be found with these models relate mainly to which aspects 
of the design process they see as central. This is probably due to the paradigmatically 
different understandings of science and research that underlie these models. The 
problem solving tradition for instance, associates design theory with a program of 
empirical science, concentrating on designers’ behaviour, rather than speculation on the 
mental processes that underlie this behaviour. While this gives the so designated design 
theory the credibility and authority of science, it is, as will be discussed in chapter five, 
an approach that has been criticised for being reductionist in nature. The reflective 
practice of Donald Schön focuses on the artful and creative aspects of design practice, 
and in doing so, it influences design theory to look for personal and cognitive 
characteristics in design work. It is little concerned with characteristics of “the outside 
world”, e.g. how the design professions have changed over time due to changes in roles 
and responsibilities, but regards design as a relationship primarily between designers 
and materials, in the confinements of “the design studio”. The doctrinaire models are 
categorical systems that implicitly argue diagnoses of roles and responsibilities inherent 
with design work, thus providing theories with a strong normative impact. The 
hermeneutic models emphasise the personal and cognitive processes in designing, and 
as such propagate introspective inquiries of designers’ processes of reasoning and 
reflection. The social models direct attention to the communities in which designers 
work, and the participatory approaches have an explicit focus with the users of products 
and the means to include these in the design process.  
In line with these different premises, the underlying conceptions of professional 
reasoning in design stands out: The problem-solving approach regards design as a 
process of sub-optimising decision-making. Reflective practice sees the same as a fluid 
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process intertwined with materials and established practices. The doctrinaire models 
suggest that design is carried out by negotiating many different kinds of standards and 
conventions and adapting these to the concrete design problem. The hermeneutic model 
sees prestructuring and interpretation as essential to this process. The social model sees 
design reflection as constrained by the social communities in which they take place, and 
participatory design sees it as an information-intensive process of facilitation and 
collaborative creativity.  
The question this raises is how these premises will impact the production of theories 
and knowledge in the design domain. For purposes of containing the research, the 
assumption with this thesis is that the ontology; i.e. concepts and their relations, will be 
a central in constraining theories. But the reader should note that this is a somewhat 
“mechanical” assumption.  
When design is explained, in the form of empirical inquiry or proposal of 
hypothetical models and theories, the association of one’s research with an idealised 
model will also imply the association with different theoretical and disciplinary 
perspectives; i.e. a wider research program. And the association with particular 
programs will not only provide technical concepts, but probably also a given 
understanding of purpose and aims with research activities.  
The problem solving model suggests that design theory should be built in a 
cumulative fashion in the vein of a classical positivist conception of science. It should 
focus on the development of context-free tools and heuristics that designers can guide 
and aid designers’ actions in the supposedly complex context of design. The reflective 
account on the other hand, focus on experience and skills of the designer, the materials 
that are used to work with, and therefore makes use of mentalist concepts as design 
worlds and repertoire-building in this project. As a scientific project, it suggests an 
interpretative, i.e. reflective approach to the accumulation of theory in the design 
domain. The normative perspectives implicitly suggest that design theory is mostly 
complementary to the practices that are at any time current. They provide categorical 
systems that guide the structuring of design tasks and are based in a political diagnosis 
of designers’ roles in society. The hermeneutic model suggests quite an inward-reaching 
kind of research, as it is concerned with understanding, interpretation, and inner 
conceptions. Therefore, monographs and case-reflections over the ways in which skilled 
designers think are valued. The social models emphasise the role of communities and 
how these formalise the practical wisdom that emerges from practice. As such, they 
suggest a social program for design research. And, lastly, the participatory model 
suggests the inclusion of users and stakeholders in any design theory, thereby 
suggesting a variety of programs for design research, all with an emphasis on mending 
the gap between designers and users. 
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The different models thereby lay trajectories that will guide research, in a wide 
sense. These trajectories are not restricted to the ontology of models, but also implicit 
stances which shape the focus of inquiries, the conventions and standards to which 
inquiries should adhere, or the definition and thereby the delimitation of design 
practices. 
But the diversity of idealisations that this review has showed provokes a question: 
What does this multitude of perspectives say of design research as a common project? 
How should design researchers make use of, and relate their findings to, previous 
inquiries, given that the underlying perceptions of “design” that one may encounter 
deviate so significantly from each other? The review suggests that readers of design 
theory will find strict disciplinary demarcations in design theory, because of the strong 
differences in the basic assumptions on design. 
The reality is not so, however. In design theory, one will find that these different 
models are used interchangeably in the same journals and conferences. Concepts and 
models are used rather freely, leaving one wondering about the operative meanings that 
these conceptions have in design theory. For instance, one can find that the problem 
solving models and even the cognitive theories of Simon are read as arguments for a 
constructivist conception of design theory (Carroll 2006; Chua Soo Meng 2009). 
Conversely, one can find that the constructivist concepts and models of Schön subjected 
to protocol studies to identify exact cognitive definitions of the “weltanschauungen” 
concept frames (Stumpf and McDonnell 2002). Design researchers appear to use and 
reuse ideal models in original ways to serve their inquiries. 
What does this interchangeable use of models say about design research practices? 
How should design researchers make use of, and relate their findings to, previous 
inquiries, given that the underlying perceptions of “design” that one may encounter in 
design theory appear to deviate so significantly? Researchers are faced with the problem 
that design research builds on ontologically different perspectives, and it is not clear 
how such different perspectives can be reconciled and support each other in inquiries 
given their differences in perspective and idealisation of design as a research object. 
It seems unclear, for instance, how the different mentalist concepts of Schön can 
support or contribute to problem solving based design research. If one takes the 
scientific orientation of the problem solving program seriously, there is no natural place 
for mentalist conceptions. One cannot include mentalist concepts in laboratory and 
protocol-studies of design without violating the premises of the original model. The 
criteria for scientific inquiries in one of the programs identified with this review will 
simply render insights from alternative programs invalid. If design researchers aim for 
theoretically informed inquiries, they must expect to spend great resources translating 
and qualifying previous findings. 
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4 - Concepts and parameters in design models 
 
An open-ended question after the review in the previous chapter is whether the 
diversity of models in design theory has any significant consequences for the 
understanding of design practice, and ultimately, the development of theories in the 
domain. In the preceding section it was argued that this influence will be complex. The 
variety in models indicates that the field has been influenced by paradigmatically 
different orientations, different personal preferences, as well as different perceptions of 
the important elements in this practice. The different perspectives thus may influence 
the understanding of the field in myriad ways. One instance where the models’ 
influence is marked and traceable, however, is in the conceptual structure of design that 
the model postulates; i.e. the ontology of the model. This chapter examines the 
conceptual structure with three of the models. By examining this, one may see how 
these models frame professional reasoning in design practice and it provides insight into 
different historical stances on how inquiry into design practice might be carried out. 
When researchers or practitioners inquire into elements of design practice, a tacit 
element of this activity is the association of a concrete situation with an ideal model. 
The conceptual structure of the model provides concepts and key relations defining how 
activities and working phases should be understood. The conceptual structure will 
emphasise some aspects of design work, while black-boxing others. In more formal 
wording: the ontology of the model decides the parameters by which design practice is 
understood and inquired. 
For instance, if a design researcher for a specific research purpose assumes that 
design can be considered as a form of ‘problem solving’, then the inquiry will also be 
committed his to a conceptual structure where design is seen as the search in a 
‘problem-space’ and the activity described in terms of ‘problems’, ‘goals’, 
‘requirements’, ‘representation’, ‘decisions’, ‘information’ and others. This conceptual 
structure will be the terminology for coding observations, and it will be the language by 
which hypotheses and theories ultimately will be deemed true or false.  
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The example is not coincidental. The problem-solving tradition in design research is 
large, bordering a dominating role in the field. Many authors have argued that the 
common convention in design literature is to idealise design practice as a form of 
problem solving process (Bousbaci 2008; 2006; Gedenryd 1998; Hey and Agogino 
2007). This implies that common research practice is to frame design in a problem-
solution dichotomy, in a way that sees design as a cognitive process of reasoning from 
function to form.  
A cause for concern in this respect is that the problem-solving model black-boxes 
central issues on designers’ knowledge. It is, by its own definition, concerned with 
procedural aspects of knowledge; it contains a (behavioural) focus on decisions, but is 
not particularly concerned with the knowledge and understanding that underlying those 
decisions. 
The problem-solving model excludes issues which many would consider central 
elements in “practical” or “professional” knowledge; the nature and characteristics of 
the mental entities by which designers structure and reflect over design problems. 
Examples are ‘frames’ postulated by Schön, ‘primary generators’ with Darke, and social 
models of design, which claim that a professional community gives rise to certain ways 
of thinking about and dealing with professional problems.  
For the community of researchers and practitioners, a risk with an alleged 
dominance of the problem-solving model is a monotonous understanding of knowledge 
in the design domain. If professional design practice, as a default model, is explained 
through a problem-solving model from cognitive roots, then this may spill over to an 
impoverished understanding of common sense concepts of knowledge and experience, 
and awareness over their role in practice. 
The chapter therefore takes up three of the previous models, identifies their 
conceptual structure and displays how they provide different perspectives on the act of 
reasoning while designing and the corresponding perspectives on the development of 
professional knowledge in design practice. 
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4.1 Approach  
For reasons of scope, this section does not detail all the models the previous chapter. 
The goal here is firstly, to highlight how the central concepts with these models 
emphasise and black-box aspects of designing, and secondly to test a principled 
perspective of idealised models in design theory. The main unit of analysis in this 
chapter is ‘conceptual structure’, a term taken from the field of terminology (Cabré 
1999). With the words of Cabré a terminology is “the set of terms of a particular special 
subject”; i.e. the specialized vocabulary of a subject field.  
As a first observation, a terminology is not a reflection of the world, but an idealized 
version of it. Employing a given terminology will imply associating real-world 
phenomena, in this case design practice, with a set of concepts, categories and implicit 
principles. The terminology of a subject field provides the terms and categories that are 
used to understand and make sense of the field. Correspondingly, the terminology of 
design theory will set constraints for how design practice is understood by establishing 
an ontology of design practice:  
In order to communicate concepts and their supporting propositions, 
speakers use written or linguistic signs made up of a term or groups of terms, or 
some other type of symbols. What they express, however, is not the real world as 
it is, but rather how the individual and the community have internalized it.” 
(p.42) 
 
Conceptual structure’ points to the fact that terms in a terminology are not isolated 
units, but stand in a relation to each other, forming a coherent whole.  
As speakers become more familiar with a special segment of the real world, 
they turn their knowledge into conceptual structures in which each concept 
occupies a specific place and acquires a functional value (p.43). 
 
Methodically, the similarity between the idealised models from chapters 3 and 
‘conceptual structures’ was seen to allow following a terminological procedure to 
examine the central concepts with these models. The assumption is that the concepts 
that go into the different idealized models from the review can be understood as largely 
equivalent to conceptual structures. And that the internal logic of the idealised model 
allows for identifying concepts in the same way as conceptual structures would. 
The identification of models is methodically significant, because terminological 
methodology requires us to identify the ‘conceptual structure’ of a written corpus before 
one can extract terms or concepts from it. This is because the conceptual structure 
serves as a principle for interpretation: it is the totality of a conceptual structure which 
enables us to differentiate between terms that belong to a particular conceptual 
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structure, and terms that are just elements in the larger language (Cabré 1999, pp. 132-
136). This approach may be understood as a hermeneutic principle: When one extract 
terms from a large written corpus, it is the overall structure of the corpus which allows 
the identification of meaning with individual terms. 
The procedure for analysis consisted in extracting from the written material the 
terms that were deemed as central to explain design reasoning. These terms were 
registered and grouped according to the concepts they designated. This work led to 
tables of the significant concepts within each group being drawn.  
This approach is qualified on some accounts. The approach here presumes a 
restricted understanding of language. In natural language, words have several uses and 
functions, such as performative functions, expressive purposes, communicative 
functions, and others. With this approach, however, the focus is on the referential 
aspects of language; i.e. what real-life equivalents the concepts denote. Consequentially, 
the categorization of authors into models and conceptual structures is a generalization 
that may leave out the nuances and subtler points of the authors included. 
The models that will be analysed in the following are the hermeneutic, the reflective 
and the social models of design. The text briefly explains how these models differ from 
the problem-solving model on knowledge in design, before moving on to the central 
concepts with these models, and what these models implicitly suggest for knowledge-
transfer in the design field. 
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4.2 Concepts in the reflective model  
The reflective model of design was also originally put forth as an antithesis to what 
was perceived as the prevailing paradigm at the time; technical rationality. The model 
proposes that knowledge in professional practices, including design, is interwoven with 
practice. The use of tools and materials, and the cooperation and interaction with clients 
should be integrated in any reflection over professional knowledge. These items were 
something which previous models of professional knowledge (i.e. the problem-solving 
perspective) had found it hard to include, as technical rationality relied on a positivist 
doctrine of knowledge:  
...Practical knowledge was to be construed as knowledge of the relationship 
of means to ends. Given agreement about ends, the question, “how I ought to 
act?” could be reduced to a merely instrumental question about the means best 
suited to achieve one’s ends. From the perspective of technical rationality, 
professional practice is a process of problem solving. Problems of choice or 
decision are solved through the selection, from available means, of the one best 
suited to establish ends. But with this emphasis on problem solving, we ignore 
problem setting, the process by which we define the decision to be made, the 
ends to be achieved, the means which may be chosen. In real-life practice, 
problems do not present themselves to the practitioner as givens. They must be 
constructed from the materials of problematic situations which are puzzling, 
troubling, and uncertain. (Schön 1995, pp. 39-40). 
 
The reflective model suggests a different depiction of the way and the means by 
which solutions are proposed and reflected over during the process. The problem-
solving model holds centrally that human cognition is a symbol processing system. 
Design processes are correspondingly understood as a cognitive endeavour; ‘data’ and 
‘information’ are processed in the brain in the same way as a computer uses symbols 
and algorithms. When proposing solutions, designers use a form of means-end analysis 
to calculate its benefit, and then simply discard or accept it, in a process of satisficing. 
The reflective model provides a depiction of this process which associates design 
with the different philosophical tradition of constructivism. In Schön’s view, 
professional knowledge emerges from everyday practice; through this practice, the 
designer develops a rich repertoire of mental models, prototypes, ways of seeing things, 
and different templates. When engaged in a design task, the designer draws on these 
items to structure the design problem. Schön explicitly proposed this perspective as an 
alternative to Simon’s:  
All of the above negates a widely accepted theory, held by Simon, among others, 
according to which designing consists in heuristic search within an initially 
given “search space”. According to this view, designing is an information-
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processing task that begins with objective “inputs”. In contrast, the parable of 
designing sketched above highlights that designer’s active role in constructing, 
prior to what are usually considered design inputs, a personal design world. It 
emphasises the construction of coherence to play and appreciative judgment. 
(1992, p. 131) 
 
Thus the design process is a dual process. On the one hand, designers tentatively test 
concepts and product solutions, but on the other hand, they also constantly test their 
own (incomplete) understanding of the design problem. This process takes place as an 
inquiry; a dialogue with the situation;  and among its characteristics are firstly, that it is 
transactional and social, secondly, that physical materials are important, and thirdly, that 
the process leads to new insights.    
The inquirer does not stand outside the problematic situation like a 
spectator, he is in it and in transaction with it (Schön 1992, p. 122). … an 
inquirer, in transaction with the materials of a situation, encounters a surprise 
in the form of “back-talk”, that momentarily interrupts action, evoking 
uncertainty. [… ]The term conversation is, in this usage, metaphorical. It does 
not refer to a literal conversation about the situation but an inquirer’s 
conversation-like transaction with the materials at hand (p. 125). 
 
In this dialogue, the materials that designers work with occupy a central role. 
Throughout the design process, designers work with a large range of representations 
such as models, sketches, diagrams, and plans. The interaction with these items is a 
complex process of reflection, experimentation with materials and reframing of the 
designer’s tentative understandings:  
A designer makes things. Sometimes he makes the final product; more often, he 
makes a representation – a plan, a program, or an image – of an artifact to be 
constructed by others. He works in particular situations, uses particular 
materials, and employs a distinctive medium and language. Typically, his 
making process is complex. There are more variables – kinds of possible moves, 
norms and interrelationships of these – than can be represented in a finite 
model. Because of this complexity, the designer’s moves tend, happily or 
unhappily, to produce consequences other than those intended. When this 
happens, the designer may take account of the unintended changes he has made 
in the situation by forming new appreciations and understandings and by 
making new moves. He shapes the situation, in accordance with his initial 
appreciation of it. The situation “talks back,” and he responds to the situation’s 
back-talk (Schön 1995, pp. 78-79). 
 
The impact of this perspective in design theory (e.g. Cross 2007), may be traced to 
its congruency with traditional hands-on focus in design practice and education. The 
central role of models and materials has always been considered a central characteristic 
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of design work and Schön’s model posits a central role for these items. Other authors 
have attempted to ring in design in light of these same characteristics. Archer (1979) 
attempted, in the very first issue of Design Studies, to define design theory as the 
‘language of modelling”. Goldschmidt (2003) has published extensively on the role of 
sketching and  models, and argue that “sketches are extensions of mental imagery”, and 
reveal “unforeseen configurations and relationships”. Buur and Andreasen (1989) 
elaborate a framework for the several functions that models have in design work.  
Turning to the model itself, a fundamental element in Schön’s model is that any 
given design process is shaped by the problem setting that the designer lays down; how 
the design problem is to be understood, and what to treat as the “things” of the situation. 
By setting a design problem in a certain perspective, the designer chooses how to frame 
the design problem; the designer regards the design problem from a perspective that 
includes elements, features, relations, and actions, and of norms used to evaluate 
problems, and tests this perspective and the ensuing hypotheses by experimentation 
with materials, or representations. These interactions are termed design moves. From 
these experiments and conversations with the materials, designers arrive at new ways of 
understanding the design problem, and potentially restructure their initial frames and 
ways of understanding the problem. 
The concepts that are central in the model of reflective practice are here taken from 
four of Schön’s publications (Schön 1988; Schön and Wiggins 1992; 1992, 1995): 
 
Problem setting When addressing new or unique problems, problem setting is the 
selection of what to treat as the “things” of the situation. The 
designer sets boundaries and imposes coherence on the design 
situation by naming the things to attend to, and frame the context 
in which they will be attended. (1995, p. 40). 
Representations Designers use many kinds of representations in their work: plans, 
sketches, images, and models. These representations are “virtual 
worlds” where the designer can experiment rigorously, or “things 
to think with” in that assumptions and hypotheses can tested 
(1992, p. 124) 
Frames Designers frame design problems from a personal perspective 
connected to the appreciative system of the designer. Frames 
include names of elements, features, relations, and actions, and of 
norms used to evaluate problems. Frames can be considered a 
limited perspective of design problems, and the concept has family 
resemblance to ‘prototypes’ and ‘exemplars’ (1998) 
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Synonyms: Design worlds (1992), normative domains (1995), 
types (1988) 
Design moves Designers manipulate and change their representations through 
experiments to explore, test consequences of moves, or as 
hypothesis-testing. These are moves by which one tries to effect a 
desired change in the situation (1995, pp. 151-153). 
Design moves extend the designers thinking because, due to 
limited cognitive information processing capacity, one cannot, in 
advance of making a particular move, consider all the 
consequences and qualities we may eventually consider relevant to 
its evaluation.” (Schön & Wiggins, 1992, p. 143) 
Conversation  The interaction with materials takes form as a transactional 
inquiry. Design moves are carried out on the material, and the 
results backtalk to the designer who reflects over these. Such 
reflection leads to frame experiments or further developments 
along the same line of reasoning. 
This is carried out in a fluid conversation-like manner where doing 
extends thinking in the tests, moves, and probes of experimental 
action, and reflection feeds on doing and its result. (1995, p. 280) 
Frame 
experiments 
When the phenomenon at hand eludes the ordinary categories of 
knowledge-in-practice, presenting itself as unique or unstable, the 
practitioner may surface and criticize his initial understanding of 
the phenomenon, construct a new description of it, and test the 
new description by an on-the-spot experiment. When the designer 
finds himself stuck in a problematic situation which he cannot 
readily convert to a manageable problem, he may construct a new 
way of setting the problem – a new frame which he tries to impose 
on the situation. This is a frame experiment (1995, pp. 62-63). 
Synonym: Problem resetting (1995) 
 
Table 4.1 - Central concepts in the model: Design as reflective practice  
 
The conceptual structure which Schön proposes is troublesome if regarded with a 
positivist lens. It includes (unobservable) mental concepts. But even with a positively 
instilled reading, there are problems with identifying the real-world equivalents of 
Schön’s concepts.   
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The ‘frames’, for instance, which denotes the personal understanding that decides 
how designers perceive and think of a given professional problem, have been denoted 
by a range of interchangeable concepts throughout Schön’s writings. Schön used terms 
such as ‘normative domains’, ‘generative metaphors’, ‘worlds’, and ’types’, and even 
aligned these terms with ‘prototypes’, ‘precedents’, and Kuhnian ‘exemplars’. The 
content of ‘frames’, i.e. the definition of these mental structures which underlie problem 
setting is a vague. The paintbrush-example in the preceding section, where a different 
analogy induced during product design facilitated new and improved solutions (chapter 
3.2) suggests that frames can be understood as some form of analogy, something which 
Schön termed both ‘seeing-as’ and ‘generative metaphor’ (Schön 1993). Other 
examples in Schön’s writings suggest that ‘frames’ could be understood as normative 
domains; i.e. different kinds of programs for the spatial and physical organisation of 
designed products (Schön 1995, p. 96) or, that frames could be understood as the 
personal, and appreciative system of designers, similar to Polanyi’s tacit knowledge 
(Schön 1992). 
The ambiguity in Schön’s writing is problematic from a scientific perspective 
aiming for cumulative research, where one seeks precise definitions of the concepts that 
go into theoretical inquiry. But from a sympathetic reading, one may argue that Schön’s 
contribution is to instil a certain attitude towards how the processes of design should be 
perceived. The social theorist Blumer operates with the term sensitising concepts; 
concepts, ideas or notions that guide observations and data collection. If Schön’s 
conceptual structure is understood as such one, it may be seen as a memento; it focuses 
on the prestructures that designers bring to the process and the breadth of perspectives 
and beliefs that such prestructures consist in.  
The historical contribution may arguably be that in a cultural climate where complex 
mental processes had been reduced to simple physical processes, Schön simply 
reopened the question of these mental structures, and illustrated the complexity. 
As a model of design practice, it is necessary to stress a premise with Schön’s 
model; the reference point for any development of professional knowledge is not the 
“blank slate” that the problem-solving model departs from. For professional knowledge, 
one does not build a cumulative body of theories in the way a scientific discipline can 
be assumed to build upon first premises. For Schön, knowledge is interwoven with 
practice; it is something that emerges from everyday interaction with professional 
problems, and internalised through this practice, in the same way that we learn walking, 
and bicycling (Schön 1992, p. 124). Any learning, reflection, and development of 
knowledge must take the existing professional practices into consideration.   
If one sees research and reflection over design practice as a question of parameters 
and constants for this practice, a characteristic of Schön’s model is that it regards the 
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role framing and the repertoire of designers as constants. In their everyday practice, 
designers work by techniques and perspectives that are “natural” elements in their 
practice, and may appear as more or less self-evident to the practitioner. Schön’s project 
is to question these ingrained behaviours, and propose that practice is an opportunity to 
reflect over these tacit practices, and also to question their limits and their proper 
application; i.e. reflection-in-action.  
From this perspective, there are at least three ways in which this model (and Schön’s 
writings) suggests that inquiries should be framed, i.e. what is significant to transfer 
across individual design projects. For one, it argues that knowledge-transfer is an 
automatic outcome of experience and practice, secondly, it argues the value of a critical 
attitude to how this knowledge develops, and thirdly, it assigns a role for physical 
materials in our understanding of practice.    
Elaborating these stances, one can first note that design can be seen as learning by 
itself. The “frames” or “design worlds” that designers use to structure the task are many 
things; analogues, templates, normative domains and many others. Design projects 
provide a way of testing these mental prestructures, and thus, through practice, 
designers gain a feel for what works:  
In this sense, designing serves as preparation for further designing – both 
within and across the boundaries of a local design episode. We speculate that 
designers are able to store the discoveries that result from past projects, 
carrying them over to new design situations that trigger them, on the basis of 
features perceived as similar. So designers may acquire the ability to operate 
simultaneously in multiple domains, spin out complex design scenarios, and 
think about larger and more complex move experiments (Schön and Wiggins 
1992, p. 155).  
 
Secondly, the reflective model argues that practice is an opportunity to reflect on the 
more or less automatic ways of framing design situations and practices that designers 
bring to design problems. Schön argues that the instances where designers experience 
breakdowns of their understanding of the design problem are opportunities to reflect 
over one’s own repertoire, as such situations reveal limitations in ones repertoire. These 
limitations are not particularly beneficial per se, but an opportunity to seek out new 
approaches and practices. Such reflection on one’s own repertoire was termed frame 
analysis by Schön:  
When practitioners are unaware of their frames for roles or problems, they 
do not experience the need to choose among them. They do not attend to the 
ways in which they construct the reality in which they function; for them, it is 
simply the given reality… When a practitioner becomes aware of his frames, he 
also becomes aware of the possibility of alternative ways of framing the reality 
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of his practice. He takes note of the values and norms to which he has given 
priority, and those he has given less importance or left out of account altogether 
(Schön 1995, p. 310). 
 
Thirdly: one unintended way in which the reflective model has impacted design 
theory is as a grounding theory for the complex issues that takes place when designers 
use physical materials. It has proven to hold the potential to reflect over own tools and 
materials that designers use in practice. By its focus on backtalk and conversation, the 
reflective model has grounded many examinations of merits and potentials associated 
with different tools and techniques. Examples of such inquiries can be found with for 
instance (Dearden 2006), and (Dorta et al. 2008). 
In general, when compared with the problem-solving framework, the conceptual 
model of design that that Schön introduced, invites reflection on the personal 
perspectives and understandings that designers bring to the design process, and the role 
that models and materials have in the development of this understanding. It singles out 
the backtalk that emerges from this interaction as a decisive factor in design processes, 
and distinguishes the interaction with materials that is part of everyday design practice.  
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4.3 Concepts in the hermeneutic model 
The hermeneutic model is also explicitly antagonistic, or alternative, to the problem-
solving model. The model was proposed as an alternative to scientific, behavioural 
research practices which restricted the empirical material to observations of designers 
and the outcome of their work. As a consequence of this stance, the hermeneutic model 
proposes a concept for the mental structures of designers; primary generators. This 
implies a focus on the mental models that designers carry, the way in which design 
problems are interpreted, and the role of personal preferences and perspectives in design 
processes:  
Some rather unfruitful attempts were made to observe designers at work but 
it seems to the present author that the research material necessary to 
understand the design process is not a set of sketches, but a knowledge of the 
mental process the designer goes through. Observation of sketched and written 
output is a curious way of obtaining such material. Asking designers to recall 
their own processes would seem prima facie to get closer to the truth about such 
processes, albeit in a less verifiable form (Darke 1979, p. 37). 
 
Contrasting the problem-solving model’s focus on functional reasoning, the 
hermeneutic model on the other hand introduces a personal and mentalist concept which 
is seen as significant in understanding how a designed product comes about. The 
premise for this depiction is that design problems are regarded as unique, singular 
problems. The central challenge in design work is that there are infinite ways of 
understanding the design problem, and an infinite number of potential solutions to it. To 
overcome this, designers prestructure the design problems in a way so that solutions 
can be discriminated. Design is thus a process of ‘variety reduction’: with the very large 
number of potential solutions reduced by external constraints and by the designer’s own 
cognitive structures (Darke 1979, p. 329). The prestructures that designers impose on a 
design problem are decisive for the design performance:  
…only by prestructuring any problem, either explicitly or implicitly, can we 
make it tractable, to rational analysis or empirical investigation… design is 
essentially a matter of prestructuring problems either by a knowledge of solution 
types or by a knowledge of the latencies of the instrumental set in relation to 
solution types (Darke 1979, p. 38).  
 
The prestructures serve as a ‘way in’ to the design problem. When designers create 
solutions to design problems, they do not rely on instrumental means-end analysis only. 
The generation of solutions is characterised by a ‘rationality gap’. It is not a logical or 
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instrumental process, but the subjective perspectives by which designers render the 
design problem in a certain light that are the basis for the generation of solutions.  
The primary generators can be a particular objective or small group of objectives, 
that are strongly valued and self-imposed, that give rise to solution concepts. They may 
be fussy or metaphorical in nature, and they implicitly render some solutions as better 
than others: 
The concept or objective that generates a solution is here called ‘the primary 
generator’. It can in fact be a group rather than a single idea. These objectives 
form a starting point for the architect, a way in to the problem; he does not start 
by listing all the constraints. Any particular primary generator may be capable 
of justification on rational grounds, but at the point where it enters the design 
process it is usually more of an article of faith on the part of the architect, a 
designer-imposed constraint, not necessarily explicit. (p. 38)  
 
The primary generator induces designers to propose conjectures, i.e. approximate, 
partial solutions to the design problem. It includes only some of the characteristics of 
the design object. In other words, the solution is not generated by a means-end analysis, 
but is shaped by the personal perspective that the designer impose on the design 
situation.  
From these conjectures, the design solution is refined in an iterative manner. 
Designers compare or evaluate the conjectures against the requirements of the design 
process, but the requirements enter the design process at varying level of details. This 
means that the designer constantly interprets the approximate values of the requirements 
throughout the design process. If the conjecture fits the requirements in an adequate 
way, it is kept and refined, if it doesn’t meet the requirements, the conjecture is 
discarded and new conjectures are elaborated:  
The designer has been aware all along that there are several detailed 
requirements to be met by the design, but performances on these parameters are 
not specified in advance. Once the initial concept has been generated it is tested 
against these various requirements and modified if necessary; the performance 
levels with respect to particular requirements are decided interactively, in the 
light of the effect on the emerging concept and on other parameters (Darke 
1979, p. 38). 
 
Where problem-solving models are largely silent about the nature of the cognitive 
processes that generate ideas in his generator-test cycle, Darke is including the nature of 
these cognitive elements in her account of design: It is seen as a process where primary 
generators give rise to conjectures, which are subsequently analysed against the 
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requirements and constraints of the process at varying level of precision. The definitions 
in the following are taken from Darke (1979). 
 
Prestructuring For purposes of variety reduction, designers construct a problem 
setting story. This involves a knowledge of solution types or by a 
knowledge of the latencies of the instrumental set in relation to 
solution types (p. 38). 
Primary 
generators 
To guide the generation of solutions, designers fix on a particular 
objective or small group of objectives, which are strongly valued 
and self-imposed. These serve as a way in to the design problem and 
give rise to proposed solutions or conjecture. This generation of 
solutions is characterised by a rationality gap, it is not dictated by 
prior analysis, but by designers’ own cognitive structures (p. 38).  
Conjectures 
 
 
 
Concepts and solutions in a design process are first presented as 
conjectures. The conjecture is a partial solution to the design 
problem. It includes characteristics of the design object, as well as 
the personalised, metaphorical understanding of these characteristics 
(p 37). 
Analysis and 
Refinement 
Conjectures are evaluated against the requirements at various levels 
of detail and iteration. Once the initial concept has been generated it 
is tested against these various requirements and modified if 
necessary; the performance levels with respect to particular 
requirements are decided interactively, in the light of the effect on 
the emerging concept and on other parameters. If there is a glaring 
mismatch between the conjecture and the detailed requirements, 
then the conjecture is discarded (p. 38). 
 
Table 4.2 - Central concepts in the model: Design as hermeneutic search  
 
Turning to the nature of primary generators, the model holds a conceptual problem: 
Darke’s argument that early design methods approaches had concentrated on a series of 
boxes “rather than with how designers filled the boxes with concepts” (p. 43), will 
probably resound with readers acquainted with those boxes. But it remains a depiction 
vague on the nature of these generators and a definition of what primary generators 
really are. Are they ideas? Concepts? Elements? Furthermore: If designers’ subjective 
understanding of a problem holds such central role for professional behaviour, then it 
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still is an open question whether such subjective primary generators can be documented 
and communicated to others.  
From interviews with architects, Darke exemplifies primary generators with 
subjective and qualitative items such as ‘expressing the unique quality of the site’, 
‘provide private open space’, ‘a traditional relationship to a communal space’, and 
others. This mirrors Darke’s disciplinary background in architecture, and provides a 
glimpse of what primary generators can be.  
For product design, one can speculate that one can find similar references to abstract 
concepts that may function as conceptual anchors in a design process, with common 
terms such as “affordances”, “usability”, “intuitive use”, “high-end”, “flexibility” and 
others. One may speculate that such metaphors, or generators, hold a central role in 
design practice, functioning as personal stances on what products should be; their 
purpose and meaning. And thus serve to discriminate design solutions based on personal 
and professional inclinations, rather than through the sequestered framework of goals 
and purposes that the problem-solving model suggests.  
For learning and knowledge transfer in design, primary generators have a central 
role. The development of a “stock” of primary generators is the difference between 
students (novices) and the professionals (experts).  
Probably the main difference between the practising architect and the 
student is that the former has the experience of solution types required for a 
realistic conjecture. A frequent problem in a school of architecture is the student 
who has a limited stock of generating ideas which he attempts to apply to every 
problem without considering whether they are appropriate (Darke 1979, p. 38). 
 
The question then is how students can learn and acquire a “stock” of primary 
generators? If the ability to structure one’ projects is so important for professional 
capability, then the development of one’s own stock seems to be a central question.  
One suggestion is that the hermeneutic model singles out the cognitive structures 
that serve as “ways into the problem” for designers, and in doing so it proposes a 
principled understanding for the fussy part of design processes where designers 
structure and shape the design problem. The conceptual structure of the hermeneutic 
model invites reflection on the metaphorical and conceptual ideas that designers bring to 
the design process; it indicates the role of conjectures in this process, and it argues that 
evaluation of solutions against requirements take place as mediation between the 
personal generators and the objective requirements of the situation. 
By this perspective, the hermeneutic model opens up for questioning the practices in 
establishing conjectures, and maybe the biases with which one approaches design 
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problems. Compared with the problem-solving model’s assumption that design 
solutions are considered by reference to goals or requirements, the perspective that 
designers attend to partial and different facts when engaged in design, may be a focus 
that allow questioning which characteristics that are attended to in a given design 
process, and by what (fussy) understanding they are approached. 
But it is also an account that argues strongly that this is a process of interpretation. If 
one are to approach the “subjective” understandings that designers lay down in design 
processes, these are only available through designers’ retroactive accounts of what they 
were thinking and how they were thinking of the design problem.  
Using the hermeneutic model as a model of design practice emphasises introspective 
considerations of the cognitive structures that designers bring to design projects. It 
explains design practice as a task environment where designers through experience 
gradually build a repertoire of subjective generators and metaphors, and that these have 
a central role in design performance. In general, the hermeneutic model posits a central 
role for examples, metaphors, ways of thinking, and subjective practices, and how these 
will shape the design process. Concepts and a principled perspective for the vague 
ideas, metaphors, and subjective factors that go into the fussy front-end of designing are 
provided. 
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4.4 Concepts in the social model 
In the same way as the reflective model, the social model sees design as a 
professional practice. But unlike the reflective model’s emphasis on designer’s 
interaction with materials in situ, the social model sees the professional community as 
central for holding and educating in the mental structures that designers use to frame 
professional problems. Typical professional problems give rise to a wide range of 
solution-structures, such as rules-of-thumbs, models, examples and others. These 
solution-structures will decide how problems are understood, and lay trajectories for the 
effectiveness and ease with which professional problems are approached and solved. 
Thus, designers can be said to work within technological frames (Bijker 1995), or 
alternatively, that they hold different object worlds (Bucciarelli 2003). 
This view stands in contrast to the functional reasoning of the problem-solving 
model; the view that design problems are reasoning from is to ought where designers 
evaluate the outcome in the form of objective means-end analysis.   
Three stances are central with the social model. One is the view that professional 
design tasks in many respects are similar, or at least have generic traits, and that these 
generic traits give rise to general professional knowledge.  The problems that designers 
face are seldom entirely novel, but require familiar kinds of judgements from problem 
to problem. Problems of structural design, for instance, involve recurrent judgements on 
issues such as stress, tension or constructive principles. Problems of function and 
ergonomics require recurrent judgements on human behaviour and physiognomy. And it 
is possible to argue that it also extends to aesthetics, as such problems require recurrent 
judgements on form composition, shape, colour, and materials. Knowledge in the sense 
of the social model emerges as knowledge on structures or analytical procedures that 
have proven useful in solving such recurrent problems.  
Secondly, the professional knowledge that designers employ is not a set of scientific 
facts. Faced with a concrete design problem, designers assess whether the problem can 
be solved drawing on existing knowledge, or whether one must recourse to the more 
cumbersome process of trial-and-error experiments. Trial-and-error approaches require 
more in terms of time and manpower, and there is thus “a premium” in the professional 
community for knowledge that will contribute to the fast and certain resolution of 
professional problems (Vincenti 1990, p. 45). Knowledge, in the sense here, therefore 
goes beyond “scientific facts” and includes structures, abstractions, facts and others that 
a more certain resolution of typical design problems. Designerly knowledge is not 
primarily academic or applied knowledge, but emerges simply to “solve problems” that 
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are common and generic to design practice11. This knowledge may be of many kinds 
and types. Vincenti suggests a taxonomy of knowledge items that hold roles in a design 
process and specifies: Fundamental design concepts; i.e. the operative principle of the 
product in question; criteria and specifications, theoretical tools, quantitative data, 
practical considerations, and design instrumentalities (Vincenti 1990, p. 208). 
Bucciarelli provides a similar taxonomy: Worlds of technical specializations, with their 
own dialects, systems of symbols, metaphors and models, instruments and craft 
sensitivities (Bucciarelli 1988, p. 162). In other words, the view here is that the 
knowledge-structures of designers resemble Kuhn’s technical matrix (Kuhn 1977), as an 
overarching system of examples and common references. 
Thirdly, the community of practitioners is where knowledge “resides”. As a social 
field, practitioners share the same kinds of problems, and develop strategies for their 
effective resolution. The community thus has “a historic memory” for how problems 
should be resolved. The concept of knowledge in the model is thus more akin to social 
field theory (e.g. Bourdieu, 1977), than the positivist conception of falsifiable facts. The 
social model views knowledge as residing in the community.   
Vincenti proposes an evolutionary model to explain how designerly knowledge 
emerges: Campbell’s model of blind variation – selective retention (Campbell 1960). 
The claim is that knowledge grows through extension of the limits of what can be 
foreseen or predicted. Vincenti illustrates this with an historical example from 
aeronautics engineering. In the first attempts to build aircrafts around 1900, one simply 
did not know how to make an airplane. One was devoid of theoretical principles, of 
technological configurations, and of functioning examples. But by proposing solutions, 
testing their feasibility by direct trials, and by systemising these findings, aeronautics 
emerged as a theoretical field with a repertoire of design principles and functioning 
examples12. This evolutionary process led the community of practitioners to accumulate 
knowledge of configurations that worked as well as configurations that did not work. 
This is the general principle of the evolutionary model, and Vincenti argues that the 
fundamental variation-selection idea is typical to the emergence of knowledge in all 
design fields, including the crafts (Vincenti 1990, p. 256). 
In principle, the emergence of designerly knowledge has a form where first, the 
designer or design group introduces solutions that “might” work – i.e. introduces “blind 
                                                 
11 The perspective is argued at length in chapter 7 of Walter G. Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How 
They Know It (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).. 
12 While Vincenti’s empirical material is from the theoretical engineering field of aeronautical 
engineering, the model is taken to be valid for most accounts of professional creative making, including 
the crafts. It is argued here that the model also fits nicely with the emergence of many, if not most 
domains of designerly knowledge. An example is ergonomics, which first started out as a set of rules-of-
thumbs, before evolving into a set of principles and analytical procedures e.g. Henry Dreyfuss, The 
Measure of Man: Human Factors in Design (New York: Whitney, 1967) 20 s., 30 pl. i mappe.. 
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variation”. Secondly, by trial-and-error, the solutions that are tested and proven useful 
will “survive”, as they become standards for solving given problems of such kinds. 
Thirdly, there must be mechanisms in the professional community for preserving and 
propagating the different variations, or solution-structures, if the larger community is to 
make use of the feasible and useful solution-types. This last aspect typically takes place 
through journals, handbooks, textbooks, teaching, design traditions, word of mouth and 
so forth. 
The outcome of the design community’s growth in knowledge of techniques and 
analytical procedures serves one important function. This knowledge enables designers 
to make judgements that would otherwise require trial-and-error by vicarious trials. By 
instituting knowledge of exemplary solutions and analytical procedures in the 
professional community, designers are enabled to perform common and recurrent 
judgements early in the process without having to resort to trial-and-error. Thus, the 
design practices and the practical testing of solutions and procedures are a way of 
reducing blindness in practitioners’ knowledge. The designer tests the limits to and the 
proper application of certain knowledge-structures, so that these may be taken up and 
applied with greater degree of certainty in subsequent design processes.  
The role of the professional design community for individuals’ execution of design 
work is therefore twofold: On the one hand, the community documents and institutes 
useful practical knowledge, by propagating solution strategies for common problems. 
On the other hand, the design community is a source of education, as it is also a social 
field with knowledge codes which equips budding practitioners with strategies for 
solving common problems.  
In the social model, design is still seen as a problem solving process, but one that is 
a somewhat predictable and foreseeable product of the social knowledge that resides in 
the design community. Prior knowledge, preconceptions, and professional cultures 
influence the quality and performance of design work, and the ensuing picture of design 
is one where this practice is seen essentially as the development and application of 
different knowledge-structures. The central elements in this account are taken from 
Vincenti (1990), unless indicated otherwise:  
Designers Designers are part of a professional community, and have varying 
experience and knowledge of solutions that work and analytical 
procedures. 
Typicality of  
problems 
Professional design problems range from typical problems to 
entirely unknown problems. Typical problems can be expected to 
reoccur throughout practice, and there is thus a premium on 
knowledge of such problems. Unfamiliar problems will require the 
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more cumbersome process of trial-and-error (p. 45). 
Repertoire The repertoire of the designer, involve many kinds of instrumental 
knowledge, ranging from examples to scientific facts. 
Vincenti proposes that knowledge is of six kinds: Fundamental 
design concepts; Criteria and specifications; Theoretical tools; 
Quantitative data; Practical considerations; and Design 
instrumentalities (p. 208) 
Near synonyms: object worlds (Bucciarelli 1988), technological 
frame (Bijker 1995) 
Mapping Faced with a concrete problem, designers identify the problems 
that can be dealt with through known approaches and problems 
that must be resorted through trial-and-error. (p. 45) 
Problem-solving 
behaviour 
In design problem solving, designers strive for vicarious trials, i.e. 
simple methods to evaluate solutions as early as possible in the 
process, with the least amount of resources being used. 
Vicarious Trials By practical trial-and-error, the repertoire of experimental and 
analytical techniques grows. As these techniques are propagated 
and instituted in the professional community, common judgements 
can be performed by vicarious trial (i.e. a simplified analysis) at 
earlier stages in the process (p. 247).   
Institutionalisation The incentive towards vicarious trials lead to increasingly 
sophisticated experimental and analytical techniques (248). These 
techniques are instituted in the community through journals, 
handbooks, textbooks, engineering-school teaching, design 
traditions, word of mouth and so forth. (pp. 242-247) 
Synonym: Propagation 
 
Table 4.3 - Central concepts in the social model of design 
 
For reflection over design practice, the relevance of this model for understanding 
design projects is firstly that it assumes that professional knowledge, in the form of 
strategies for solving problems, is constrained by the problems that are typical and 
reoccurring. One can illustrate this phenomenon by stating that if a group of designers 
typically hold the professional responsibility for form giving in a group of products, 
they will develop generic approaches which allow them to treat questions of form 
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throughout their work. Similarly, responsibility for structure, interaction, or other areas 
will lead to the evolution of generic approaches, allowing designers to reflect over, and 
discriminate between alternative solutions. 
As a general model of development of professional competence in design, it holds 
that professional knowledge is constrained by the social context. Whereas the problem-
solving model frames design as a work-type seeking objective evaluations, the social 
model, sees design reflection as constrained by the knowledge and models residing in a 
particular community. This knowledge is characterised by being applicable across a 
continuum of typical problems, and consequentially, there will be important differences 
in designers’ knowledge with respect to the particular industry they work in or the 
geographical or social context for their work.  
As a general, principled perspective on design practice, the social model 
distinguishes the concepts underlying knowledge in the design process, and the role that 
the professional community has for the establishment of this knowledge. It argues that 
this knowledge is founded in the desire to perform typical judgements by vicarious trial 
rather than trial-and-error. As such the terminology of the social model invites reflection 
on design practice as the appropriation and employment of professional knowledge 
codes. Practice is an opportunity to apply and test the limits of these knowledge codes. 
For the design community, design practice is an opportunity to “reduce the blindness” 
with the community’s repertoire. The social model therefore implicitly argues that it is 
important to consider these knowledge structures as common practices and standards in 
the practical community.  
Different from the problem solving model, the questions that may be posed in 
inquiries in design from this model are questions such “What kinds of tools and models 
do the community use to solve design problems? In what ways are design problems 
similar? And for what kinds of problems are particular models applicable?” 
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4.5 Concluding remarks 
The conceptual structures presented here define ontologies of design where mental 
structures and knowledge are included and given a designation as central elements in 
design practice. They provide different frameworks for understanding and reflecting 
over design work, by idealising different depictions of how understanding develops in a 
concrete project, and how the more enduring professional knowledge evolves as a 
consequence of professional experience with projects and through participation in 
professional communities.  
The importance of these conceptual structures is that they open for reflection on how 
the designer’s understanding will shape outcome in a design project: How designers 
reflect over a problem, how solutions are generated, and how solutions are 
discriminated and judged. In doing so, the models indicate some of the many underlying 
processes that lead to the development of this knowledge: the personal element in 
understanding, the transactional nature of design work, and the role of professional 
communities for developing and constraining such knowledge.  
Cognitive scientist Hoff once noted that designers very seldom are aware that they 
actually have an implicit theory of the products they make. The observation, he argued, 
is as trivial, really, as to say that a designer of a hat has a theory the size of a head (Hoff 
2003, p. 27). He argued that the implicit theories that designers hold is something they 
should be aware of, because the potential for errors and misconceptions is potentially 
limitless. The first step in such a project, he notes, is to make designers’ theories 
explicit, and step two is to put those theories under close scrutiny.  
The conceptual structures here provide frameworks for such reflection. Rather than 
assuming the stances in the problem-solving model, that design projects are 
contextually insensitive, and a form of symbolical means-end optimisation, they provide 
depictions of the causes and elements that partake in the forming of designers’ implicit 
theories (to follow the terminology). It also goes beyond noting that designers hold 
implicit theories, and propose the processes and practices that go into the formation of 
these theories.  
To elaborate Hoff’s rhetorical example, it is obvious that one need a theory of a head 
for the making of a hat. From the reflective model, it could be argued that designers 
make hats in a transactional nature; prototypes, experiments and samples reshape their 
initial theories, and develop templates by which also other design problems are 
approached. From the hermeneutic perspective, it could even be argued that designers 
draw on “stocks” of theories; of heads, of purposes, appreciations, and likings, and that 
these will contribute to structure the design problem. Consequentially, reflection and 
inquiry on design should acknowledge and identify the repertoire of such generating 
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theories. And finally, from the social model it could be argued that the theories held by 
designers are not positive, scientific theories, but a wide range of knowledge-items, 
which evolves from the community of practitioners as they gain experience with solving 
similar problems over time.  
The conceptual structures presented here provide means to reflect over such aspects 
in inquiries, and they do so by opening up aspects to design work which were black-
boxed and defined out by the problem-solving model.  
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5 - The problem-solving model; limits and fair uses 
 
Of the models presented, the problem-solving model has been argued to stand out as 
something of a “default model” in design theory. Originally emerging from Newell and 
Simon’s research on human problem-solving (Newell and Simon 1972), the model has 
occupied a pivotal role in design research and in many respects define design as an area 
of systematic study. The model is much referenced, its central concepts and terminology 
are widely employed, also by those not working within an explicit cognitive tradition, 
and the pervasive use of protocol- and laboratory studies in design research can 
arguably be traced to the research program that Newell and Simon instigated.  
The mere observation of such historical “trends” in the design literature point to an 
important aspect of research practices: Abstractions and idealisations in the literature 
are not normally the outcome of a conscious mapping between a concrete problem at 
hand and the characteristics of an ideal model. Rather, common models are inherited as 
metaphysical stances on what design “is”, and how the field should be understood. As 
such individual schools of thoughts are internalised by researchers, they gradually gain 
status as proper ways of understanding and idealising the research topic. If one follows 
(Lakatos 1977), one could hold that researchers within a community will belong to 
different programs. The central element in these programs is a theoretical core; 
communally agreed theories, postulates, and assumptions, as well as a “protective belt” 
of auxiliary hypotheses that serve to protect this hard core.  
A similar perspective, but from a different point of view, was observed by Schön; in 
professional communities, different schools of thought will be formed, and the debate 
between the protagonists between these schools can be harsh:  
Traditionally, the discussion of alternative frames, values, and approaches to 
practice tends to appear in professional communities in the mode of debate 
among representatives of the contending schools of thought. There is a great 
deal of polemical writing, in this vein, in the literatures of such fields as 
architecture, psychiatry, planning, social work, and divinity. There is also a 
literature of debate in such fields as law, engineering, and medicine between 
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practitioners of the establishment and their radical critics. In this sort of 
writing, the style of communication is primarily ideological. The protagonists of 
the various points of view do not reflect on their frames but act from them, 
seeking to defend their own positions and attack the positions of their opponents. 
The readers of these literatures may be helped to become aware of alternative 
points of view, but they are not much helped to reflect on the different frames 
that underlie them (Schön 1995, p. 312). 
  
Against this general background, the problem-solving model can be seen as 
exemplifying a core element in such a program; by many researchers, the model has 
been understood as a, if not the, way to abstract design problems and practices. But 
despite, or maybe because, of its central position in design theory, several critiques of 
the model and of the general research program associated with it, have been raised. 
These critics argue that the models diagnosis of design is flawed, that the empirical data 
the model is based on are irrelevant for design practice; that it builds on an outdated 
conception of the mind; and others.  
If one gives credence to this line of critique, awareness of premises and 
characteristics with the model is called for. Inawareness of the characteristics with this 
model may lead to conceptual problems resurfacing in research practices. As Dorst 
states: Some of the problems inherent in Simon’s theory are inherited by the people 
using the conceptual framework that he introduced (Dorst 2006, p. 16). If it is so, as 
Dorst suggests, that problems are inherited by the tendency for conservatism in a 
research community, then a general understanding of how different ways of framing 
design practice will impact inquiries and reflection appears a sensible remedy. 
The situation calls the ability to reflect over abstractions in design theory on a 
general level. Asking for instance, what are the characteristics to certain ways of 
depicting design, and what are the limits to these depictions? Any such reflection is, 
however, confronted by a conceptual problem. As it ultimately raises the question of 
correspondence between an ideal model and design practice, one cannot presume to 
find an ulterior objective point of reference, i.e. objective criteria, against which 
different abstractions of design can be compared as more fitting, or truer, depictions of 
design work (Morgan and Morrison 1999b). Any reflection over the correspondence 
between abstractions of design practice, and a concrete problem at hand will be pre-
theoretical in that it is an article of faith just as much as it will be a rational reflection 
over the characteristics of the model and its subject. There is nothing “truer” in asserting 
design to be a cognitive entity, such as Simon does, than asserting it to be of any other 
kind, be it social, reflective, hermeneutic, or another one. 
But reflection and awareness is still necessary. For every instance where design 
researchers or design practitioners seek to reflect and inquire into practice, they must 
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choose between and navigate the large range of narratives that can be found in design 
theory.  
The suggestion here is that one can turn to the history of design research for 
acquiring such awareness. By aiming to learn from insights others have arrived at, to 
gain awareness with important caveats in the field, and to steer clear of the most blatant 
errors, one may enhance ones knowledge and awareness. 
The approach in this chapter is to make use of the historical discourse in the design 
research community as a means to reflect over the characteristics and limits with the 
problem-solving model. Although one cannot base this reflection on objective ground, 
one can make use of “the common wisdom” that field of design theory represents and 
document the limits that have been identified with the model.   
The historical criticism of the problem-solving model that can be found in the 
literature is here structured and presented in order to provide a reflection over the ways 
in which the problem-solving model shape inquiries when it is employed as an 
underlying abstraction of design work. The text is exemplary, in that it demonstrates a 
principled way of understanding design theory. It is as such an approach that could have 
been levelled also at other abstractions in design theory, and is not primarily concerned 
with debunking the problem-solving program. The underlying conviction here is that 
the problem-solving model is simply one of several ways of abstracting design practice, 
and as such has both instances of fair use, as well as limitations in the situations it 
applies to.  
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5.1 Approach 
In this chapter, the problem-solving model is examined by firstly presenting the 
background for the model; its role in design theory, the greater program it grew out 
from, as well as restating some of its central positions.  
Beginning in chapter 5.3, five central tenets with the model, and the critique these 
tenets have generated, are taken up and discussed. The reason for this structure is that 
comparing the criticisms requires an element of glossing. The criticisms of the problem-
solving model have emerged from a variety of perspectives and take on different aspects 
of the model. They include vague references to the model, such as when Darke argues 
against the tendency to “a sequence of boxes bearing particular labels, rather than the 
way particular designers filled the boxes with concepts” (Darke 1979), or when Rittel 
and Webber argue against the “zeitgeist” of systemising at the time (Rittel and Webber 
1973). But there are also concretely directed criticisms, such as when Schön explicitly 
argue against Simon’s conception of design as problem solving (Schön 1992, p. 131), or 
when Dorst argues it is based on a false distinction between kinds of problems (Dorst 
2006), or when Coyne argue that the inherent view of professionalism is simply flawed 
(Coyne 2005). 
The examination of the discourse suggests that the cognitive purpose of the 
problem-solving model may have been overlooked in design theory and that this 
negligence may be a source for problems. The problem-solving model is structured 
around cognitive invariants which is different from design research’s traditional focus 
on real-world invariants. If this characteristic is not acknowledged, problems for 
research may occur. 
The discussion of design is here constrained to a general and typical level. The 
assumption is that ‘design’ denotes the kind of project work where designers act from 
an incomplete brief or information to make a product concept or solution, and that this 
takes place in an industrial context. The problem solving model is thus understood as a 
model, or framework, for describing design. It is an analytical tool for understanding 
this practice, and the model will potentially influence inquiries by providing a set of 
terms (e.g. problem space, structuring, decision-making), a general model (design as a 
process of consecutive steps to optimise decisions), and an implicit diagnosis of the 
challenges in design (the limited capacity for information-processing in humans). 
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5.2 Design theory and the problem solving model 
Before examining the tenets of the model, this section sketches out the problem-
solving model’s impact on design theory, some central positions with the model, and the 
scientific context from which it emerged.  
5.2.1 The problem solving model in design theory 
The problem solving model of design has influenced design theory in many ways. 
Most obviously, it has grounded cognitive and computational studies in design. It has 
provided a framework for describing design, and it may have served, in many instances, 
as a general blueprint for what design research should be, as a body of intellectually 
tough, analytic, partly formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the 
design process (Cross 2007). Dorst argues that the problem solving framework is 
simply the lingua franca of design research:  
The rational problem-solving paradigm, based on the conceptual framework 
that Simon introduced, is still a dominant paradigm in the field, and that the 
conceptual framework of rational problem solving has become the normal 
“language” of thinking and talking about design (Dorst 2006, p. 4).  
 
A similar argument is raised by Gedenryd, who holds that the problem solving 
model shares with design theory an underlying pattern that is a general model of 
rationality and rational action (Gedenryd 1998, p. 55). Bousbaci argues that the 
problem solving model has had a transitional role in design theory. When developing 
from the early, entirely rationalist, models of design, to the now dominant reflective 
paradigm in design theory, he proposes that the bounded rationality of the problem 
solving model served as an intermediate conception of the designer’s rationality 
(Bousbaci 2008). The assertion that the problem solving model is outdated may be 
premature however. Hey and Agogino (2007) analysed the conceptual design chapters 
of engineering and product development textbooks and found a largely consistent 
Western approach to design (p. 9): namely that design was commonly explained in 
terms of ideas, problems and solutions. 
Apart from the direct references, one may also trace the influences of the problem 
solving model with the research practices in design theory. The Design Methods 
Movement, for instance, was susceptible to the formal models and the schematic 
conception of design. Computational approaches, e.g. CAD-research, also shared many 
of the same basic assumptions and principles in their models (e.g. Gero 1990; Jones 
1970). Furthermore, common terms such as “solution space” and “problem-space” can 
be traced to the problem-solving model, and the common practice of laboratory and 
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protocol studies of design is also one that is derived from the heritage of Newell and 
Simon (e.g. Dorst et al. 1996).  
The influence that the problem-solving model has exerted on design theory is thus 
large, albeit difficult to define. The problem-solving model appears to be understood 
both as a scientific paradigm, and as a more general program of rationality in design 
theory. While the problem solving model provides a systematic view of design practice 
as a scientific object, it is also a model of design that can be read metaphorically. 
Several researchers apply to the perspective that the problem solving model should be 
understood as a general way of understanding design and thereby merely a principled 
view in thinking about design (Carroll 2006). There is merit to the claim that one may 
read Simon openly, and that its main contribution is a systematic way of thinking about 
design. But either way, it may be argued that this way of thinking about design has 
influenced design theory and laid important trajectories for the development of the 
design theory as a knowledge domain.  
5.2.2 The problem solving model 
The problem-solving model of design can be traced to The Sciences of the Artificial 
(Simon 1996), where Simon establishes a research program for design. The book’s first 
edition appeared in 1969, and was one of the first instances where ‘design’ was 
conceived as both an independent and scientific domain of study. Simon saw ‘design’ as 
a cross-disciplinary topic aimed at improving and strengthening the knowledge at 
professional schools. The curricula in these schools were, according to Simon, 
struggling to meet the conflicting demands of scientific credibility, as well as practically 
relevance:  
The professional schools can reassume their professional responsibilities just to the 
degree that they discover and teach a science of design, a body of intellectually 
tough, analytic, partly formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the 
design process (p. 113) 
 
The principled view of the new topic of ‘design’ was a particular kind of problem 
solving; a purposeful, rational process of decision making. ‘Design’ was understood as 
bringing about desired situations and artefacts states from given ends. Since Simon was 
intellectually engaged with the communities of cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence, and thereby the current scientific practices of these disciplines, a particular 
conception with this model is the view that the inference, or professional reasoning, that 
took place when moving from is to ought, could be represented by logical symbols. I.e. 
the human mind was for all practical purposes analogous to that of the computer. This 
logical model of design required that one defined the current state of affairs as well as 
“the goal state”, so that any design move could be judged against how it contributed 
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towards reaching the final goal state (Simon 1973). In practical terms, this laid the 
foundation for seeing design as the cognitive process of reasoning from a set of 
requirements to a solution to those requirements. 
The kind of reasoning that designers undergo when designing is to span out a 
“problem space”, which consists in all the possible choices that the designer can make 
to reach the goal state. Notably, the actions that the designer can make are seen as 
decisions; choices between alternatives. In the cases where the full consequences of 
these choices cannot be foreseen by the designer, Simon’s contention is that the design 
problem should be broken down further into sub-problems, and sub-sub-problems, i.e. a 
hierarchical decomposition of design problems:  
Applying the same linguistic metaphor to house design, “house” might transform to 
“general floor plan plus structure”, “structure” to “support plus roofing plus 
sheathing plus utilities”, “utilities” to “plumbing plus heating system plus electrical 
system and so on.” (Simon 1973, p. 190) 
5.2.3 The problem solving research program 
The reason that design is depicted in this particular way is that the problem solving 
model of design grew out of a larger cognitive research project on information 
processing. This research project was concerned with the formal modelling of human 
reasoning and thought with the aim of improving our knowledge both on cognition and 
computers. The project was large and involved many scholars with a variety of 
backgrounds, such as linguistics, mathematics, artificial intelligence and management 
(Gardner 1986). 
Herbert Simon was a central person in this project, and also the author that were to 
be the most central contributor to design theory. Simon was an interdisciplinary scientist 
who primarily worked on decision making by combining fields such as economics, 
mathematics, psychology, and management. The time span of Simon’s active career 
stretched from his PhD on administrative behaviour in 1942, through a Nobel Prize in 
economics in 1978, until his death in 2001. 
According to Simon’s biographer Crowther-Heyck (2005), an overriding concern in 
Simon’s project was to explain rationality in decision making. Rationality, implying 
how humans can make ethical, or good, choices, is, according to Simon, limited by the 
human bounds of reason: the human species’ limited capacity for cognitive processing. 
This is what he termed “bounded rationality”, the theoretical complex for which he 
would eventually receive the Nobel Prize in 1976. Simon’s view of decisions, however, 
is a particular one: From the American psychologist Tolman he took the idea that 
rationality depends upon the existence of purpose – rationality is displayed by learning 
to adapt means to ends. From Carnap, the logical positivist, he took the view that a 
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decision is like a logical proof in that it is based upon the application of logical rules to 
given premises. The union of these ideas is the view that purpose is inherent in premises 
of a decision, and reason in the degree to which those decisions achieve purposes.  
Another central point in Simon’s scientific outlook was that he saw the entire world 
as a system. The economy, the family, the cell; all were complex, hierarchically 
structured systems. Truth, in the form of theories that could explain the world to us, 
would lay in identifying structure from chaos, in deducing the structure of the topic at 
hand. 
The goal of this new science of decision-making was the construction of formal 
models of human thought and reasoning, as it was believed that such models would aid 
practical decision making. Simon’s preferred method was to develop programs that 
would enable one complex system – such as the computer – to simulate the behaviour of 
another - such as the human mind. The empirical data that went into these models were 
for the most part derived from examinations of how laymen and experts behaved when 
they solved simple tasks like puzzles, mazes and chess-games.  
The central point of this is that the problem solving model emerged from attempts to 
systemise and explain human behaviour in a scientific frame. In practice, this has 
implied the association of real-life design practice with an ideal model based in a 
program of decision-making and systems theory. 
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5.3 Tenets in the problem solving model 
The tenets discussed in the following are extracted from Simon’s book The Sciences 
of the Artificial (Simon 1996), and the paper The Structure of Ill-structured Problems 
(Simon 1973). The criticisms presented are taken from design theory, and can be 
considered “classic” to the field. The principle behind selecting these criticisms was 
their practical focus. I.e. they are criticisms that have been levelled at the model for 
being incorrect or deficient in its depiction of practice. These criticisms are in the 
following structured and confronted with the tenets of the problem solving model. 
 
5.3.1 Design is problem solving 
The first and central assumption with Simon’s model of design is the view that 
‘design’ itself can be made the object of scientific study, and that it is a domain that 
transcends many known disciplinary borders. Simon saw design as a discipline of 
making that encompasses all of man-made making:  
Engineers are not the only professional designers. Everyone designs who 
devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred 
ones. The intellectual activity that produces material artefacts is no different 
fundamentally from the one that prescribes remedies for a sick patient or the one 
that devises a new sales plan for a company or a social welfare policy for a 
state. Design, so construed, is the core of all professional training: it is the 
principal mark that distinguishes the professions from the sciences (Simon 1996, 
p. 111). 
 
Simon thus defines design as an instrumental activity, of which the general purpose 
is to adapt means to ends. This includes considerable human activity. Simon also 
indicated the theoretical structure of this new scientific domain. It was the way in which 
design processes were similar and thereby objects of generalisation that were valuable 
in the new approach to design science:  
Few engineers and composers, whether deaf, ignorant, or not can carry on a 
mutually rewarding conversation about the content of each other’s professional 
work. What I am suggesting, is that they can carry on such a conversation about 
design, can begin to perceive the common creative activity in which they are 
both engaged, can begin to share their experiences of the creative, professional 
design process (p. 137).  
 
The proposal to see design as a scientific domain that is concerned with the general 
and common aspects of design may seem common sense. But it is also a view that 
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generated criticism. Rittel and Webber pointed out in a classical critique that it 
implicitly depicts the designer as an efficiency expert: the designer is seen as diagnosing 
a problem and then solving it while reducing the resource inputs (Rittel and Webber 
1973). Rittel and Webber argued instead that since there are social issues at stake, there 
is always more than one good answer, and more than one singular perspective on any 
problem that is presented to the designer. Design problems are understood differently 
from the “tame problems” of the scientist they argue. Instead, design problems should 
be understood as essentially unique and coined design problems to be “wicked”.  
by ‘essentially unique’ we mean that, despite long lists of similarities 
between a current problem and a previous one, there might always be an 
additional distinguishing property that is of overriding importance (Rittel and 
Webber 1973, p. 164). 
 
Their argument indicates the danger of reductionism with the problem-solving 
model. The example that is stated will in itself open a question: Is it so that engineers 
and musicians can converse meaningfully about the design of anything. The counter-
argument that also Schön later introduced to design theory is that designers of any 
profession will develop esoteric knowledge codes by which they think about the design 
problem. Schön held that one should be cautious with Simon’s perspective of design, 
simply because it reduces the focus and the parameters by which design is understood:  
Herbert Simon and others have suggested that all occupations engaged in 
converting actual to preferred situations are concerned with design. 
Increasingly there has been a tendency to think of policies, institutions, and 
behaviour itself as objects of design. It is questionable how far we ought to go. 
We risk ignoring or underestimating significant differences in media, contexts, 
goals, and bodies of knowledge specific to the professions (Schön 1995, p. 77).  
 
A general criticism of the problem solving model is therefore the extent to which 
design problems have the general and recurring features that Simon postulated. Can one 
ignore the particular and contingent characteristics of a design task, without reducing 
the value and usability of the theory? Arguments have been raised that the specialised 
knowledge and the perspectives and languages of design participants will significantly 
shape the design situation, and that the problem solving model therefore is rather coarse 
in its depiction of design. 
 
5.3.2 A goal-directed process 
A second characteristic of the problem solving model is that it sees design as a 
process of decision-making. In essence, the reasoning process in design can be 
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understood as a decision-tree, where, for every node in the tree, designers generate a 
move – and then evaluate this move against the end-goals of the task. The design task is 
thus seen as a consecutive set of choices between alternatives. 
The counter-argument to this depiction is that designers use considerable resources 
in making sense of a design task. The design process seldom presents itself to designers 
as a set of alternatives where designers simply reflect over alternatives and move along.   
Simon concedes that there are some problems with this conception of design. In The 
Sciences of the Artificial, he elaborates the theory to account also for such situations as 
when alternatives are unknown to the designer and when the end-goals are unknown to 
the designer and others. But the underlying conception of design as decision-making is 
retained also in these depictions of design.  
There is general agreement that while designing, the conversion of a real-life 
problem into a structured and ideal problem space will require a form of interpretation 
and abstraction on part of the designer. For Simon however, these processes of 
interpretation are merely secondary. On discussing the difference between well-
structured problems (i.e. problems that have known solution procedures) and ill-
structured problems (i.e. problems where the solution procedure is unknown), Simon 
holds that all real-life problems are ill-structured problems, but that the process of 
converting them to well-structured (i.e. solvable) problems is rather mundane, or 
secondary: 
A standard posture in artificial intelligence work, and in the theorising in 
this field, has been to consider only the idealized problems, and to leave the 
quality of the approximation, and the processes for formulating that 
approximation to informal discussion outside the scopes both of the theory and 
of the problem solving programs. This is a defensible strategy, common to many 
fields of intellectual inquiry; but it encourages allegations that the “real” 
problem solving activity occurs while providing a problem with structure, and 
not after the problem has been formulated as a WSP13. As Newell and I have 
observed elsewhere […], these allegations are refuted simple by observing that 
“if [they] were correct, and tasks from the same environment were presented 
sequentially to a subject, only the first of them would present him with a 
problem, since he would not need to determine a new problem space and 
program for subsequent tasks”. Nevertheless, there is merit to the claim that 
much of the problem solving effort is directed at structuring problems, and only 
a fraction of it at solving problems once they are structured (Simon 1973, pp. 
186-187). 
 
                                                 
13 WSP is shorthand for a ’well-structured problem’; i.e. a problem that is naturally decomposable. 
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From these writings, it is clear that Simon acknowledges that the construction of the 
problem-space is a difficult step in real-life design situations. He does hold, however, 
that this is only of secondary interest to theories on design. The “problem” of 
establishing a problem space falls outside the responsibility and interest of a design 
theory.  
In this way, Simon met up with a central criticism of the model. Many design 
researchers hold that what may be termed “the construction of the problem space” is a 
central topic for design theory, and argue against the realism of this conception. 
Dorst and Cross (2001) use a hermeneutical argument that implicitly counters 
Simon’s conception. They argue that the “problem” and the “solution” to the problem 
co-evolve:  
It seems that creative design is not a matter of first fixing the problem and 
then searching for a satisfactory solution concept. Creative design seems more 
to be a matter of developing and refining together both the formulation of a 
problem and ideas for a solution, with constant iteration of analysis, synthesis 
and evaluation processes between the two notional design ‘spaces’—problem 
space and solution space (p. 434). Their focus is more on moments of surprise 
and discovery, which leads to new conceptions of the design problem, than on 
the reasoning that is confined within a problem space.  
 
Schön also argued that in many instances, how designers structured their problems is 
more important to understand than the reasoning once the problem is set:  
But with this emphasis on problem solving, we ignore problem setting, the 
process by which we define the decisions to be made, the ends to be achieved, 
the means which may be chosen. In real-world practice, problems do not present 
themselves to the practitioner as givens. They must be constructed from the 
materials of problematic situations which are puzzling, troubling, and uncertain 
(Schön 1995, p. 40). 
 
The view that a design theory should be based in a conception where designers 
structure problems into problem spaces and that a design theory could provide general 
heuristics for structurally similar problem spaces thus has generated many 
counterarguments. The gist of these arguments is that the construction of the problem 
space is not secondary at all, as Simon contended, but a central topic for a design 
theory. In other words, the process of interpreting the design problem into an operative 
understanding is something that design researchers should be aware of as both 
troublesome and worthy of attention. 
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5.3.3 Hierarchy and decomposition in design 
The problem solving model also presents the reader with a particular worldview; 
that any object can be regarded as a hierarchic system, where simpler sub-systems are 
embedded in larger ones. This is a central position in Simon’s worldview, even the 
conclusive point in The Sciences of the Artificial:  
My thesis has been that one path to the construction of a nontrivial theory of 
complex systems is by way of a theory of hierarchy. Empirically a large 
proportion of the complex systems we observe in nature exhibit hierarchic 
structure. On theoretical grounds we could expect complex systems to be 
hierarchies in a world in which complexity had to evolve from simplicity. In 
their dynamics hierarchies have a property, near decomposability, that greatly 
simplifies their behaviour. Near decomposability also simplifies the description 
of a complex system and makes it easier to understand how the information 
needed for the development or reproduction of the system can be stored in 
reasonable compass (Simon 1996, p. 216). 
 
“Near decomposability” is a concept that is central. By and large, the view is, any 
design task can be expected to exhibit a given structure, and the task of the designer is 
largely to discover this structure. Design problems are sub-sets of problems embedded 
in larger problems, and the design process can be understood as attending to the smaller 
problems individually, before recombining them to solve the larger design problem. A 
previous quote illustrates this view:  
Applying the same linguistic metaphor to house design, “house” might 
transform to “general floor plan plus structure”, “structure” to “support plus 
roofing plus sheathing plus utilities”, “utilities” to “plumbing plus heating 
system plus electrical system and so on.” (Simon 1973, p. 190) 
 
Simon concedes that there may be problems in that the individual sub-systems in a 
design process are not entirely independent of each other, so that solutions in one sub-
space may influence other sub-spaces. But Simon does not hold this to be a problem 
with the model. Rather, he provides a normative stance towards the proper 
decomposition of design problems: a good procedure will divide the task into 
components that are as nearly “self-contained” as possible”. (Simon 1973, p. 191) 
Simon grounds the argument for this normative view with Alexander’s seminal work in 
design methodology, Notes on the Synthesis of Form (Alexander 1964) where 
Alexander argues for such a systematic approach to designing. 
The normative basis for this tenet is problematic. The author in question, Alexander, 
has later famously disowned the theory, calling it an entirely unrealistic approach to 
how designers design (Alexander 1971). 
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As Bousbaci notes, Simon’s worldview is essentially Cartesian (Bousbaci 2008). It 
prescribes an attitude towards problems where, for solving them, they should be 
decomposed into their constituent elements, the sub-problems then solved individually, 
and subsequently recombined again into a solved problem. 
The criticism of this tenet does not concern hierarchy itself, but rather how and with 
what purpose designers assign hierarchy to design problems. Simon’s normative 
position, that designers should aim to establish near-independence between issues, is a 
stance that has caused disputes. 
First, this tenet has generated qualifiers from researchers who have followed 
explicitly in the path that Simon laid out. If one solves design problems by way of 
individually isolated sub-problems, one will have great problems recombining these 
solutions into a solved design problem (Reich 1995). Consider for instance, the design 
of a car: If the electrical engineer, the mechanical engineer, and the stylist were to solve 
their task individually, there would be obvious problems of recombining the solutions 
within the given set of constraints. Solving design sub-problems in individual manner is 
known to cause problems.  
The conception of hierarchy in design problems that Simon proposes is problematic 
because it suggests that there is an optimum, or near natural, way of decomposing 
design problems. But a centrepiece in much design discourse is the view that there are 
practically infinite ways of decomposing a professional problem and assigning 
hierarchy to the tasks that need attention. Assigning a hierarchy to a design problem is a 
normative decision, i.e. the designer decides to see the design problem as being of a 
certain type or belonging to a certain class. Making the assumption that this normative 
stance is “naturally given” runs contrary to much design theory where it is argued that 
the decision on how to characterise the design problem is a central part of solving the 
design problem, and not something that is objectively “given” (Coyne 2005). 
As a general model of how designers decompose design problems, the assumption 
that there exists a natural hierarchy for any object will need attention and probably 
modification if it is to be applied in design inquiries. The assumption that design 
problems are hierarchic and should be decomposed into independent sub-problems is a 
claim with little empirical backing. 
5.3.4 Bounded rationality 
A fourth tenet of the problem solving model concerns Simon’s general conception of 
the mind, and thereby the implicit view of how designers understand and reflect over 
design problems. With the problem solving model, Simon lays down a conception of 
human understanding termed “bounded rationality” which has consequences for how 
design knowledge is understood. 
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Bounded rationality is a centrepiece in Simon’s writings. Originally, bounded 
rationality was a concept that addressed why people were “irrational” in their decision 
making behaviour. On the one hand, theories on decision making that explained human 
behaviour as entirely rational, e.g. Bayesian models, were obviously flawed; on the 
other hand, theories that explained irrationality in terms of passion or the unconscious 
are obviously problematic in a scientific context. Rather, Simon held, limited capacities 
for information processing were the underlying factor of irrationality. When faced with 
a complex world, humans construct simplified models of their environment in order to 
deal with it, and people act and reflect on the basis of these simplified models.  
Given this view of human understanding, Simon held that the larger goal of the new 
science was the construction of formal models of human behaviour, and its method was 
to develop programs that would enable one complex system to simulate the behaviour 
of another, such as the human mind. Thus, the problem solving program equalised 
understanding with an algorithm; different (numerical) heuristics that could be applied 
in situations of complexity, such as design.  
This general view of human understanding as rule-based reasoning is included in a 
science of design. In The Sciences of the Artificial (Simon 1996, p. 134), Simon 
indicates and delimits the topics in a theory of design. These are, notably, in the form of 
rules and algorithms that are believed to be central in a design process: 
1. Theory of evaluation; utility theory, statistical decision theory 
2. Computational methods 
a. Algorithms for choosing optimal alternatives 
b. Algorithms and heuristics for choosing satisfactory alternatives 
3. The formal logic of design: imperative and declarative logics 
4. Heuristic search: factorization and means-end analysis 
5. Allocation of resources for search 
6. Theory of structure and design organization: hierarchic systems 
7. Representation of design problems 
 
The depiction has generated criticisms that one cannot meaningfully develop a 
scientific program aiming for “rules” for design. To render the gist of this criticism, one 
may observe that when designers face a design problem, their understanding of the 
design problem will decide how they approach and attempt to solve that problem. For 
the problem solving model, the scientific commitment to the behaviourist tradition, 
renders it virtually impossible to deal with a concept such as ‘understanding’ because it 
is a mentalist concept.  
But in normal language and much of design theory, mentalist concepts such as 
“frames” are entirely unproblematic. They denote more or less the worldview or 
specific understanding that a designer approaches a given task with. The exact nature of 
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“understanding” is, however, something of a riddle as it is more varied and generally 
more difficult to define than the mere existence of rules.  
Other design researchers have argued that the reasoning process in design is vitally 
depending on mental prestructures that designers make use of to impose coherence and 
meaning onto the design problem. These authors hold that designers’ moves and 
judgements in the design process are evaluated by simple and vague mental structures, 
and not evaluated against the end-goal of the process (Darke 1979; Hillier et al. 1972; 
Schön 1992). 
In design theory, such mentalist conceptions have been a prominent part of the 
discussion in design theory; tacit knowledge, experience, practical knowledge, values, 
i.e. the entire background of the designer will contribute to how designers solve their 
tasks. Schön for instance, notably proposed “frames” as a way of depicting the 
understanding that designers approach design problems with (Schön 1995). Another 
conception of understanding is proposed by Vincenti (Vincenti 1990). He sees the 
understanding that designers make use of in design problems as being a spectrum of 
different knowledge types: Fundamental design concepts, theoretical tools, rules-of-
thumbs, quantitative data, procedural knowledge, and many others (p. 208). One may 
also consider Dorst’s introduction of Dreyfus’ general conception of competence to 
design theory (Dorst 2003); that understanding develops with experience and familiarity 
with certain kinds of problems. 
In summary, one should be aware that Simon’s programmatic commitments hinders 
the problem solving model from dealing with mentalist conceptions, and that many 
design researchers have found the idea of rules underlying design behaviour as greatly 
deficient concerning their explanatory and predictive value for a design context.  
 
5.3.5 A scientifically objective design theory 
The final tenet with the problem solving model taken up here is the view that a 
design theory can and should be pursued by scientific means in the mould of positivism. 
As has been argued, one of the central concerns in Simon’s theories was the view that 
computers and human minds were similar:  
As we succeed in broadening and deepening our knowledge – theoretical 
and empirical – about computers, we discover that in large part their behaviour 
is governed by simple general laws, that what appeared as complexity in the 
computer program was to a considerable extent complexity of the environment 
to which the program was seeking to adapt its behaviour. This relation of 
program to environment opened up an exceedingly important role for computer 
simulation as a tool for achieving a deeper understanding of human behaviour. 
For if it is the organisation of components, and not their physical properties, 
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that largely determines behaviour, and computers are organised somewhat in 
the image of man, then the computer becomes an obvious device for exploring 
the consequences of alternative organisational assumptions for human 
behaviour (Simon 1996, p. 21).  
 
This quote shows some of the labours that one had to go through to establish a 
research field, in psychology, that was concerned with how people reason at the time. 
One obviously had great difficulties in allocating a role to mental concepts because of 
the behaviourist heritage that influenced the model. 
Instead of approaching human faculties directly, Simon had to establish a physical 
object (the computer) and argue its analogy to the human mind. By way of this 
approach, one could argue that mentalist conceptions were “physical”, in that they were 
symbols (akin to the computers signals). This allowed for an empirical science on 
problem solving, by way of careful analogising: One could simulate and compare 
human mental processes, by arguing that they were the same as one found inside a 
computer.  
The two central elements in this account are the inner environment of humans, and 
the outer environment. Human cognition is regarded as discreet “symbol systems” that 
adapts to different environments, and can be programmed to deal with different “task 
environments” by careful scientific scrutiny. 
“The science of design” thus is a cognitive science aiming for better knowledge of 
cognitive invariants, but where issues of understanding and interpretation; i.e. 
participation in the real world; are regarded as secondary. So the view here is that by 
examining “design behaviour” it is possible, by scientific means, to establish rules that 
guide design behaviour in different “task environments”. So, the outer environment is, 
quite simply, of secondary interest. 
A problem with this conception is therefore that it is largely unconcerned with the 
characteristics of the outer world. This “outer environment” has a role for any design 
process that is much more important, and much more complex than merely “providing 
goals”. In any design process, designers must seek to understand various interests and 
trade-off situations. Rittel and Webber, for instance, termed design problems “wicked”: 
since there are social issues at stake, there is always more than one good answer, and 
more than one singular perspective on any problem that is presented to the designer. 
Design problems are understood differently from the “tame problems” of the scientist 
(Rittel and Webber 1973). It is difficult to see how these wicked problems can be 
categorised into “task environments” 
A similar argument has been raised by Hatchuel, who argues that Simon overlooked 
the social interactions that contribute in driving the design process forward (Hatchuel 
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2001). Common sense supports the claim that design does not take place in a vacuum. 
In the industrial context there are always many stakeholders involved: clients, suppliers, 
customers, not to mention the many kinds of professionals that are involved in 
development. A design process is always dependent on the information provided by the 
client, and for many inquiries it may seem strange to isolate these and generalise them 
into task environments, as they may be factors that are decisive for the course of the 
design process. It is therefore open what a cognitive, empirical theory on design can tell 
us about such situations. 
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5.4 Discussion 
Given the objections that have been raised in the preceding, the historical impact of 
the problem-solving model seems to be somewhat of a puzzle. Why does the model 
hold such a central role in design theory, when so many vocal counter-arguments have 
been raised against it?  
One answer probably has to do with Simon’s authority. As a nobel-laureated 
academic, central in research communities spanning cognitive science and academic 
research, his recognition surpassed any other academic who has held an interest in 
design. The general credibility of the model may have been deemed high by merit of 
this status alone, and thereby provided an alluring reference for authors seeking 
respectability. 
But apart from external factors, the criticisms suggest that the problem solving 
model causes problems regarding its practical application, as its explanatory value of 
design is contested on several grounds. Why then, is the model so much used, and what 
are the reasons it causes these problems when applied in research? 
A tentative explanation for how the problem-solving model causes problems when 
applied in a design context is that it might be common to overlook the extent to which 
the problem-solving model has a cognitive focus and purpose. If one considers the 
research culture that Simon worked within, one will note that it is rooted in behavioural 
research, and was primarily concerned with cognitive research, artificial intelligence, as 
well as other fields related to decision-making (Crowther-Heyck 2005; Gardner 1986) 
The problem-solving model was an attempt to formalise human reasoning both to 
understand it better and to be able to model it (in computer form). This is, quite simply, 
a different motivation than design researchers are likely to hold. If one assumes that 
design researchers hold an interest in design because they seek to learn across design 
projects, i.e. how insights and learning in one context can be transformed to another 
context, then the consequences that the problem-solving model will have for research 
will be difficult to spot, but they will also be significant and determine important 
qualifiers.    
A characteristic to the problem-solving model is that it regards design in a very 
general manner. It is based on the conception that ‘design’ includes all of man-made 
making. But any design researcher searching further clarification and elaboration of the 
characteristics to different “task environments” will find that Simon’s theories are 
consistently vague in describing the entities that are general and reoccurring in this large 
set. From a design perspective, one could expect some form of classification in Simon’s 
model; a discussion of the ways in which different design disciplines differ from each 
other for instance; how engineering is different from architecture, how graphic design is 
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different from product design, to mention some typical examples. In the absence of 
these, one could at least expect some discussion of the characteristic differences 
between different types of problems in the real world. Such an explication would be 
important for understanding transfer in design, i.e. how designers of different kinds 
transfer experiences from one context to another, and the way in which different design 
tasks are similar.   
But going through Simon’s texts, one will find no such explication of the differences 
between different problem-solving contexts. Rather, Simon’s empirical material is 
restricted to chess-playing, ants moving on a beach, and theorem-finding computer 
programs, where the intention is more to show that such contexts are similar (at heart 
simple processes) than to reflect over how these differ. Simon simply blurs the topic of 
how different real-world “task environments” differ from each other, something other 
authors have noted:  
In Newell and Simon's early work on problem solving (1963), the environment is 
reduced to the discrete series of choices that it presents in the course of solving 
a given problem. The phrase “task environment" came to refer to the formal 
structure of the search space of choices and outcomes. This is clearly a good 
way of modelling tasks such as logical theorem-proving and chess, in which the 
objects being manipulated are purely formal. For tasks that involve activities in 
the physical world, however, the picture is more complex. In such cases, the 
problem solving model analyzes the world in a distinctive way. Their theory does 
not treat the world and the agent as separate constructs. Instead, the world 
shows up, so to speak, phenomenologically: in terms of the differences that make 
a difference for this agent, given its particular representations, actions, and 
goals. Agents with different perceptual capabilities and action repertoires, for 
example, will inhabit different task environments, even though their physical 
surroundings and goals might be identical (Agre and Horswill 1997, p. 113). 
 
Why this peculiar construct? The answer is that the real focus of this model is the 
cognitive processes, not the design process per se. The problem-solving model glosses 
over the way in which different contexts are different, and focuses instead on the 
cognitive invariants of design; i.e. that which will be reoccurring every time a human 
individual confronts a design situation. If such cognitive invariants could be established, 
Simon would have opened a new avenue for scientific inquiry into a particular branch of 
the human mind.  
The implications for transfer considerations in the design field are that one may 
learn from observing designers, through e.g. protocol-study, how limits to their 
cognitive capacity are overcome. But there is little to none consideration of how 
different tasks will, and should, trigger different behaviour. If design researchers are to 
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learn from one project to another, the model contains neither terminology nor means to 
identify differences in premises or similarity between different real-world projects.  
This focus can be interpreted as a flat out deficiency, given design research’s 
historical concerns and focus. If one holds the view that research in the design field has 
the purpose of documenting and communicating insights that are valuable and useful 
across a range of design projects, then one is implicitly looking for real-world 
invariance, not cognitive ones. Vincenti’s social model of design, for instance defines 
the invariance underlying design as the “typicality” of professional problems (Vincenti 
1990). Groups of designers will encounter problems that have generic traits; it is from 
this kind of generality that insights can be derived and transferred across the field. Not, 
importantly, through the invariance that is psychologically common to all people. 
The qualifier that can be derived is that if the problem-solving model is used for 
more traditional design research, researchers must, on their own initiative, consider and 
reflect over how different real-world design projects are similar. If one relies on the 
implicit stances of the problem-solving model, there is a risk of reductionism in that all 
kinds of design activities are deflated into one simple entity.  
The percussions of the cognitive and symbolic nature of the problem-solving model 
extend to the other criticisms taken up here. The second tenet criticised; that for design 
activities, problem setting and co-development of problems and solutions is central; is a 
topic of great practical interest. In education, and in practice, ways of understanding 
design problems appears to be at the heart of research and reflection over design 
activity. But in the problem-solving model, these issues are actively deemphasised 
because they violate the definition of design; that it is a form of reasoning from function 
to form. Accepting the view that problem setting and understanding in design is 
contingent and depending on the problem at hand would make it endlessly difficult to 
formalise the cognitive problem-solving process in a form that could be programmed in 
a computer. Thus, the qualifier to the problem-solving model is that it defines out 
problem setting as an element in design. In other words; designers should be aware that 
any form of problem interpretation is defined out from the model. The model ignores 
how designers establish a problem-space, potentially leading to the belief that designers 
retain an unchanged view of the design problem throughout the process. 
The same extends to the third tenet. Why should one assume that there exists a 
hierarchy in all kinds of design problems; a Cartesian world-view, philosophically 
dubious, against which a range of objections have been raised? A plausible answer is 
that it fits nicely with Simon’s programmatic view: The belief that computers would, 
eventually, solve every kind of problem required that one postulated the decomposition 
of complex problems into simpler ones. If it hadn’t been done, Simon would have had 
to postulate a form of computing unknown at the time. The qualifier is that one must be 
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careful with taking up the normative view that designers should decompose the design 
task into independent entities, or that there exists such a thing as a natural hierarchy in 
design problems. Observing any given design process under the view that there exists 
and “optimum” way of decomposing it, researchers will risk projecting their own 
conceptions, and their own preferences with the design task under the assumption that 
they present a natural hierarchy of the design problem. 
The fourth criticism touches on more philosophical problems of Simon’s model: To 
see mental reasoning as a form of ‘symbol-processing’ is a depiction with obvious 
analogies to computers. Against this way of seeing human reasoning, there are vocal 
counter-arguments, many of which from design theory. Darke’s primary generators and 
Schön’s frames are just some examples. From a design perspective, researchers should 
be aware that the problem-solving model is a conception that excludes concepts of mind 
and understanding, such as frames (the problem space is the frame), and that the model 
aims at documenting only observable behaviour.  
Finally, the scientific framework may appear incredible today. It is a requirement 
mostly necessary for discourse in the cognitive domains, artificial intelligence and so on 
where establishing the status of science is important. For design research, one may 
debate whether scientific status of this kind is necessary, or even plausible. If one is 
concerned with how designers think, for instance, why not simply go ahead and 
interview them? The option is open to design researchers, but the answers they receive 
are likely to be couched in other terms than ‘heuristics’, ‘problem-spaces, and 
‘representations’. 
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
The discussion here has concentrated on the problem-solving model as it has been 
formulated by Herbert Simon. One may question how relevant this discussion is for 
design research today. Is it so that the problems mentioned here have been sorted out by 
researchers; have they moved on to remedy the flaws that were inherent in Simon’s 
model? 
It appears that the discussion is still relevant. Examining the latest issue of Design 
Studies at the time of writing (March 2011), one will find the article The effects of 
physical prototyping and group work on the reduction of design fixation (Youmans 
2011). The article displays every characteristic of Simon’s model: It is based on 
protocol-studies of 120 designers. The premise for the article is that fixation is a major 
problem in design, and the hypothesis is that physical prototyping will yield fewer 
fixations. The conclusion from the experiment is that: 
Results showed that designs were better and contained fewer fixations to the 
example tool when designed in the physical prototyping environment, but that 
groups designed better tools than individuals or nominal groups when no 
physical prototyping was available. These results underscore the importance of 
physical prototyping in design. 
 
With other words: After having set up variables and environment for protocol 
studies of 120 students, documented experiments, subjected empirical studies to blind 
review of dependent variables, and run statistical correlation and regression tests, 
Youmans concludes that for designers, using models is a better form of practice than not 
using models. Few will disagree with him. Except perhaps, Herbert Simon himself, on 
the grounds that he arrived at the same conclusion in 1969 (Simon 1996, p. 132). So, the 
problem-solving model appears to be alive and well, and knowledge of its 
characteristics is still required background knowledge for anyone engaged in design 
theory.  
The argument that the problem-solving model should be used with caution is not a 
devaluation of its value or its historical contribution to design theory. In inventing these 
theories and models Simon did several contributions: He formulated a program 
research, discussed the contents of such a program with unprecedented level of detail, 
suggested a systems view of design problems, and invented a terminology for the field. 
In short, Simon provided theoretical structure to an otherwise very fussy field of 
inquiry. It is difficult to imagine a design theory at all, without the contributions of 
Herbert Simon, and his postulate that design can be considered a valuable domain of 
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inquiry. And judging from the quantity of researchers that have followed in his 
footsteps, it is a contribution that many have found valuable. 
But for any real-life application of this model, one should keep in mind that it comes 
with a string of qualifiers attached: 1) It contains a reductive depiction of the many 
contexts and environments designers work in; its generalisation for transfer is a 
cognitive one, and indifferent on the real world. 2) It defines out issues of interpretation 
and understanding during design. 3) It postulates a hierarchy of design problems which 
is dubious, and 4) It proposes a scientific framework for design that very often will be 
impractical and outdated. 
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6 - Ideal models as repertoire for theoretical 
triangulation  
 
So far in the account, the assessment of theoretical traditions in design theory has 
been primarily analytic; the focus has been the characteristics of the models within the 
narrative traditions of design theory. This chapter aims to synthesise findings, by taking 
up how knowledge of these different traditions for idealising design practice can inform 
one’s own research.  
The general goal underlying this thesis has been to take stock of existing narrative 
traditions and investigate how these traditions influence the formation of theory and the 
development of professional knowledge in the design domain (chapter 1.3). The 
examination has showed that there exist deep-running differences between the 
narratives in design theory, and that these will have impact on the formation of theory 
and knowledge in the domain in many characteristic ways. The motivation was 
primarily the perceived need for clarification and systematisation of existing narrative 
traditions. 
This concluding chapter suggests a more positive strategy: How can broad 
knowledge of traditions be utilised as a repertoire, or a “toolbox”, for research and 
reflection in the design domain? The suggestion here is that a positive way of utilising 
the variety in design theory is to make use of its potential for theoretical triangulation of 
design activities.  
Theoretical triangulation is the use of more than one theoretical position in 
interpreting data. Its relevance to the design domain is that research on design 
characteristically is broad in scope; a large number of issues are potentially relevant to 
the profession. For reflection and inquiry into this domain, the ability to navigate 
different theoretical perspectives and methodological practices will be a benefit. As 
abstractions of design practice the narrative traditions indicate different “research 
programs” for design; different principled perspectives on how to frame inquiries in the 
design domain. The narrative traditions contain different principles for knowledge-
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transfer between design projects, and therefore the models provide different 
perspectives of what and how designers may learn from projects. 
This chapter sketches out and suggests how the models in this dissertation can be 
acquired and taken up as principled perspectives on design practice and the perspectives 
on knowledge-transfer these models carry. In the following, triangulation as a research 
practice in design research is taken up. Thereafter, the models are compared. From this 
comparison, the transfer-models implicit with the narrative traditions are explicated. 
The final section of this chapter suggests how these principled perspectives can inform 
one’s own research. It also provides a structured presentation of the authors underlying 
this thesis so that further reading and orientation in these narrative traditions is 
facilitated. 
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6.1 Theoretical triangulation and ideal models 
One value of broad knowledge of narrative traditions in design theory is that it will 
allow theoretical triangulation as an element in design research practices. Theoretical 
triangulation is the use of more than one theoretical position in interpreting data (Denzin 
2009), implying the ability to explain practice from several theoretical perspectives, 
allowing different potential explanations of the same “data”.  
Supporting the argument for theoretical triangulation in design research is the 
observation that the design domain reaches broadly by a contested professional 
jurisdiction, and that theoretical and empirical references in this domain are project-
based rather than theory-based (chapter 1.2).  
The characteristic differences between design research and the classical schema for 
academic research are central to consider in this respect. Apparently, these two fields do 
not differ much. They share the idea that knowledge expands within a particular field 
through the use of theory and methods; that this research is concerned with validation of 
theories in a defined theoretical domain; that researchers share a set of conventions as 
well as common historical exemplars. The scientific schema suggests that problems of 
understanding in the field lead to contradiction and dilemmas that provokes new 
inquiry, new theory, and the general growth of knowledge in the field.  
Design research differs from such a schema on important points. It can be 
characterised as both a practical and problem-based domain, and the academic schema 
fits poorly with the research activities which take place at design departments at 
universities and schools. A look at the department where this thesis is written, for 
instance, reveals that the topics forming the bulk of research are not defined by 
theoretical convergence. Research initiatives here have included topics as diverse as 
haptics, packaging, sustainability, interaction and usability, workshop organisation, 
“strategic” design management and others.  
The focus for design research here, as it is at many other design departments, is not 
primarily the theoretical understanding of design as a “field”. Research initiatives are 
not intended to further a theoretical tradition, but seek to answer concrete problems that 
are related to the design profession’s work. The nature of these problems reach broad 
and wide; they touch on most issues relevant to design, human behaviour, society, and 
economics. Research topics include questions of organisations, of knowledge, of 
aesthetics, of best practice, and of pragmatics of industry and society.  
A marked difference from academic research is that research initiatives are not 
pursued within the confines of a specific theoretical tradition, but opt instead to employ 
models and concepts drawing on a large range of traditions to pursue research problems. 
Design research cannot be characterised by its contribution to a theoretical “field”. It 
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addresses multiple issues related to the profession’s challenges, spreading across 
theoretical domains, and requires a theoretical breadth that is different from the 
specialisation normally associated with academic research. Correspondingly, it requires 
from design researchers, as well as anyone inquiring and reflecting over design practice, 
the ability to navigate between and consider different theoretical perspectives, i.e. 
narratives, on design practice and its associated problems.   
The difference between academic research and design research is not lost on the 
wider design community. For example, a common way to identify these differences at 
the department where this dissertation is written is to frame design research in 
Jørgensen’s depiction of problem-based versus discipline-based research. This depiction 
sees design research as a problem-driven field, contrasting this research to a general 
form of academic research. All research within ‘design science’ is a combination of 
addressing a certain basis of perceived problems, and working with a basis of existing 
theories. Jørgensen calls these the problem-based approach, and the theory based 
approach (figure 6.1). 
 
 
Figure 6.1 - Jørgensen’s model of design research. From (Øritsland 1999). 
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Jørgensen’s model illustrates a problematic tendency, however. The model 
overlooks the extent to which one’s own problem understanding is theory-laden. It 
seems unlikely that one’s own problem-diagnosis can be performed without any 
theoretical framing of the phenomenon. But from Jørgensen’s model, both problem-
diagnosis, and knowledge-transfer are expected to more or less “take care of 
themselves”. Such a depiction obscures that understanding “problems” requires 
preconceptions on the part of the designer researcher. The diagnosis of a problem 
requires theoretical and normative framing of the phenomenon perceived to presenting a 
problem. 
The risk is that one may miss out the impact that individual narratives have upon on 
our understanding of any problem. Without awareness of the way in which 
understanding is coloured by historical and traditional ways of framing practice, 
researchers are in danger of tacitly projecting their own preferences and assumptions. It 
may promote a tacit form of objectivism, where inherited and traditional ways of 
framing practice seldom are reflected over, and alternative ways of understanding 
practice seldom are explored.  
Triangulation; the ability to explain the same problem from different theoretical 
perspectives in a conscious manner, will be one way of overcoming such tendencies. By 
being able to frame and explain design practice through different lenses, it is feasible 
that one will have availability to a greater set of hypotheses, more methodological 
means to explore hypotheses, and thereby a broader view of design practice.  
As a caveat, one should be aware that triangulation probably will be difficult in 
practice, because it requires a multi-disciplinary mindset. It requires from researchers 
that one is able to pursue topics in a way that is informed of best research practices, yet 
without going into the specialisation that one expects from academic research. The 
challenges are obvious. An experienced researcher (in any field) will have spent years 
learning and internalising certain theoretical perspectives, which will shape perspectives 
and bias the way in which research problems are understood.  
Contributing to the ability for theoretical triangulation in the design field, the 
findings in this thesis have identified models of professional reasoning, because these 
are deemed central in understanding the traditions available in design theory. The 
models in this thesis thus indicate different “research programs” as they provide a cross-
sectional view of the abstractions that are common to base inquiries on. A value with 
this is that it may facilitate theoretical triangulation in at least four areas:  
Longitudinal studies: 
Design research is often motivated by the need to understand a fussy, problematic 
situation with design practice; for instance the effects of the design function in industry, 
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collaboration with other professions, the effects of certain methods and so on. For such 
problems, longitudinal studies of how design processes proceed over time are often 
initiated; researchers either follow a design process as it takes place in industry or 
follow elements of the design process, e.g. meetings, idea-generation, or brainstorming-
sessions. The purpose of such research is largely to better understand key success 
factors and hindrances to design work as they appear in practice.   
A potential problem is if researchers enter the studies with a bias. If they for instance 
enter the research project with the preconception that it is a research problem pertaining 
to social roles and professional identity, or conversely, that the research problem 
pertains to problems with the problem-solving behaviour. If so, then the risk is that 
researchers’ preconceptions in reality decide much of the outcome and the conclusions 
of the research.    
If, ideally, researchers could approach such processes with a pluralist mindset, and a 
repertoire of alternative, causational models, then researchers could test and examine 
different theoretical explanations, comparing e.g. how social models and problem-
solving models explained the same work and design processes, and gain a richer 
understanding of the ways in which design work proceeds.   
Such an approach would characteristically see the theoretical framing of design as 
secondary to defining and understanding the problem. If design researchers could enter 
longitudinal studies using a broad theoretical framing, it would have the consequences 
that the researcher is equipped with a richer repertoire for identifying and examining 
professional problems.  
Pilot studies:  
In early phases of research, when the purpose is exploratory; to ring in the research 
problem and decide early hypotheses, postulate relationships and identify the central 
elements to be examined, a broad theoretical understanding serves a purpose by 
retaining a wide framing until one decide the proper framing of subsequent studies.   
The ability to associate a problem with several theoretical frameworks, and check 
several ways of theorising the design activity will have a value by eliminating the 
frameworks that have little ability to explain the factors (i.e. parameters), and the 
causational relationships.  
A broad understanding in the early phases of research will allow associating the 
research problem with a relevant theoretical framework before elaborating the research 
design, deciding on relevant theory and formulating more precise theoretical 
hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis-testing: 
When design researchers are to analyse a data-set, i.e. they are confronted with 
examining a given problem, without carrying out empirical research, broad design 
research knowledge is valuable. Design researchers often deal with limited problem-
complexes which require reflection and critical assessment; e.g. evaluations of best 
practices within a particular industry, different assessments of design work, attempts at 
integrating working processes with new technologies and many others. These kinds of 
problems are often presented to researchers, akin to consultancy work, dealing with 
problems in industry, available statistics, and other kinds of ad-hoc research.  
For such tasks, ability to judge problems from multiple perspectives, quickly, will be 
of value. This allows designers to make different hypotheses and explain different 
aspects of designing, drawing on different theoretical traditions. 
Methods: 
A large part of design research aims at equipping designers with methods for solving 
problems of particular kinds; e.g. methods for sustainability, or methods for branding of 
products, methods of creativity and several others.  
Such methods are always based on an implicit assumption on how designers work. 
The historical example here is the design methods movement, which produced design 
methods based on the assumption that designers work in a form of rational, decision-
making, i.e. problem-solving. 
It is, however, entirely feasible to frame such methods based on other perspectives. 
Methods based on the assumption of reflective practice, for instance, could have 
stressed the iterative and physical aspects of design work, allowing space for the 
iterative nature of design work, and the process of reflection and reframing in the course 
of the process. Methods based on a social perspective could stress the value of existing 
methods and social practices, allowing considerations of a community’s history and 
typical kinds of problems that are resolved. These are alternatives to regarding the 
design process as a form of clinical reasoning from requirements to solution.  
In general, the triangulation proposed here, allows researchers to run hypotheses, 
and postulate relationships before committing the research to theoretical tradition. 
Admittedly, the results with this thesis are still at an early stage. More work is needed 
before an operative model of these narrative traditions can be presented.  
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6.2 Transfer in design; a comparison of models 
To lay the foundation for how these models can serve different research initiatives, a 
condensed and summarised look at these models and what they say about knowledge s 
is here provided. The ideal models examined throughout this thesis have postulated 
different ways of understanding design practice. The characteristic differences between 
them extend to the way in which they define and generalise design, the conventions and 
methods underlying theoretical development, and the more general paradigmatic 
outlook. 
Among these differences, particular attention is here devoted to the perspectives on 
knowledge transfer inherent with these models. Transfer is here understood as the way 
in which a narrative tradition regards professional knowledge in the design domain to 
develop; i.e. the central elements in design transfer, and the conventions by which this 
theoretical domain can develop.  The narrative traditions have postulated different 
perspectives on what one should learn from design practice, effectively defining the 
core contents of any design theory, as well as how this project can be carried out in a 
credible, authoritative and valid way.  
The following section presents the perspectives on transfer in design in the form of 
models as a rhetorical device for grasping the narrative traditions in design theory and 
the perspectives they provide on research and reflection in the design domain. The 
transfer-model is the implicit position that follows from the characteristics of the 
models of professional reasoning. Given that these identify the characteristics of 
designer’s processes of professional reflection, the transfer-model is the derived 
position on how knowledge in design develops from project to project, or context to 
context.  
6.2.1 A Comparative view of ideal models 
If the models of professional reasoning and their associated programs are considered 
as frameworks for understanding design practice, their differences are more 
fundamental than mere “difference of perspective”. The models rest with different 
research paradigms entirely and thereby provide characteristically different perspectives 
on design. Table 6.1 displays the characteristic differences in schematic form. It 
presents an overview of the central stances with these models. The table shows the 
diversity of theoretical stances with the traditions that have been put to use in design 
theory.  
A first topic is how they generalise a design field in different ways. This 
characteristic way in which similarity across the design field is understood, will to a 
large extent identify which elements that are important in design practice, and how one 
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can learn and transfer knowledge across individual design projects. The problem-
solving tradition for instance, sees ‘design’ as including “all man-made making”, 
leading to the view that design projects have a structure, and that one can identify 
decision-sequences, heuristics, which fit with different kinds of problem structures. This 
generalisation can be contrasted with the social tradition, which sees design as a practice 
that is defined by different social contexts to which the characteristics are the typical 
problems that the social community encounters. The social tradition thus, implicitly sees 
design problems as something solved more or less automatically, as the professional 
community develops a technological frame internalising design problems.  
On a second point, the ideal models presented here have originally been established 
to serve inquiries with different purposes. The overall aim and purpose for research 
associated with these programs are therefore different. The problem-solving model grew 
out of a research program originally interested in cognition; how one could understand 
and formally model cognitive processes (so that they eventually could be programmed 
in a computer). The hermeneutic tradition on the other hand, was motivated by an 
explicit practical focus: How designers grew stocks of “prestructures” that served to 
structure design problems; clearly a more didactical and practically aimed research 
program.  
A third point is that narrative traditions in design theory also contain different 
positions on what kind of empirical material that should be regarded as permissible 
data-sources for research and theorising. Since some traditions hold design research as a 
scientific project, a “laboratory approach” is favoured; design is subjected to 
controllable protocol studies, where insights and findings in turn can be extrapolated 
across the design field. Other traditions are based on the view that professional 
knowledge is personal, potentially tacit, and correspondingly, that we can only have 
indirect access to this kind of knowledge, such as conducted in monographs, interviews 
and experience-based cases, calling for an interpretative research form.  
A fourth point is that the models hold different perspectives on what is being 
transferred between design projects, and how we can deem this knowledge credible and 
valid. For instance, the reflective model of design holds a constructivist perspective, 
arguing that knowledge arises in practice, and argues the need for self-reflection over 
professional frames and common methods. The problem-solving contains a more 
traditional positivist view of knowledge where; since we do not have access to “the 
mind”; knowledge is seen as growing through controlled experiments on designers’ 
“behaviour”, leading to heuristics for design practice. 
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A fifth point is that these traditions hold different stances on the relationship 
between research and practice. Some traditions see professional knowledge as 
something that can be grounded in science; i.e. that design practice is a form of applied 
science. Other traditions are vocally arguing that professional knowledge is something 
that arises in practice, and that research activities have more of a supporting than a 
grounding role in the development of such knowledge. 
In sum, the differences mentioned can be ascribed to a different wider paradigmatic 
worldview that authors have written from. Simon was explicitly behavioural and 
positivist scientific in his worldview. Schön’s perspective is influenced by constructivist 
and pragmatist ideas. The doctrinaire positions include all and any position. The 
hermeneutic model is mainly based on to Popper’s theories on knowledge. The social 
models refer to social constructivism. And finally, the participatory model is based both 
on the Critical Theory of the 70’s, with Rittel and Webbers writings, whereas the 
management-tradition for user-orientation appears to have been more central at later 
stages.  
6.2.2 Transfer-models with narratives  
Among the differences between narratives, the principled perspective of transfer is 
central for understanding how knowledge in the design domain develops, and the 
underlying rationale for research and inquiry in the domain. The transfer-model is 
strongly affiliated with how authors have chosen to generalise the field of design; some 
authors see the similarity between projects as design being a professional role, others as 
a cognitive challenging issue, and so on. This “principle of generalisation” as it is stated 
here is important both for rhetorical reasons; it is a simple way of grasping the 
differences between narrative traditions; and as a source for understanding how transfer 
in the design field is expected to take place. Because it differentiates the important form 
the unimportant, it singles out important elements in knowledge-transfer across the 
design field. 
In the following, these perspectives are presented as transfer-models. The models 
largely seek to explain what is being extracted from design projects, how one is 
assumed to epistemically reflect over and test the items being transferred, and the valid 
reapplication of insights in new projects. A template for the analysis is given in figure 
6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 - Template for examining perspectives on transfer. 
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The problem-solving model; transfer of heuristics 
The problem-solving model of design provides a “scientific” model of knowledge 
and learning in design. As a general principle, it asserts the similarity across design 
fields by a cognitive assumption; that design problems are all the situations where one 
seeks to achieve a desirable situation that is different from the existing one. The 
challenge inherent with design in practice is seen as a problem of cognition: Limitations 
in human reasoning will render it difficult to foresee both potential solutions and the 
consequences of these. 
Central for transfer is the view that design problems have a ‘structure’. By proposing 
heuristics and tools, and test their applicability with different problem structures, 
researchers may find improved ways of solving and approaching different problem 
structures. The general model of transfer is thus that through observation and 
experimentation on design behaviour in controlled environments; a laboratory, one may 
scientifically test different heuristics and tools that aid designers in overcoming the 
cognitive challenge that design tasks represent.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 - Transfer in design as the problem-solving model depicts it 
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The reflective model; critical inquiry into working practices 
The principle of generalisation with the reflective model is that design practice 
should be considered as professional work. In the context of design practice, knowledge 
develops through practical experience, and it includes interaction with materials, clients 
and stakeholders. Through practice, designers develop frames for understanding and 
treating problems, and familiarity with tools and materials by which problems are 
reflected over. These general items are, however, troubled by the fact that design 
problems always are unique, leading to the need to reflect over and maintain a reflective 
attitude to the perspective and methods that one commonly employs.  
Concrete design projects provide an opportunity to test and evaluate the usefulness 
and fit of these individual frames. Design projects are therefore important as 
opportunities to reflect over the extent and application of one’s own professional 
perspectives and methods. 
In the reflective model, transfer takes place more or less automatically; by 
experience, designers naturally develop and evolve their ways of framing problems and 
testing solutions. The argument is that designers need to be aware and reflect over the 
effectiveness of framing problems in different ways, for the reason among others, that 
one is conscious about one’s own perspectives and how they shape solutions. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 - Reflective transfer 
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The doctrinaire model; responsibility and jurisdiction 
The range of different publications that have been subsumed here under the label 
doctrinaire share one generalising principle: They locate a pertinent issue with the 
profession and prescribe a way in which this issue can be remedied.  
The design role can be seen as primarily a professional role and responsibility; 
certain domains, e.g. aesthetics, are seen as designers’ area of responsibility. Proper 
ethos, models, and strategies for solving problems in a way that is up to the standards of 
the profession are seen as necessary elements for solving these. 
Central for transfer are therefore authors themselves and their ability to diagnose 
pertinent and general issues with the profession. Judging from the assessed material, 
such diagnoses display varying degree of soundness, and the material assessed ranges 
from armchair-based polemics to robust scientifically tested, and philosophically 
grounded theories. The doctrinaire model thereby assigns a central position for authors 
(experienced practitioners and researchers), in the larger project of knowledge-transfer 
for the product design profession. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 - Doctrinaire transfer 
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The hermeneutic model; mental models and loose ideas 
In the hermeneutic model, design practice is seen as a general problem of variety 
reduction (Darke 1979); because there are potentially infinite solutions to every design 
problem, designers must constrain the number of solutions to be evaluated. While 
designing, designers therefore establish mental concepts, simple ideas and conceptions 
which guide idea generation and subsequent evaluation.  
The process of professional reasoning in design is seen as akin to Popper’s model of 
scientific discovery; the conjecture-analysis model (Bamford 2002). The term for the 
mental conceptions that constrain the solution-space and give rise to conjectures is 
primary generators; they serve as ways in to the design problem and they may both be 
loose ideas and groups of concepts.  
Transfer in design can by this account be seen as a process of developing “stocks of 
models” in designers’ mind. Prestructures of many kinds are learnt and acquired 
through experience, but this process can be catalysed by examining and documenting 
how designers think about and structure professional problems.  
In other words, the central source for developing and expanding professional design 
knowledge is the inner world of experienced or skilful designers, as lesser experienced 
designers can learn particular ways of thinking about and constraining design problems. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 - Hermeneutic transfer 
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The social model; the community as source of knowledge 
The social model of design holds the view that designers should be regarded, 
primarily as members of a professional community. The typical practical problems in 
design work define also the knowledge and intellectual structure in the design field.  
As members of a profession, designers are exposed to typical recurring problems. 
For these recurring problems, solution strategies evolve, and these may range from 
simple rules of thumbs to robust scientific theories and models. Such knowledge-items 
constitute a ‘technological frame’, and is retained and maintained through the 
community of practitioners that share the same type of professional problems.  
Transfer in design is therefore much a matter of participation in the professional 
community. It is through interaction with other practitioners one learn ways of framing 
problems and common models to employ in the design process. An important aspect 
here is the importance of understanding typical professional problems; the ‘typical’ 
professional problems are problems that a group of people share, i.e. they are 
characteristic for a “social field”. Typical problems can be defined by geography, 
industry, or other social demarcations. It is therefore a perspective that is different from 
the general design theories, which seek to define ‘design’ on a global scale. Under the 
social model, designers from different social contexts will have very little to learn from 
each other.  
 
 
Figure 6.7 - A social model of transfer in design 
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The participatory model; transfer of techniques for user-involvement 
The participatory model of design sees the design process as primarily a task of 
overcoming the gap between makers and users. When engaged in designing, designers 
will invariably project both their own preferences and their own understanding of the 
design problem to be solved. Including users in the process is a way of overcoming 
one’s preconceptions and make sure that the product serves a role for those it’s intended 
for.  
Framed in this manner design is centrally about inclusion, facilitation, and 
cooperation. The designer’s task is primarily to reconcile conflicts that arise from 
several different stakeholders and social groups holding an interest in the product.  
Transfer of knowledge in the design domain, as it is understood here, is not the 
growth of personal knowledge, but the improved ability to facilitate and include 
conflicting perspectives in the design process. The participatory model thus implies a 
methodological focus where the outcome often are particular techniques intended to 
involve users at an early stage; games, metaphorical interviews, scenario-building and 
so on. The argument has been raised that participatory design research represents a 
fusion between academic research and design practice: As designers take on the 
information-sensitive tasks of involving people, reconciling interests, and challenging 
own concepts, the need for improved abilities in elementary scientific methodology is 
argued to become more central, and in many ways represents a break with the classical 
conception of the designer as a making artist. 
 
Figure 6.8 - Transfer according to the participatory view. 
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6.3 Practical implications: Narrative traditions as frames for 
theoretical triangulation 
Responding to the question of how these abstractions will impact theory and inquiry, 
the account here must resort to arguments of a more speculative calibre. Providing 
advice to how one should utilise the theoretical traditions of design theory, requires that 
one presumes the nature and characteristic of this practice. It may be worthwhile, 
therefore, to recall that there are three arguments underlying the view that theoretical 
triangulation will be beneficial in design research. 
Firstly, the product design field has a ‘project structure’. It is defined by the practice 
and the projects that designers do, and therefore encompasses an array of issues ranging 
from creativity, social collaboration and management to individual knowledge domains 
subject to the role and professional jurisdiction, such as aesthetics, consumer theory, 
ecology, and technology to mention a few. Compared with this, a shortcoming of 
generally accepted research methods is that they always have a limited scope; the 
inherent premises and assumptions will constrain the organisation and execution of 
inquiries. 
Secondly, if design research aims for a research practice that is carried out in an 
informed manner, knowledge of existing traditions will be necessary in order to make 
use of previous findings. Understanding the historical concerns in design theory will 
enable design researchers to navigate the field with more certainty.  
Thirdly, design theory is troubled by conflicts over “correct” ways of modelling 
design. There exist contending schools of thought and the discourse can be excluding in 
nature. If one is enabled to treat different narrative traditions as tools in a toolbox rather 
than as correct or erroneous research approaches, the quality, not to mention soundness, 
of one’s research is likely to improve.  
The next section summarises the models that have been unearthed in this thesis, and 
tentatively displays how these models provide different research programs, or 
paradigmatic perspectives on how reflection and research can and should be carried out. 
It does so within a framework that takes up, the general research program associated 
with each narrative, and the general aims for design research. It moves on to state 
“typical” research foci, hypotheses and questions, and identify the permissible empirical 
sources for research within each narrative. For purposes of further reading and 
orientation in the traditions of design theory, exemplars and important works within the 
individual traditions are presented. These works are classified as: 1) Conceptual; the 
works that have defined and presented the rationale for a narrative tradition. 2) 
Secondary; literature that contextualises the conceptual works or the narrative tradition. 
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3) Methodical; works that suggest how design research could or should be carried out. 
4) Exemplary; examples of research within individual traditions. 
 
The problem-solving model  
As a general program for research in the design field, the problem-solving tradition 
holds that professional design knowledge develops through formal analytic research on 
designers’ behaviour. By using research methods such as laboratory studies, researchers 
can provide heuristics; simple solution-strategies that designers can reuse for different 
problems and whose primary purpose is to overcome the limitations of human 
cognition. Additionally, one will find in Simon’s writings, more conceptual topics in a 
“science” of design; representation, evaluation, and structuring are examples of issues 
of which Simon suggests we should develop a better conceptual understanding.  
The aim for any design research is to facilitate reasoning in design and provide aids 
to overcoming cognitive obstacles. Design is generally seen as a process of goal-based 
reasoning where the designer reasons back and forth between requirements and 
proposed solutions, and this process is cognitively taxing. But through cognitive 
science, researchers can provide general heuristics and algorithms that help in 
overcoming the cognitive obstacles that design represents. 
Central in this account is the view that problems have a ‘structure’. It is possible to 
develop solution-heuristics, programs, which can be reused in instances where a similar 
problem structure is encountered. 
The permissible empirical sources within this program are decided by the 
behaviourist heritage. Laboratory studies of design are regarded as the central source for 
insight as it provides a controllable environment. In a real or virtual (class-room) 
laboratory, researchers may observe and measure what designers do and analyse these 
findings in terms of their impact on design result. Topics measured typically include 
difference in behaviour between expert and novice designers, or the effects of various 
tools on design performance. As a general observation, the impact of the problem-
solving tradition can be witnessed in the widespread tradition for basing design research 
on laboratory studies.  
As a program for design research, the cognitive tradition invites hypotheses and 
inquiries on matters of design which are cognitive in nature, for instance: How 
designers solve recurrent challenges, how designers choose between alternatives, 
assessment of different ways of organising the design process, and the use of tools and 
aids to overcome common cognitive impediments. 
Table 6.2 below identifies central authors within this tradition. Among the 
exemplars with this tradition, the instances of this program in design theory should 
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probably be differentiated in a “strong” and a “weak” tradition. The “strong” tradition 
has retained the cognitive and symbolic intention from Simon’s program. It includes 
research on cognition in design. (Dorst et al. 1996), representation (Brereton 2004), and 
formal models of the design process (Gero 1990). The “weak” tradition retains 
primarily an applied focus in design, but uses terms and central stances from the 
problem-solving model (Jones 1992; Pahl et al. 1996; Roozenburg and Eekels 1995).  
For applied purposes, one should note that counter-arguments to and criticisms of 
this program are a recurrent theme in design theory. Among these are that one could 
expect that the problem-solving program was explicit on how insights arrived at in the 
laboratory can be validly transferred to a real-life design project. In psychology, this is 
known as ecological validity, implying the assumption, on how the laboratory 
experiment is similar to a real world setting. But the cognitive assumption of the 
problem-solving model glosses over the difference in contexts, and provides few 
terminological or conceptual cues to the question of how insights are transferred across 
different ‘task environments (Chapter 5). Apart from this, researchers should note that 
the problem-solving model by definition suppresses reflection on how designers 
interpret, and how they subjectively understand the design process. 
 
Conceptual Secondary literature Methodical Exemplary 
 
(Newell and Simon 
1972) (Rowe 1987) (Dorst et al. 1996) (Pahl et al. 1996) 
(Simon 1973, 1996) (Crowther-Heyck 2005) (Akin 1986) (Jones 1992) 
(Newell et al. 1958) (Chua Soo Meng 2009) (Carroll 2006) 
(Roozenburg and 
Eekels 1995) 
(Asimow 1962) (Bousbaci 2008)  (Gero 1990) 
 (Dorst 2006)  (Youmans 2011) 
 (Gedenryd 1998)  (Brereton 2004) 
 (Hey and Agogino 2007)   
 (Gardner 1986)   
 
Table 6.2 - Authors in the problem-solving tradition and relevant secondary literature 
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The reflective program 
As a program for design research, the reflective model sees design as a professional 
practice. Characteristic to any professional practice is that it gives rise to particular ways 
of thinking and reflecting over professional problems as well as training with the tools 
and materials (sketches, models) that are integral parts of practice. Professional 
knowledge is seen as emerging from solving everyday professional problems. 
Consequentially, the reflective model rests with a more or less automatic transfer-
principle, in that learning from experience is the primary source for developing 
professional capability.  
From this view, the central aim for design research is seen as facilitating reflection 
and awareness over common practices; ways of framing problems, and materials and 
tools used. The departure point for any systematic inquiry in design practice will be the 
existing frames and tools which are the currency of professional practice (and not, e.g. a 
postulated entity such as problem-spaces). The role for research is primarily to reflect 
over and test existing knowledge. Rather than regarding research as the production of 
knowledge, the purpose of research is rather seen as to question whether the knowledge 
practitioners hold is sound, and how this knowledge can be put under scrutiny and 
improved.  
Throughout his writings, Schön suggested several reflective research approaches, 
which all held in common that they were interpretative ways of reflecting over the 
theories and knowledge designers held: Frame reflection (Schön 1993) promotes 
awareness over one’s own perspective; espoused theories versus theories in use (Argyris 
and Schön 1978) focuses on the fact that the theory one claim to hold very often differs 
from the theory that is actually followed in practice; and a tentative categorisation and 
definition of designers’ knowledge can be found with Rules, Types and Worlds (Schön 
1988). 
A concrete research strategy can be found in The Reflective Practitioner. Here 
Schön suggests that such research can take one in four forms (Schön 1983, p 309):  
• Frame analysis: the study of the ways in which designers frame problems and 
roles. 
• Repertoire-building research: Description and analyses of images, category 
schemes, cases, precedents and exemplars.  
• Research on fundamental methods of inquiry: Overarching theories, from which 
designers develop on-the-spot variations.  
• Research on the process of reflection-in-action itself.  
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As a template for research in design, the reflective model suggests that one may 
raise hypothesis and carry out inquiries on the ways in which designers frame problems, 
and the interactions they have with tools and materials.  
As empirical sources for design research, the reflective model suggests self-
reflection and learning from experienced practitioners is the mode by which knowledge 
in professions may expand, but primarily in a complementary role. Since “knowledge” 
is understood to be created in practice, conscious methods can provide reflection over 
everyday practices; ways of dealing with common problems, and typical approaches. 
Such reflection can potentially lead to better ways of framing and depicting professional 
problems. The view on empirical source for research is thereby nearly opposite from the 
problem-solving model; practice cannot be separated from the context in which 
practitioners work; understanding the characteristics of this context is therefore a 
premise for any reflection over practice. 
The examples here, in table 6.3 include Schön’s texts primarily. Additionally, there 
are several examples from design theory where the reflective model is used as 
abstraction for reflecting over how designers use sketches and models in their work.  
 
Conceptual Secondary 
literature 
Methodical Exemplary 
(Schön 1992, 1995) Waks (2001) (Schön 1988, 1993) (Dearden 2006) 
 (Chua Soo Meng 
2009) 
(Schön and Wiggins 
1992) 
(Adams et al. 
2003) 
 (Goldschmidt 2008)   
 (Goldschmidt 2003)   
 (Cross 2007)   
 
Table 6.3 - Literature in the reflective tradition 
 
The doctrinaire program 
Framing research in the doctrinaire tradition will imply that the development of 
professional knowledge critically relies on authors’ ability to infer a relevant diagnosis 
of the profession, its responsibilities and role in society. Doctrinaire models thereby rest 
with authors’ appreciations and horizons, and will in this way contain a strong 
normative component regarding how designers should work, particularly the issues they 
should attend to.  
The central element in doctrinaire models is a belief, and a concern, that the 
responsibility of design practitioners extend to a certain domain. This implies a 
normative stance on the profession’s role in society and, consequentially, that acquiring 
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and learning certain domains may improve practitioners’ ability to fulfil this role. Under 
the doctrinaire model, authors contribute within a specific domain of knowledge and 
argue its relevance and importance for the profession. Since this “tradition”, as 
mentioned, reaches wide, examples are probably the best way of illustrating how this 
tradition relies on diagnosis of the larger profession and its role in society: 
• Product Semiotics is one central example of an influential tradition in design. Its 
doctrinaire position is expressed through the implicit stance that products can 
and should be regarded as objects of communication. The assumption is 
associated with formal analyses on product grammar, of products as signs, and 
other semiotic approaches.  
• Sustainability is another example. Here, the argument is that products in general 
must conform to principles of environmental soundness, sustainability and that 
designers have an important role to fulfil in this respect. The tradition provides 
models and methods enabling designers to attend to such issues while designing. 
• Innovation theory is a third example; the perspective that designers have a 
central role for ensuring novelty and creativity in products and the way in which 
products are produced.  
 
The point to be made is that the relevance of any knowledge domain to practice is 
not self-evident. Hypothetically, counter-arguments could be raised depending on one’s 
perspective of the profession and its responsibilities. Against the semiotic tradition for, 
instance, an argument could be the view that form is secondary to function, if the 
designer were to be more technically inclined. Against sustainability one could argue 
that ecological concerns are unimportant in a free market economy, if the designer were 
so inclined. Against innovation theory, the argument could be raised that innovation is 
something that management holds responsibility for, whereas designers’ responsibility 
resides lower in the corporate food-chain.  
As a general template for design research, a tendency of the doctrinaire programs is 
to suggest that authors and researchers should and must take a stance towards 
practitioners’ role and responsibilities in the larger society. They must consider how the 
profession carries out its tasks, whether there are flawed practices with these, and if so, 
how these can be remedied. Knowledge in the design field evolves by researchers 
(authors) taking care for and normatively decide upon areas of responsibility. Judging 
from the history of the field, experienced practitioners and others have an important role 
to play, by virtue of their oversight, experience, and acquaintance with the larger 
workings of the profession. 
The kind of hypothesising and inquiring this tradition opens for is virtually endless. 
So are the methodical conventions and empirical sources for this tradition. The element 
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to consider at this level of analysis, is that for practically oriented design theory, the 
diagnoses that can be found underlying inquiries and publications, ranges from off-hand 
assumptions to well-argued observations of the practice and its responsibilities. The 
doctrinaire perspective displays a spectrum of methodological perspectives; from 
rigorous empirical scientific studies, via experience-based reflective accounts, to 
polemical doctrines written with affective appeal.  
Presented on this level of detail, one will be hard pressed to state any caveats with 
this approach. Criticism is mostly relevant on a case-by-case basis. Of the few general 
critical observation is Rowe’s (1987): Doctrinaire models may pose a problem in that 
they, ideally, may present the designer with an overwhelming amount of different 
theoretical frameworks to take into account. In the case where these frameworks are 
contrary, the designer may experience cognitive overload; for example, with a 
caricature, when the judgements emerging from aesthetic considerations of the product 
concept are contrary to those that emerge from ecological considerations.  
The examples presented here provide examples of doctrinaire models of many kinds; 
from the classical perspective of Vitruvius, to more modern applied perspectives. Table 
6.4 shows examples of works which have held this implicit view of knowledge-transfer 
in design. 
 
Conceptual Secondary Methodical Exemplary 
(Vitruvius 
1914) 
(Rowe 
1987) 
 Sustainability: (Papanek 1971)  
   Sustainability: McAloone & Bey (2009) 
   Semantics: (Vihma 1990, 1995) 
   Semantics: (Monö 1997) 
   Semantics: (Krippendorff 2006) 
   System design: (Sakao and Lindahl 2009) 
   Manufacturing: (Boothroyd et al. 2002) 
   Design for emotion: 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 - Examples of works with a doctrinaire view on transfer 
 
The hermeneutic program 
The program for the growth of knowledge in the design field that Darke postulates is 
one of “subjectivity”; the way designers prestructure problems, through primary 
generators, are determinants for which solutions to design problems that are found. The 
central aim for research activities can be seen as documenting and publishing mental 
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structures that experienced designers hold. Darke exemplifies this by postulating the 
central problem of novice students as having a limited “stock” of models to draw from 
when solving problems, and correspondingly, the growth of this “stock” is a way in 
which designerly knowledge expands.  
In other words, the central source for developing and expanding professional design 
knowledge is the “inner world” of experienced or skilful designers, and in this way 
lesser experienced designers can learn particular ways of thinking about and 
constraining design problems.  
This program calls for an indirect kind of research, where interviews and 
monographs are the way in which the ways of thinking can be documented and 
presented to the larger community. One should note that this is a traditional way of 
learning in design fields; analysis of especially skilful designers in the form of e.g. 
monographs have been made since well before the works of Darke and Hiller et al.  
The kind of hypotheses and inquiries it opens for are mainly examinations of how 
skilful designers think about their problems, and reflections over whether such ways of 
structuring design problems have a general and wider value across the profession. 
Alternatively, the model could be seen as an entrée to reflect over how problems are 
structured in a given project. One could, for example, follow Darke’s tenet, that 
designer use vague ideas to prestructure design tasks, and ask what impact such 
structures have had in a given project.  
Methodically, pursuing a program of subjectivity will encounter challenges in that 
subjective perspectives are hard to assess. One of Schön’s central arguments, for 
instance, is that the espoused theory very often differs from the theory-in-use, 
potentially qualifying the hermeneutic approach to design research.  
The empirical sources for the development of design knowledge are therefore, under 
this model, mainly interviews, and reflective, experience-based accounts on how one 
thought about the design problem at a given time. The implicit stance is that interviews 
and experience-base accounts are the central sources for development of professional 
design knowledge.  
Table 6.5 shows that apart from Darke’s account, examples can be found with 
Lawson (1994) and Cross & Cross (1996). A related way of seeing design processes; 
namely that these mental prestructures should be actively formed and manipulated in 
order to achieve a directed end-product, can be found with Lerdahl (2001) and Snoek & 
Hekkert (1999).  
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Conceptual Secondary Methodical Exemplary 
(Hillier et al. 1972) (Bamford 2002)  (Lawson 1994) 
(Darke 1979)   (Cross and Cross 
1996) 
(Coyne and Snodgrass 
1992) 
  (Lerdahl 2001) 
   (Snoek and 
Hekkert 1999) 
 
Table 6.5 - Literature in the hermeneutic tradition 
 
The social program 
If professional design knowledge is regarded as a social entity, the primary source 
for reflection and research is, like in the reflective model, the existing practices in a 
community. Design research should aim for disclosing the ways in which design 
problems are made sense of and structured, and how models and templates are used to 
solve typical problems. This perspective opens for several types of studies. 
For design research, the social model suggests a focus on the social community in 
which designers work; common working practices as well as models and working 
theories that are particular to a given community. The model opens for consideration of 
the social differences existing between designers of different industry, geography or 
other social context. Bucciarelli for example, used an ethnographic approach, 
participatory observation, to inquire the “culture of designing” across different projects 
and industries; excavating the social practices during design and development 
(Bucciarelli 2003). Vincenti used document studies to unearth the development and 
institutionalisation of professional knowledge codes in the aviation industry. He 
followed the development of industry standards from qualitative rules-of-thumbs to the 
more formal, and nominally scientific, current standards (Vincenti 1990).  
The methods and principles for epistemology that the social model favours, reach as 
wide as the social sciences. But central for this model is probably that one understands 
the concept of “social fields”; i.e that knowledge resides with a group:  
In this way design is a social process, i.e. if we ask ‘What is the design?’ at 
any time in that process my response would be, following Durkheim, that it 
exists only in a collective sense. Its state is not in the possession of any one 
individual to describe or completely define, although participants have their 
own individual views, their own images and thoughts, their own sketches, lists, 
diagrams, analyses, precedents, pieces of hardware, and now spread-sheets 
which they construe as the design. (Bucciarelli 1988, p. 161). 
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Additionally, if one follows the conceptual view that professional knowledge 
emerges from common typical problems, the model does suggest a certain level of 
reflection and awareness over what items or entities that are recurrent in the tasks that 
designers encounter in work. According to Vincenti, when designers recurrently 
encounter problems of the same kind, there will be a drive toward decreased 
uncertainty, i.e. a need to choose between alternatives with greater degree of certainty. 
This drive will be central for the development of knowledge. What items that are 
recurrent, will however, always be depending on the industry or group in question.  
Since the social model can be equated with a social science perspective on design, 
the permissible empirical sources for research are as wide as with these sciences. With 
the examples here, in table 6.6, they range from the participatory observations of 
Bucciarelli to the document studies of Vincenti.  
Conceptual Secondary Methodical Exemplary 
(Vincenti 1990) (Bijker et al. 1987) (Bucciarelli 1988) (Ingram et al. 2007) 
(Bucciarelli 2003) (Bijker 1995) (Button 2000)  
  (Cross and 
Clayburn Cross 
1995) 
 
 
Table 6.6 - A social model of design; literature within tradition 
The participatory program 
As a program for research and reflection, the participatory approach to design sees 
the main practical challenge of design work as overcoming own preconceptions in the 
course of work. The principled view is that there will be a gap between users’ and 
designers’ understanding of a product, and if this gap is not attended to, the product will 
develop in way that is ill-fitted with users’ wants and needs. 
The development of knowledge in design under such a view is primarily a matter of 
developing methodical approaches to include users in the design process. This inclusion 
can typically be performed on one of three levels: 
1. Co-creation: Users are invited in and participate in the conceptualisation and 
subsequent stages of the design process.  
2. Exploratory and participatory research: Designers make use of social science 
methods, e.g. probes or ethno-methodology, to observe situations of use and identify 
needs, problematic situations, or potentials for new, improved solutions. 
3. Post-hoc testing: The traditional user-oriented form, where a product concept or 
solution is tested for use in a laboratory or real-life context.  
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A characteristic with the participatory tradition is that designers’ own perspectives, 
in the form of artful, creative abilities are relegated to a secondary position. The 
organisation of the design process is at the fore.  
Methodically and empirically, the participatory tradition has a wide scope, including 
approaches that vary from simple ad-hoc techniques, to theoretically grounded 
approaches to design in an inclusive manner. One of the tendencies this model may 
promote, however, is a more research-intensive design practice. Challenging own 
conceptions, and treating data, information, and perspectives of others is a complex task 
that requires stringency of methods. Cross-cultural perspectives and the rejection of 
own hypotheses and preferences is a challenging task:  
For example, one of the major challenges in the planning and architectural 
practices today is the communication gap between the design team, the various 
levels of ‘user groups’ and the wide array of specialised consultants to the 
process. In the future, the new co-design languages that support and facilitate 
the many varieties of cross-cultural communication will become highly valued 
(Sanders and Stappers 2007, p. 16).  
 
The classical caveat with participatory approaches concern the level of education 
users can be expected to hold. When users are presented with conceptual solutions in 
various contexts, they cannot be expected to have the same level of imagination and 
ability to read models as designers involved. Correspondingly, participatory design 
attempts can be criticised on this ground; that an element of creation will be necessary 
to any design process, but that users will be ill-equipped to formulate exactly how 
solutions should be embodied.  
When orienting oneself in this tradition, it can probably be considered as a truism 
that interaction design is the leader in this field. Information-intensive product context, 
short development cycles, and few barriers to prototyping are probably contributing 
factors. References in table 6.7 include both authors from this tradition and explicitly 
product design focused authors. 
Conceptual Secondary 
literature 
Methodical Exemplary 
(Rittel and Webber 
1973) 
(Sanoff 2007) (Sanders and 
Stappers 2007) 
(Fulton and Marsh 
2000) 
(Cross 1972)   (Stappers and Sleeswijk 
Visser 2007) 
(Norman 2002)   (Binder et al. 2008) 
Table 6.7 - Literature in the participatory tradition 
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6.4 Concluding remarks 
This final assessment of the ideal models of professional reasoning has indicated 
central elements and an overview of the larger narratives these models are parts of. In 
doing so, emphasis has been given to the transfer-models implicit with the models, and 
how these narrative traditions may serve as research programs for inquiring design 
practice and the furthering of professional knowledge in the field. The aim has been to 
show that the many narratives may serve as a useful repertoire for triangulating design 
activities. They provide different perspectives on design and the elements that are 
important to consider. 
For triangulation in a given research situation, the models suggest different focus 
and consequentially that different elements in design processes have a value for transfer 
across the design field. The problem-solving model idealises design as a process 
inhabited by the designer and the requirements of the problem, suggesting that 
heuristics for solving different types of problems are the currency of any design theory. 
The reflective model considers tools and materials, stakeholders, and the designer’s 
different frames of understanding as central elements in a design process; suggesting 
that critical reflection over skills and habitual practices are the currency of a design 
theory. The hermeneutic model focuses on designers’ personal ways of structuring 
problems, suggesting that the loose ideas and notions that designers hold are central. 
The doctrinaire models hold that designers should adhere to specific knowledge or 
certain perspectives; suggesting that the furthering of these domains are the value of a 
design theory and that researchers have a central role in the production of this theory by 
normatively taking stances on the issues that are important and relevant to professional 
practice. The social models include the community designers belong to, and categorises 
design practices according to their typicality. This suggests that one should look to the 
community and within particular industries to identify and further particular elements of 
knowledge. It also serves as a qualifier, as it implicitly claims that design theory have 
little general value beyond particular industries or communities sharing the same kind 
of typical problems. The participatory model suggests that inclusion and interaction 
with users are the central challenge in design processes, thus suggesting techniques and 
methods, as well as an empathic mindset, as the currency of design theory.  
Concerning the reasons for this divergence, it is tempting to think of the differences 
as owing to the fact that authors have operated with very different understandings of 
design, while still referencing a common concept of ‘design’. Since ‘design’ subsumes 
quite a large set of activities (cf. chapter 2.2.1), it may appear that authors have operated 
with prototypical conceptions of design, and construed their results across a larger 
design field, whereas their empirical basis has been confined to what in retrospect 
appears as a very narrow focus: The problem-solving model, for instance, is based on 
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cognitive research into confined problem-solving tasks, where the end-goal is clearly 
defined. The ensuing model fits well with design tasks that display such characteristics, 
e.g. types of technical engineering activities. The reflective and the hermeneutic models 
on the other hand, have an empirical basis with the early stage conceptual designing, 
where one still searches to understand the design task and the end-goals it poses. I.e it 
emphasises the creative and artful elements of designing, and empirical materials are 
usually constrained to relatively simple kinds of design processes, e.g. early phase or 
crafts-based design. The social models implicitly constrain design to large projects 
where several professional groups are involved, and the participatory approach suggests 
an antithetical stance to romantic views of design, seeing design as a process of 
facilitating the creative abilities of users, constraining empirical material to the kinds of 
products where use poses a “problem”.  
But while the fact that these authors write from a dissimilar ‘design’ concept may be 
a source for confusion, one may also argue that the plurality they present is a benefit to 
the design research community. The models are committed to different theoretical 
traditions, which are potentially valuable in that they promote a large range of 
perspectives with which to reflect over design practice: Cognitive, pragmatic, romantic, 
particular, social, critical and empathic; these are an enormous scope in theoretical 
traditions. While the theoretical landscape is difficult to gain a comprehensive view 
over, the perspectives and inquiries they open up for are broad.  
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7 - Conclusions 
 
Concluding this excursion into design theory, what are the lessons learned? How 
does the thesis contribute to a greater understanding of design? Here it is argued that 
this can only be answered reflecting over the current status of design research and 
design theory.  
The thesis has taken up how ideal models in design theory lay trajectories for the 
growth of professional knowledge in the field of product design. It has done so by 
examining how authors within this tradition commonly idealise the element of 
professional reasoning. The thesis has furthermore examined conceptual structures with 
these models and examined how criticisms in existing discourse identify problems with 
the correspondence between models and practice.  
The findings should be of value in a practical and professional context. The thesis 
identifies narrative traditions with different principled perspectives on design practice; it 
identifies some of the central stances with these traditions; and thereby characteristic 
ways of describing and abstracting design work. For practical situations in industry, this 
is held to provide insight into a valuable repertoire of perspectives since design 
functions can be troubled by simplistic and contradictory understandings of how 
designers work and the problems and challenges this work gives rise to.  
For the same reasons, the thesis is believed to be of value in an educational context. 
Knowledge of different theoretical traditions gives rise to a broader repertoire for 
explaining and reflecting over design practice, as it induces reflection across several 
issues and knowledge domains.  
But primarily, the thesis addresses practices in the tradition termed ‘design 
research’. Within this tradition, there is uncertainty and lack of consensus concerning 
the fundamental assumptions and premises in the common project of developing 
knowledge for design professionals; concepts and generalisations, and accepted research 
methods are both debated and contested. Different research programs have been 
proposed, ranging from Frayling’s open perspective; that design research can be carried 
 Framing Product Design 
 
182 
out for, into, or through design (Frayling 1993), via the historical positivist program in 
design research (chapter 5), and even to the negative standpoint that design research 
should be rejected entirely, because design is about practical experience and that tacit, 
experience-based knowledge is the only currency within this profession.  
This programmatic uncertainty creates problems. Particularly, it creates problems for 
the general ability to perform informed research. Awareness of how research problems 
have been dealt with in the design domain, so that findings of predecessors can be 
included is hampered by the programmatic uncertainty. In the literature, premises will 
vary from author to author, rendering the relation and relevance of individual pieces of 
research unclear. The extent to which this programmatic uncertainty causes methodical 
and conceptual problems is seldom reflected over in design theory. On one hand, there 
is the widespread position that one should embrace the theoretical plurality in the field 
(Buchanan 2004), but on the other hand, what this theoretical plurality actually implies 
is still rather open.  
The question is how this plurality impacts the credibility of research and research 
findings. If researchers can draw from a range of different metaphors, use different 
empirical sources, and employ different research methods, while still subsuming all of 
these practices under a common ‘design’ label, then it appears that at least some 
theoretical work remains to be done in this field. The situation appears to demand 
reflection over fundamental positions in the common research project rather than the 
expansion and furthering of this project in new directions.  
This is the background against which this thesis has been written. It appeared 
necessary to unearth basic assumptions associated with the narratives in design theory 
with the aim of improved critical reflection, rather than breaking “new” ground in the 
form of, e.g. new and better models. 
The underlying motivation for this concern is the belief that design research is still 
both necessary and needed, as it is a central element in the furthering of professional 
knowledge. The ability to articulate the knowledge-structure of the profession, 
formulate sound research projects, and contribute to the growth of knowledge in this 
field, is of central importance to practitioners and industry. Today, design research 
needs critically aware self-reflection because in the current educational and industrial 
context, it is generally expected that professions are capable of associating their 
knowledge-structure with science and research. Developments such as the Bologna 
Process, for instance, have led to a practice where design education faculty increasingly 
is qualified on basis of academic merit, in addition to practical design experience. 
Financing of research underlying textbooks and design literature increasingly depend on 
governmental research bodies. Lastly, in the jurisdictional disputes that design 
practitioners have with neighbouring professions, the ability to model and theoretically 
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explain the knowledge underlying what designers do is a central element. All these 
trends point towards the need for a robust and intellectual structure, where designers can 
formulate and reflect over what the profession knows, and how this knowledge can be 
furthered.  
7.1 Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are improved knowledge of the theoretical heritage 
and traditions in design theory and the ways in which these traditions influence 
inquiries. Narrative traditions constrains the production of theory and the understanding 
in the design field, and through concrete investigations, the dissertation has provided a 
cross-sectional examination of these traditions and contributed to the ability for precise 
theoretical inquiry in the design domain.  
The thesis explains and analyses some of the characteristics of different traditions, 
and reveal some of the perspectives and potential examinations that different traditions 
open up for. Thus, the awareness and understanding of design theory as a repertoire of 
approaches and stances that in different ways provide schema for the growth of 
designerly knowledge is enhanced. 
The general problem opening this thesis was a concern for the theoretical principles 
underlying knowledge-transfer in the field of product design. Based on the theoretical 
perspective of the semantic view of theories, the general problem was constrained by 
posing the research questions:  
 
1. Which are the central idealised models of professional reasoning in the parts of 
design theory relevant to product design? 
and 
 
2. How, characteristically, will the ontology of these models constrain and influence 
theory production in product design?  
 
The thesis has addressed these questions firstly by reviewing the models of 
professional reasoning implicit with central traditions presented in chapter 3. The 
examination shows that, historically, design practice has been defined by a large range 
of variant conceptions in theory: Design as a goal-oriented process, Design as reflective 
practice, Design as hermeneutic search, Design as a social process, Design as a 
participatory process and doctrinaire models of design.  
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The second question has been answered by means of several investigations from 
different perspectives. The first, an exemplary investigation of the conceptual structures 
associated with three of the models, was presented in chapter 4. The examination 
showed how the different conceptual structures open for different ways of reflecting 
over the role of the designer’s understanding in the execution of a design project; how 
designers reflect over a problem, how solutions are generated, and how solutions are 
discriminated and judged.  
Another investigation was into the discourse surrounding the problem-solving 
model, which was presented in chapter 5. The examination shows that despite the 
central role and ubiquitous use of this model, one should keep in mind that its use 
comes with a string of qualifiers attached: 1) It contains a reductive depiction of the 
many contexts and environments designers work in; its generalisation for transfer is a 
cognitive one, and indifferent on the real world. 2) It defines out issues of interpretation 
and understanding during design. 3) It postulates a hierarchy of design problems which 
is dubious, and 4) It proposes a scientific framework for design that very often will be 
impractical and outdated. 
In the last chapter, these findings were synthesised. The implicit models of 
knowledge-transfer in design were interpreted and modelled, and the way in which 
these traditions could serve as programs for theoretical triangulation in design research 
were discussed. These results can be useful primarily for researchers who need a 
systematic and historical introduction to the repertoire of approaches that have been 
used in design theory.  
7.2 Further work  
All research is a work-in-progress, and this is no exception. The thesis has shown 
that there exist many different theoretical traditions in design theory, and that gaining a 
full oversight of the myriad ways in which these traditions lay trajectories for design 
research is a large task.  
To further the work in this thesis, three activities are suggested:  
1. To further elaborate the understanding of the models presented in the thesis  
2. To empirically examine the correspondence between the assumptions in these 
models and design practitioners’ perception of their practice, and  
3. To expand the framework with models omitted by the thesis. 
Concerning the first activity, working with the thesis has led to the conviction that 
both design theory in general and the product design profession would have much to 
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gain from an improved ability to navigate and triangulate the theoretical traditions 
existing. A natural next step in this respect would be to develop more easily accessible 
models, or frameworks, for research initiatives in the product design domain. These 
models can be based on the findings in this thesis, which presents conceptual structures, 
main concepts and their relation, and exemplars of inquiries. The benefit of such models 
is to facilitate design inquiry by lowering the threshold for theoretical triangulation and 
to allow for early what-if diagnoses, enabling researchers and practitioners to alternate 
between perspectives on design theory, comparing e.g. social models and cognitive 
models of practice. 
Developing such models would require further elaboration of the idealised models 
presented here. It would be necessary to take up the ontology of all the different models, 
and to pursue criticisms also for the other models in the way the exemplary approach in 
chapter five suggests, before the subsequent publication of these in an accessible format.  
Concerning the second point, another initiative is to further and critically examine 
the empirical basis for these models. I have in the thesis assumed that the different 
idealised models of design reasoning were sound and well-argued abstractions of design 
work. The inquiry showed, however, that many of these models rest with surprisingly 
simple assertions. 
This can be exemplified by the principles of generalisation on design that underlie 
these models; i.e. the implicit diagnosis of what the main challenges of design work are. 
The hermeneutic model sees the challenge of design as that of “constraining the infinite 
number of potential solutions”, whereas the problem-solving model sees the problem as 
primarily that of structuring and decomposing design problems. It is still an open 
question whether these assertions cover how designers perceive their work, or whether 
there are good reasons to hold that design should be framed in the context of these 
assertions.  
One should note, for instance, that many of these models make use of 
generalisations which exclude reflections over social differences in design work; social 
demarcations, such as the differences between types of designers (e.g. type of industry, 
size of projects, geographical location), are mostly absent. It seems improbable that a 
design theory can be expected to be valid across both geographical and industrial 
divides with little or no reflection on the differences between these groups.   
At the same time, different models of design often rely on an analogy with the 
scientist, seeing designers simply as creative scientists. This is the case both with the 
problem-solving model, which perceives the designer as a technical problem-solver, and 
the hermeneutic model which essentially appropriates Popper’s conjectural model of 
hypothesis-generation for design purposes. The common assumption that there is a 
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likeness between designers and scientists seems improbable, and is also an assumption 
that deserves closer scrutiny.  
A practical first step to empirically examine whether these models fit with 
practitioners’ perception of their own practice could be to examine the type of 
responsibility that designers in a particular context hold, thereby gaining empirical 
documentation of common working procedures, and potentially, situations with these 
procedures that designers find challenging.  
This could be a ground to compare theoretical models with actual working 
conditions and lead to a reflection over the similarity, and/or differences between 
theoretical models and professional practice. The focus of the empirical examination 
proposed here would be to inquire into the abstractions that generalise and explain 
practical doing, on the basis of their central role for learning and furthering of 
professional knowledge. Such a research project could, in time, lead to better and 
improved models of designers’ work and thereby improved ability to understand the 
challenges confronting the profession in live practice.  
Concerning the third point, a last issue that will need attention in a furthering of this 
work is to expand the map of models with models that have been omitted. This point is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
7.3 Discussion  
At the end of the thesis, it is necessary to address the degree to which the findings 
here can be trusted. Has this thesis succeeded in answering the research questions, and 
has it done so in a methodically credible way? My contention is that two issues are most 
pressingly in need of consideration: Are the models presented representative for design 
theory? And, has the thesis succeeded in showing how different narratives will 
influence the development of theories and knowledge in the field?  The first question 
addresses the representativity of findings, the second is a question on the influences 
these models have upon the production of theory in the design domain. 
 
Representativity 
The intention of the thesis, as stated in the research question, has been to locate the 
“main models” of professional reasoning in design theory relevant to product design 
practice. The question of representativity is therefore central: Has the thesis succeeded 
in displaying the most relevant and central models in design theory? 
Admittedly, there is a wealth of models existing and therefore the selection with the 
approach here may be deficient. One example of an historic model that has been 
overlooked is Broadbent’s framework where design reasoning is categorised into four 
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types; either pragmatic, canonic, iconic, or analogous forms of reasoning (Broadbent 
1973). Another model that could have been taken up is the common perspective that 
designers reason by a fluctuating change between abstract and concrete domains (Dorst 
and Cross 2001). 
In particular, criticism for not including the product semantic model in the thesis 
might be put forth; the semantic model is an element in the large narrative tradition that 
holds that products can be regarded primarily as means of communication and bearers 
of meaning. This program has developed a considerable theoretical body, historically 
associated with architectural and the writings of Charles Jencks, drawing on the 
semiotic tradition of Pierce and Saussure. In a product design, or design context, the 
central authors include Krippendorff (2006) and Vihma (1995). 
This may point to a problem of omission; that the method employed here has not 
succeeded in displaying central models. It may also indicate a problem with how these 
models have been categorised in the thesis. 
Addressing, firstly, the omission-problem, the criticism is obviously valid. There are 
good reasons to argue that the thesis should have been larger in scope if one were to 
credibly include what all potential readers may have understood by the “main models” 
of design theory.  
But this is also a question on the resources that may feasibly go into a PhD-project. 
It is necessary to frame the theoretical inquiry in one way or the other, and the 
assumption guiding this thesis was that the conflicts surrounding the positivist 
discussion in design appeared as a feasible starting point. The focus on the discourse 
and the conflicts in this had the benefit that one would examine models that had left a 
mark, or had an impact, on the larger design community.  
I must therefore make the concession, in retrospect, that this approach does not 
provide robust arguments why these models should be considered “main”. The reader 
should therefore be aware that several other models exist in design theory, and that the 
centrality of the models here is debatable. Some models are missed out with this 
approach, but that should not refute the value of the thesis, as the belief is that the 
efforts succeed in providing an overview from which one can start discussing and 
reflecting over the narrative traditions in design theory.  
Secondly, the categorisation of these models needs attention. The models as they are 
presented here are not “all inclusive, mutually exclusive”. There are overlaps and 
convergences between these models, and they do not indicate exclusive traditions, as the 
tradition in design theory is to mix models and perspectives quite freely. 
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But more importantly, the models are unevenly categorised if one considers the 
theoretical heritage associated with each one of them. Some of the models stand for 
large research traditions, whereas others have had lesser impact.  
The original challenge with this thesis was the need for a methodical perspective that 
could align the different theoretical traditions in a comparative way. At least since the 
critical tradition associated with Kuhn, we have known that such paradigmatic 
comparison must make concessions, because there does not exist a neutral high ground 
from which paradigmatically different theories can be compared. Therefore, a cross-
sectional approach was selected. The semantic view of theories was settled for, and the 
particular focus was the presumed models of professional reasoning. Particularly, the 
goal was to identify different assumptions in this regard; different programs for design 
research, and different frameworks for the production and documentation of knowledge 
in a design context.  
Like any categorisation, this choice has the effect that it suppresses some 
perspectives, and establishes undue focus on others. As the focus was the difference in 
models of professional reasoning, rather than e.g. quantitative analysis of impact, large 
traditions that could be assumed to have a fairly similar perspective on reasoning were 
lumped together.  
One of the effects of this is that the categorisation suppresses, e.g. the semantic 
perspective of design, simply by subsuming it as one of several “doctrinaire” positions. 
Several other large traditions in design theory have fallen victim to the same: 
sustainability, usability, a fairly large tradition on branding and marketing, or, for the 
more technically interested, design for manufacturing.  
It is therefore important to point out that the doctrinaire model indicates several 
large theoretical traditions that are important in their own regard. An alternative 
approach, which could have resolved this uneven categorisation, could have been to 
trace the various theoretical traditions on basis of their impact in the design community. 
This would have been another thesis entirely, however. The reader should be aware of 
the shortcomings with the approach selected here.  
Influence on theory 
A second question is whether this thesis has managed to show how these models 
influence theoretical inquiries as common assumptions on the process of designerly 
inference. I.e. is there a relationship between these models and how design theory 
proceeds and develops, and has the thesis succeeded in showing this relationship? 
In favour of answering yes, I would hold that the thesis has shown central 
characteristics with these models, and given a depiction of how these characteristics 
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influence theoretical developments. And it has been done in a manner that is both 
explorative and fairly new to the design community.  
In favour of answering no, however, one could argue that the lack of strict 
definitions with this thesis is problematic. Both the decision to retain an open 
understanding of ‘design’, and the lack of an essential definition of ‘ideal models’, 
could allow for unduly subjective understanding of the topics in this thesis. And thus 
raise the question whether this is an instance of a researcher enforcing own perspectives 
under the pretences of scientific authority.  
To answer that, I would argue that considerable time has been spent identifying the 
premises and research traditions associated with these models. The assumption has been 
that these are important sources of impact and influence on design theory. But the 
question of how assumptions “influence” a theoretical field is endlessly more complex 
than this assumption allow for. Maybe one could have used discourse analysis to 
examine how fundamental positions in the discourse changes over time. Maybe one 
could have asked how industrial developments and new technology influenced the 
discourse. These are also relevant and interesting questions when examining design 
theory. And they indicate the breadth with which this theoretical tradition can be 
understood and examined.   
The last arguments point to an inherent danger with nearly all kinds of theoretical 
research. They are necessarily interpretative, and they are written from the researcher’s 
own perspective. I have accounted for my understanding and problem diagnosis in 
chapter 2. Considering the lack of definition of what an ideal model really “is”, my 
response would be that it is a necessary concession to make when comparing different 
paradigmatic perspectives. 
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